Envisioning Post-Conflict Security For The Yazidis

The Yazidi minority in Iraq and Syria has it rough.  ISIL has spent the past year driving Yazidis from their homes and enslaving them.  The international community has work to do after it eventually defeats ISIS.  The Yazidis and other minorities will need repatriation to their homes and permanent security that they cannot achieve on their own.

The national government of Iraq has failed its R2P responsibilities towards the Yazidis, just as it failed the Iranian exiles within its borders.  Iraq's hastily reconstituted army is unable to make significant progress against ISIS without help from the US and other stable nations.  The weakness of Iraq's Shiite-led government and military in the face of ISIS will persist long after the US and its allies vanquish ISIS . . . and that victory may be a long time in coming.

The international community is doing what Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis are incapable of doing for Yazidis.  UNHCR has provided emergency shelter for Yazidi refugees since the Mount Sinjar siege in August 2014.  Estimating need starts with an estimate of population size.  Pew Research's Fact Tank discussed several Yazidi population estimates in August 2014.  Third Eye OSINT judges the straight extrapolation from the Iraqi 1965 census to be the most accurate number.  Consider that Saddam Hussein's Arabization repression of ethnic Kurds would have suppressed any excess fecundity that less literate groups possess.  Statistics have a logic all their own.  The least reliable numbers are the most recent self-reported stats the Yazidis fed to the US State Department.  Diplomats are normally not experienced statisticians.  Self-reported numbers that are far higher than what normal statistical progression should indicate are very likely artificially inflated.  Deliberately driving numbers higher feeds a political agenda for more aid spending.

The Yezidis are also spread among several Transcaucasus nations.  Georgia is increasingly under Russian dominance.  Armenia and Azerbaijan have not resolved their tension over disputed territory.  None of those states strongly favor the rights of ethnic minorities.  Yazidis in the Transcaucasus seeking a better life will not migrate to Iraq or Syria while ISIS threatens their kin.  Migration to Western Europe exposes them to wealth creation that they otherwise cannot access.  The international community should leverage Westernized Yazidi expatriates as a leadership cadre for a post-conflict Iraq and Syria.  These leaders will be trustworthy if they refrain from inflating their population numbers as a way to extort more Western aid.

The straightforward military solution to ISIS is obvious to serious strategists.  One division-sized ground combat formation, with at least one fighter wing of air support, could drive west from Sadr City all the way to ISIS's de facto capital in Raqqa, Syria.  One month of solid combat would disperse the tens of thousands of drug-crazed jihadi opportunists adhering to ISIS for romantic adventures in theological purity.  The West's political leaders are unwilling to sell this prospective victory to their electorates.  Lack of political will to win leaves Iraq and its neighbors with a festering sore in Mesopotamia.  Yezidis will remain homeless in the meantime.

The Haiku of OSINT for 09/10/14

Fight Islamic State
Air power will not suffice
Need to send ground troops

Announcing America's New Counter-ISIL Strategy

The CEO of Alfidi Capital paid close attention to tonight's national address articulating a new strategy against ISIL.  Third Eye OSINT stream-of-consciousness reaction to its major points was powered by pure genius.  Stand by for a recap.

Making the case for emerging threats in the MENA region means understanding their sociocultural context.  Radical Islam animates ISIL, pure and simple.  Claiming it is not an authentic Islamic force invites ridicule in the souks of Cairo and Riyadh.  

Citing barbaric tactics and genocide correctly places the threat in a category requiring international response.  This supports international conventions dating back decades and more recent responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine.  

Air strikes are easy against equipment we recognize, i.e. captured US materiel.  The US can quickly exhaust its high-value target list of easily identifiable vehicles.  The harder part is destroying ISIL's very mobile C2 network of bad actors.

I like the word "destroy."  The US must DESTROY any armed force that threatens violence against our homeland, national leadership, or citizens abroad.  The widely-shared photo of someone outside the White House displaying ISIL's flag on a smartphone proves how easily a threat can reach our own C2 nodes.  

The national leadership endorses strikes in Syria.  Terrorists deserve no safe havens.  Training and equipping proxy forces is not as easy as rhetoric makes it sound.  The moderate Syrian opposition is mostly cut off and surrounded in many areas where it was formerly active, according to open source reporting.

I'm pretty sure I could assess Iraqi armed forces' condition from my laptop, using open media.  US advisers knew the condition of the Iraqi partners they trained all throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Western journalists who have covered Iraq since the US troop withdrawal in 2011 knew about the endemic corruption and incompetence in the Iraqi military.  NPR's Fresh Air broadcast today discussed this in detail.  

Excuse me . . how and why are we enlisting Arab nations' help?  Many Gulf sheikhs privately funded Syrian radicals who joined ISIL.  Wealthy Kuwaitis and Qataris were willfully blind to the misuse of donated funds intended for humanitarian projects in Syria.  There's nothing secret there and it's all in open source media.  

Ruling out US ground forces lengthens the time needed for a counteroffensive.  Unready Iraqi forces cannot carry the load until they can reconstitute in safe havens far from ISIL-controlled areas.  This means extensive retraining under American supervision in either Kurdistan or the Shiite south of Iraq.  

Referencing America's economic and scientific strength is obviously intended for a foreign audience, especially the Ebola comment.  Foreign intelligence services will review the inventory of America's aid programs mentioned and ask their American ambassadors how they will benefit by joining this coalition of the willing.  

Ending with "vanquished from the earth" is a good call that articulates a desired end state. The US is in "it to win it" but only with air power for the time being.  Air campaigns against highly mobile urban insurgencies are not effective without ground forces conducting COIN in liberated territory.  US planners will eventually realize the need to introduce competent ground forces.  Active-duty US military members should not make vacation plans for 2015.  

The American response to ISIL's emergent threat was delayed by a politically-driven unwillingness to acknowledge its potency.  Echoes of that unwillingness remained audible in tonight's address.  The National Security Council's mission is to synchronize threat warnings with a whole-of-government response to threats.  Political operatives who supplant foreign policy professionals among NSC staffers are incapable of providing thereat warnings or staffing strong responses.  The tragedy of America's new counter-ISIL policy is that it came long after the threat was obvious.  It is still incomplete without a US ground force option.  

This concludes today's commentary.  Have a nice evening.  

The Haiku of OSINT for 06/22/14

Militants advance
Sunni terror to Baghdad
Shiites will respond

Responsibility To Protect Doctrine And Iranian Dissidents In Iraq

The responsibility to protect (R2P) is an emerging norm in international relations.  It modifies the inviolability of state sovereignty and allows the international community to intervene in a state's internal affairs to prevent genocide.  The UN system has two special advisers developing this norm within the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.  Determining how well states are enforcing this norm is now a worthy US foreign policy objective.  Let's pick a test case from the Middle East.

The People's Mojahedin of Iran (aka Mojahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK) are a longstanding Iranian dissident group that first opposed the Shah and later opposed the Islamic revolutionary government.  MEK had a history of causing trouble in several countries but cleaned up its act in recent years.  It convinced a critical mass of prominent Americans to lobby for its removal from the US State Department's list of designated terrorist organizations.  Its exile within Iraq left the Shiite-led government with both a bargaining chip and a humanitarian responsibility.

Iraq could have used MEK's status as a showpiece for its commitment to human rights.  Keeping the group disarmed and safeguarded was a no-brainer opportunity to show the Middle East that Iraq was serious about not interfering in its neighbors' affairs.  The Al-Maliki government instead squandered this opportunity by allowing armed elements, with the alleged collusion of its armed forces, to raid MEK's enclaves in 2013.  The influence Tehran now possesses in Baghdad may have been an enabling factor in the attacks against MEK.  The mechanisms of anti-MEK action are less important than the precedent they set.  Baghdad's inability or unwillingness to ensure fair treatment of a dissident group was a clear signal to Sunnis that they could expect no better treatment from a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad.

The international community can easily assemble pretexts for renewed intervention in Iraq under R2P doctrine.  The anti-MEK violence was the beginning.  ISIS has begun imposing sharia law in Mosul and other cities it has taken hostage in the last few weeks.  The Sunni tribes who acquiesced to ISIS's advance will soon regret their "inshallah" nonchalance toward that group's power grab.  The Al-Maliki government in Baghdad has proven itself unable to protect expatriate dissidents and its own minority populations.  That is a clear breach of R2P.  The human cost of nonintervention under R2P grows progressively worse with delay.  Ron Capps' Seriously Not All Right describes the horror of genocide in the face of the international community's delayed intervention in several conflicts.  UN invocation of R2P would signal to Iraq's Sunnis and stranded MEK activists that help is justified.

The Haiku of OSINT for 03/19/13

Liberate Iraq
Measure US cost of gain
High price status quo

Iraq Liberation Ten Year Anniversary Scorecard

Ten years ago today, the United States led a coalition of the willing to liberate Iraq from the Saddam Hussein regime.  Let's run through the neighborhood and examine the strategic results.

Iraq.  The liberated Iraqi people suffered anywhere from 109,000 to over 1,000,000 deaths, depending on who does the counting and whether it includes sectarian violence and deaths from disease or malnutrition.  Iraq is no longer governed by an autocrat but its democratic institutions are still weak.  The country is still periodically beset by sectarian violence and instability.  The good news is that Iraq has functioning democratic institutions and is producing oil for export, although energy supermajors are beginning to sour on Iraq's business climate and poor infrastructure.  The bad news is that the Sunni and Kurd minorities are not full partners in Iraq's governance.  Iraq is a winner, just barely.

Iran.  The Islamic Republic of Iran has been ascendant since the overthrow of the Saddam regime.  Its remaining regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel, are unwilling to officially cooperate to restrain potential Iranian hegemony.  A continued U.S. military presence in the Middle East deters Iran's overt ambitions.  This does not deter Iran from using asymmetric methods to influence the Syrian insurrection (Quds Force support to the Assad regime) or the Iraqi government (support to Shiite sect leaders).  Iran is probably the biggest winner of the war.

Saudi Arabia.  American assurances sustain the kingdom against external threats.  Oil revenue sustains it against internal unrest.  The House of Saud bribed its citizens to ignore the Arab Spring and the gamble paid off.  The Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force stopped Bahrain's unrest from spreading.  It's business as usual in Riyadh as if nothing changed in Baghdad.  Saudi Arabia is a big winner.

Kuwait.  The Saddam regime posed an existential threat to Kuwait as long as it existed.  Kuwait now has a much freer hand in dealing with its neighbors.  A large U.S. military presence in the Emirate ensures its security.  Kuwait is a big winner.

Israel.  The oldest democracy in the Middle East is no longer faced with the threat of land invasion or ballistic missile attack from Iraq.  The Palestinian insurgency is still a problem but it has one less Arab sponsor.  Israel is a big winner.

United States.  America's years in Iraq cost over 4400 combat-related casualties and have afflicted thousands more veterans with combinations of mild ailments and severe wounds.  The best estimates of the financial costs exceed US$2T including direct appropriations, interest on debt, supplementary expenses in related budget lines (State Department aid), and deferred costs of veterans' care.  The opportunity costs of careers unfulfilled and businesses interrupted by repeated mobilizations of the military reserve components are incalculable.  The U.S. gained no permanent military basing rights other than the right to continue a large advisory mission under the supervision of its embassy in Baghdad.   Concessions for U.S.-based energy producers were mostly limited to support services and a U.S.-Iraq trade framework has taken eight years to implement.  The U.S. strategic position as guarantor of the balance of power in the Middle East is unchanged; this came at an enormous cost in lives, prestige, material, and treasure.  The United States cannot lose as long as it remains engaged in the Middle East with all elements of its national power, but the price of truly winning is now higher than ever.

My Encounter With Paula Broadwell, Where Nothing Happened

I remember it like it was yesterday.  I went to the Marines Memorial Club on May 9, 2012 to hear from the author of All In: The Education of General David Petraeus.  Book tours are a fun way to meet semi-important people.  I didn't look closely at the book's cover, so I missed the chance to note that the biographer had a ghostwriter.  That should have been red flag number one that the book, its primary author, its subject, and its promotional tour were all contrived to one degree or another.  Analysts like yours truly can't afford too many oversights like that.

Paula Broadwell was immediately noticeable.  I did get the chance to briefly talk with her about her background in the military.  I mentioned my interests in foreign policy and she nodded approvingly.  She then turned her attention to others in the room who were going to prep her for her talk.  No flirting took place at all.

I didn't take notes during her talk, which was just as well because there wasn't much of substance to remember.  She giggled like a schoolgirl when she mentioned the CIA's drone program.  I didn't ask anything during the Q&A at the end because I didn't see any further mystery about her biographical subject that needed to be revealed.  Boy, was I ever ignorant of what was left unsaid, like whether "All In" was some snarky inside joke between author and subject about what they were really doing.  The whole tone of her talk painted David Petraeus in saintly terms, so much so that I was turned off from ever reading her book.  The term "hagiography" kept popping into my head, like so many uncritical "lives of the saints" stories I recall from the catechism of my youth.  One could be excused for thinking The Greatest General Of Our Time (TM) had no flaws besides the tendency to work too hard, which is the one most important flaw that job interview candidates are told to mention to a hiring manager.

The talk ended and I briefly watched Ms. Broadwell interact with her audience before I left.  I stated in my title that "nothing happened" and I truly mean nothing happened in her entire talk that warranted attention.  The whole show left me with the impression that David Petraeus wanted this woman polishing his image in the public's mind to "shape the battlespace" for something else.  Only time will tell whether that something else is a campaign for elected office.

The revelation of l'affaire Petraeus puts her sales pitch into its proper context.  Ambitious people have their courtiers and hangers-on.  Ms. Broadwell reminded me of every single mid-ranking female executive I encountered while working for large investment firms.  They all exuded feminine appeal from every pore and leveraged this persona to get everything their hearts desired.  Performing special favors for a powerful mentor is just another rung on the way up the ladder.

I am at least relieved to note that this sad affair was not a penetration by a foreign intelligence service or an attempt at blackmail (although obviously some form of "penetration" took place, heh heh).  Whatever notoriety Mr. Petraeus and Ms. Broadwell have earned will be completely forgiven by 2016 should either of them enter politics.  Their carefully constructed personas as dynamic, virile, all-American forces of nature will survive and thrive in whatever narrative awaits the national stage.  It is a stage, after all, and Americans expect their favorite performers to make repeat appearances.  The show must go on.

Iraq Potential Unity Diminished But Not Destroyed

Strategy Page is raising an alarm about the Iraqi political system careening off its democratic rails.  I am not so alarmed.  Violence is normal in the Arab world and the use of terror attacks, extralegal threats, and intimidation should not surprise Western observers.  Iraq will never clone a Western political process no matter how much advice the United States provides.  Iraqi self-governance will retain facets of brutality that are ingrained in Arab political culture.  

In December 2009, I estimated Iraq's chances for "success" as a unitary state at 60%. I stand by that estimate. Suicide bombings have not yet returned to the epidemic levels at the height of the war. Iraq's generational dynamics are such that a full Sunni-Shiite civil war is unlikely because many survivors of the last Sunni-Shiite conflict, the Iran-Iraq War, are still alive and remember the horror. Only the intervention of Sunni Arab neighbors would upset the balance and they don't trust each other enough to work together (GCC Shield Force notwithstanding).  That Shield Force was able to stabilize Bahrain, a small country, with a short-duration deployment.  It is too small to pose an existential threat to the Iraqi military establishment.  Arab military coalitions are ineffective because Arabs don't trust each other.  Only those Arab forces that acted in concert with a Western sponsor (as in the first Persian Gulf War under US leadership) can operate at even a minimal level of effectiveness.  This means that other Sunni Arab states have little hope of influencing Iraqi politics with a threat of land invasion.  Iraqi Shiites have little appetite for mass expulsions or worse directed against its Sunni minority because they value integration with the world economy after decades of deprivation under UN sanctions.  They will continue to find ways to make life uncomfortable for Sunnis but they value their new investment links with the outside world too much to risk anything more harsh.  


We shouldn't use Anglo-Western standards of normalcy to judge Arab internal stability. There will be more bombings. That does not mean Iraqi self-governance will fail. 

Analysis Of Gen. James N. Mattis' Shultz Lecture

In August I had the distinct pleasure of hearing Gen. James N. Mattis (USMC), commander of U.S. Central Command, address the Marines Memorial Club as part of its George P. Shultz Lecture Series.  You can watch a video recording of his lecture online. If it seems like waiting over a month to post a review is a long time, bear with me.  I was waiting for another geopolitical shoe to drop, and that shoe recently landed. 

Gen. Mattis' remarks were quite substantial.  He noted that Iraq lacked an Arab Spring uprising.  I wonder whether that is because the Muslim Brotherhood has no Iraqi chapter that can instigate one or if Iraqis are just so sick of unrest that they can't muster any enthusiasm for further social disruption.  I wanted to hear more details about Iranian Quds force units operating in Iraq and whether they've penetrated Muqtada al-Sadr's organization.  The General mentioned they're operating in Syria too and are the only thing keeping the Assad regime in power.  I think Gen. Mattis' assessment of Syria gives Iran too much credit; the Assad family has plenty of support among Syria's business class, it has successfully isolated or co-opted many of the regime's opponents, and defections from the Syrian military have not significantly degraded its combat power. 

As an aside, Iran's ability to manipulate events in the Arab world will always be circumscribed by its Shiite and Persian identity, no matter how many rockets it ships to Hezbollah or how many special operators it can send to Iraq and Syria.  Did Iran send Quds operators to Bahrain during its Arab Spring unrest?  It has claimed that country as historically Iranian but couldn't influence the outcome there thanks to the GCC's deployment of the Peninsula Shield Force.  Score that as a Saudi victory over Iran in their never-ending contest for leadership of the Islamic world.  Anyway, back to the lecture. 

Gen. Mattis' summary of progress in Afghanistan is spot-on.  IMHO the American military has finally internalized the successful COIN approaches that stabilized Central America in the 1980s.  The military effort in Afghanistan is now facilitating Taliban defections provided those defectors renounce violence and support the Afghan government.  Requiring them to break ties with Al Qaeda is probably unnecessary IMHO.  The U.S. has mostly defeated Al Qaeda and is now threatened by other terrorist networks that regenerate in Pakistan (more on that below). 

The General was distinctly proud of CENTCOM's military-to-military contacts in support of diplomacy in the region.  Hey folks, that's DIME at work, and the military is very willing to play ball with the other elements of national power.  The Egyptian military seems eager to hold elections and turn over power, but IMHO we all may regret the lack of formal organization in Egyptian politics.  The Muslim Brotherhood is the most well-organized political actor in Egypt and will easily play a leading role in an elected government.  Islamic thinkers are fond of using the "democracy as train station" metaphor, meaning democracy is merely a way station enabling Islamists who can seize power and enact Sharia law.  Egypt under Sharia would pose a major threat to Israel's security, but neither I nor Gen. Mattis are capable of speculating on whether that outcome is probable. 

Now, about that other shoe I mentioned up front.  Gen. Mattis' comments on Pakistan were very circumspect, mentioning that they fear India but have moved troops into their west to help the U.S.  The U.S. military is traditionally very restrained in public comments that may contradict the government's publicly stated diplomatic positions; once again, we do DIME quite well, thank you very much.  The U.S. government's diplomatic position on Pakistan is subtly shifting.  Adm. Michael Mullen, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently excoriated Pakistan's ISI for aiding and abetting the Haqqani network's recent attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.  It is not clear whether uniformed ISI officials exercised C2 over the attacking cell, but the support the ISI provides to Haqqani fighters has long been clear.  It was safe for Adm. Mullen to vent because he is about to leave government service, so he has no reason to fear career repercussions for his candor.  It is becoming safer for others in the military to pick up an anti-Pakistan line now that the rest of the U.S. government is turning against Pakistan's proxies.  The Treasury Department has recently sanctioned some Haqqani Network leaders.  I believe it is a matter of time before the rest of the network will be formally sanctioned.  That will make them fair game for the full range of U.S. offensive action, including covert disruption of their supporters. 

The U.S. is slowly but surely distancing itself from Pakistan due to that country's increasingly public tilt toward China as a benefactor and its profound lack of cooperation with U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.  The rupture will not be complete until the bulk of U.S. combat forces have departed Afghanistan because those forces need a line of communication through Pakistan for support. 

This Shultz Lecture Series is a big treat for geopolitical junkies and Marines Memorial Club members like yours truly. The Life Membership I paid for ten years ago has paid off many times over.  It was even cool to see George Shultz himself get up and about at the venue.  The guy just doesn't know how to slow down.