End of Afghan war
Our coalition exit
Sad time in Kabul
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 31, 2021
Thursday, April 2, 2015
The Immediate Future for Afghanistan
Afghanistan may finally be getting better after almost fourteen years of direct Western intervention n its affairs. President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani is leveraging his years of development expertise from the World Bank. His Pashtun ties mean he represents Afghanistan's most populous sub-national group. Having a competent head of state is a necessary but not sufficient condition for better governance. The people themselves must want a better country.
UNICEF statistics on Afghanistan are discouraging. School net attendance ratios for girls show only a minority can get education after more than thirteen years of liberation from the Taliban's anti-female theology. Educated women are one of the most potent weapons against radical Islam. The UNGEI's statistics on girls' education in Afghanistan do not match the UNICEF data. The international community will have problems coordinating a coherent aid solution if it can't agree on data for the biggest problem areas.
A developed country must be a connected country. Searching the World Bank's site for Afghanistan's transport sector reveals road network data that has not been updated since 2007. The World Bank's main page on Afghanistan has more recent development data. The overall numbers are still discouraging. It is jarring to see CO2 emissions displayed so prominently for such a poor country. Controlling carbon is a luxury only the developed world can easily afford. Exempting Afghanistan from this expectation for at least a decade would speed its development. The USGS estimates Afghanistan has enormous natural resources but those will remain untapped if the West expects immediate adherence to every environmental standard in the developed world.
Developing countries have every right to join international regimes that will further their development. Afghanistan has been working toward WTO membership since 2004; it is still not a member. The country has been a WIPO member since 2005, so not all is lost. It will be difficult for Afghanistan to exploit any IP or other domestic advantage it can generate as long as it scores low on the Transparency Corruption Perceptions Index and Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom.
Afghanistan's future political development depends greatly on where it resides in the Strauss-Howe generational cycle. Generational Dynamics has begun discussing Afghanistan's Awakening period. Getting better data on the country's age cohorts will be crucial in estimating how strongly younger Afghans will push their elders for political reforms. The Asia Foundation's longitudinal public opinion polls of Afghans are among the best data available covering sentiment within the country. Effective leaders will leverage that polling data. Afghanistan's next generation of leaders should read the Fourth Turning to understand how public opinion will determine their options.
Weak governance in Afghanistan leaves it at the mercy of stronger neighbors. Iran threatened to attack Afghanistan in the late 1990s and has long maintained ties to Herat province. Pashtuns in Pakistan seek to erase the Durand Line and create a Pashtunistan joined with southeastern Afghanistan. Ironically, wise leaders in Kabul can hold Afghanistan together by giving provincial governors the support they need to solve problems as locally as possible. The West has never fully understood Afghanistan's traditionally decentralized approach to governance. Afghans understand it quite well enough.
Repatriated Afghans like President Ghani have enough experience in the West to know how to implement good governance. The West should have enough confidence in their education and professionalism to let them do so in ways consistent with Afghan traditions. The developed world has long known what lasting democracy needs. A middle class that can participate in making policy and an independent judiciary are absolute minimum requirements for a stable society under the rule of law. I have personally met Afghan graduate students studying in San Francisco under Fulbright scholarships and I am confident that they can make the best of what the West offers their country. The Fourth Turning awaits them when they return to Afghanistan.
Tuesday, December 17, 2013
Hidden Narratives in Afghanistan
Critics of the US/NATO mission in Afghanistan point to unintended consequences of military actions. Their objections have merit if substantiating evidence exists.
One commonly heard allegation is that many attacks on US forces are the result of ordinary Afghans' frustrations with humiliating raids and cultural offenses. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made much of these claims and insisted that the US-Afghan security pact include severe restrictions on such raids. The fact that the US agreed to this restriction shows that its basis has merit. International news media reports of US troops raiding hospitals do not help America's image. The rationale for Afghan forces' attacks on their international allies is difficult to pin down. Analysis reveals a mix of cultural misunderstandings that escalate into perceived offenses, triggering many attacks. If the most likely attackers are ethnic Pashtuns recruited into Afghan forces from border regions with Pakistan, US forces should focus fratricide prevention efforts on that specific population.
Drone strikes have been a continual point of contention between the US and its Af-Pak partners. A drone is only as accurate as the intelligence feeding its controller. Local sources who report faulty information on an HVT's whereabouts may be using US firepower to settle personal scores. The pending force drawdown will severely limit the number of reliable sources US forces can successfully cultivate.
Human Rights Watch noted in 2001 that combatants employed landmines in Afghanistan long before US forces arrived. Much of rural Afghanistan still contains mines that kill and main civilians. The international community does its part to remove landmine hazards through the Halo Trust's de-mining efforts and other organizations. The US should include funding for de-mining programs as part of its continued US support to Afghan rural development.
The predominant media narrative for the US intervention in Afghanistan is one of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and missed opportunities. The US's enduring presence in Afghanistan must begin to tell a new narrative in 2014. The story should lead with something other than interjections into tribal conflict.
One commonly heard allegation is that many attacks on US forces are the result of ordinary Afghans' frustrations with humiliating raids and cultural offenses. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made much of these claims and insisted that the US-Afghan security pact include severe restrictions on such raids. The fact that the US agreed to this restriction shows that its basis has merit. International news media reports of US troops raiding hospitals do not help America's image. The rationale for Afghan forces' attacks on their international allies is difficult to pin down. Analysis reveals a mix of cultural misunderstandings that escalate into perceived offenses, triggering many attacks. If the most likely attackers are ethnic Pashtuns recruited into Afghan forces from border regions with Pakistan, US forces should focus fratricide prevention efforts on that specific population.
Drone strikes have been a continual point of contention between the US and its Af-Pak partners. A drone is only as accurate as the intelligence feeding its controller. Local sources who report faulty information on an HVT's whereabouts may be using US firepower to settle personal scores. The pending force drawdown will severely limit the number of reliable sources US forces can successfully cultivate.
Human Rights Watch noted in 2001 that combatants employed landmines in Afghanistan long before US forces arrived. Much of rural Afghanistan still contains mines that kill and main civilians. The international community does its part to remove landmine hazards through the Halo Trust's de-mining efforts and other organizations. The US should include funding for de-mining programs as part of its continued US support to Afghan rural development.
The predominant media narrative for the US intervention in Afghanistan is one of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and missed opportunities. The US's enduring presence in Afghanistan must begin to tell a new narrative in 2014. The story should lead with something other than interjections into tribal conflict.
Monday, December 19, 2011
Daniel Green, "Reconstructing Afghanistan" At The MMC
Daniel Green, Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, spoke recently at the Marines Memorial Club on "Reconstructing Afghanistan." This was another lecture co-sponsored by the World Affairs Council, where I used to hold a membership until I got too busy with all of my Web blogging action. I attended and took good notes. My observations are in italics.
Mr. Green talked about his experiences on a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, the stomping grounds for Hamid Karzai's early supporters. His brief description of the topography tells us how hard it is to build infrastructure in parts of A-stan. The population lives along green belts near rivers in a mostly desert province. Check out pics online of terraced farms in parts of A-stan. Then try to imagine the futility of building millions of dollars worth of roads and sewer systems to service an agricultural village whose annual economic productivity can probably be measured in the low five figures.
Mr. Green mentioned that Karzai's status as head of the Popalzai tribe gave him credibility as a Durrani leader, but didn't go further into A-stan's history. Here's the significance. The Durrani Empire was probably Afghanistan's golden age, when it was expansive enough to hold both Persia and India at bay. A legitimate Durrani lineage helps explain Karzai's staying power. It also explains Mr. Green's comment that the Oruzgan governor was not necessarily into good governance but remained a Karzai ally. Their politics aren't like ours, folks, and their standards for good governance are not what we would demand in the Anglo-West.
Oruzgan province was mostly safe when Mr. Green's PRT arrived in 2005 but only seven months later the Taliban had stepped up activities with more sophisticated attacks. More foreign fighters showed up to join the party. The PRT had to shut down its good governance projects due to the violence. The U.S. didn't understand the importance of village-level engagement and spent little developmental aid on small villages due to its orientation on conventional nation-state governance. Maybe we should check out the book and movie versions of The Ugly American before we do any more nation-building in countries that don't function as nations.
One thing Mr. Green wanted to emphasize is that the U.S. drawdown through 2014 is not at all synonymous with a complete departure. The U.S. is staying in Afghanistan, in some form, for a very long time. The Afghans interpret White House pronouncements as a departure, so being the survivors they are they will hedge their strategic bets. Keep that in mind the next time you hear Hamid Karzai making friendly moves toward Iran or India. He's being more pro-Afghanistan than anti-American and his moves play well with his home audience. Remember also that the Taliban are primarily a Pashtun movement, and his own Pashtun lineage matters. Karzai's public comments that may rile the U.S. will give him crucial credibility at the negotiating table if he is to ever successfully disarm the Taliban and re-orient them toward nonviolence. We miss the nuances of this in the Western media.
America's bad strategic habits in foreign intervention are all to familiar to Mr. Green. He noted how we tend to underestimate problems and later throw money and technology at them because that's what we understand. He likes the AfPak Hands program and thinks it needs special management; it can be an antidote to the short-term thinking paradigm the U.S. uses to solve long-term problems. I for one would love to become an AfPak Hand. There's no way we can understand that region without a cadre of people dedicated to its permanent study.
The mention of village stability operations caught my attention in the lecture. This is an effort by NATO/ISAF conventional forces to position themselves inside villages and build tribal-based defense forces around them. This immediately reminded me of Army Special Forces Major Jim Gant's concept of Tribal Engagement Teams. If you've never heard of it, read about it in the milblogosphere. I had the chance to ask Mr. Green afterwards if village stability ops were based on Maj. Gant's ideas; he said the approach was heavily informed by Maj. Gant's work and is spreading rapidly. Wow, we actually learned something and applied it. America is number one!
Mr. Green obliquely mentioned that U.S. policy on Pakistan needs review because we are partially subsidizing covert wars against ourselves by supporting Pakistan. The unspoken limitation of any substantive policy review is the dependence of U.S. forces on a ground line of communications (i.e., a logistics corridor) from the port of Karachi. Any force footprint larger than roughly a division will need resupply from some direction other than the northern rail corridor, which is inefficient because changes in rail gauges through the 'Stans slow down railcar movement. Reviewing our support for Pakistan means reducing our force structure so Pakistani logistics doesn't hold us hostage. This is part of the rationale behind announcements of drawdowns until 2014. I hear your frustration, Mr. Green.
He framed a choice comment about fighting with allies very diplomatically. NATO countries seem to prefer the political benefit of participation in ISAF over actual fighting. Many NATO forces have immature COIN approaches, learned little from Iraq, and restrict their fighting with too many caveats. Winston Churchill had a choice quote about fighting with allies, but he assumed allies would actually do some real fighting. There's a running joke that ISAF stands for "I Saw America Fight."
Here's an observation on the interagency effort that's worth repeating. Mr. Green was disappointed that USAID had devolved from a competent organization in the 1960s to having too few field agents, little COIN understanding, and a limited focus on contract monitoring. This dovetailed into his comment about NGOs lacking accountability, staying in the capital too much, and undermining Afghan sovereignty. This is the logical result of outsourcing government functions. Governance is the core of an aid effort, and legitimacy comes from government-to-government contact. Perhaps the U.S. Army should detail some civil affairs troops to USAID, because synching the CMOC doesn't seem to be working if our institutions are that weak.
BTW, there may be a better way to do opium mitigation. Mr. Green said Marine forces are working this in Helmand province. The U.S. should give those opium farmers some biodiesel reactors so they can turn poppies into fuel. Granted, that's only a concept. It won't be viable unless farmers could sell their biodiesel for more than what they'd make for a comparable opium crop.
A couple more observations are worth repeating. Al Qaeda sticks out like a sore thumb in A-stan and may fill the vacuum if the U.S. leaves completely. The Arab Spring encourages reform without reliance upon Al Qaeda's extremism. I wonder if Mr. Green knows of the Muslim Brotherhood's extensive network in the Middle East; there may not be much reform with them in charge after elections are held. Embedding U.S. personnel 24/7 with Afghan forces is effective. Local police are less educated and professional than the Afghan army. Having an enduring U.S. ground presence is essential to avoid throwing away what we've gained from our dislodgement of the Taliban and Al Qaeda; ground forces develop intelligence on local personalities and safe havens that enable strike packages against high value targets. That last comment brings out what a military force does in COIN and also reveals the military's limits. It takes a lot of nation-building effort to get sufficient intel for even a limited strike on one bad guy's hideout. The nation-building renders his hideout untenable by making local villages secure and prosperous. That is why the U.S. will be in Afghanistan, in some fashion, for a long time. Oh, yeah, there's a lot of very valuable minerals there too.
Mr. Green talked about his experiences on a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, the stomping grounds for Hamid Karzai's early supporters. His brief description of the topography tells us how hard it is to build infrastructure in parts of A-stan. The population lives along green belts near rivers in a mostly desert province. Check out pics online of terraced farms in parts of A-stan. Then try to imagine the futility of building millions of dollars worth of roads and sewer systems to service an agricultural village whose annual economic productivity can probably be measured in the low five figures.
Mr. Green mentioned that Karzai's status as head of the Popalzai tribe gave him credibility as a Durrani leader, but didn't go further into A-stan's history. Here's the significance. The Durrani Empire was probably Afghanistan's golden age, when it was expansive enough to hold both Persia and India at bay. A legitimate Durrani lineage helps explain Karzai's staying power. It also explains Mr. Green's comment that the Oruzgan governor was not necessarily into good governance but remained a Karzai ally. Their politics aren't like ours, folks, and their standards for good governance are not what we would demand in the Anglo-West.
Oruzgan province was mostly safe when Mr. Green's PRT arrived in 2005 but only seven months later the Taliban had stepped up activities with more sophisticated attacks. More foreign fighters showed up to join the party. The PRT had to shut down its good governance projects due to the violence. The U.S. didn't understand the importance of village-level engagement and spent little developmental aid on small villages due to its orientation on conventional nation-state governance. Maybe we should check out the book and movie versions of The Ugly American before we do any more nation-building in countries that don't function as nations.
One thing Mr. Green wanted to emphasize is that the U.S. drawdown through 2014 is not at all synonymous with a complete departure. The U.S. is staying in Afghanistan, in some form, for a very long time. The Afghans interpret White House pronouncements as a departure, so being the survivors they are they will hedge their strategic bets. Keep that in mind the next time you hear Hamid Karzai making friendly moves toward Iran or India. He's being more pro-Afghanistan than anti-American and his moves play well with his home audience. Remember also that the Taliban are primarily a Pashtun movement, and his own Pashtun lineage matters. Karzai's public comments that may rile the U.S. will give him crucial credibility at the negotiating table if he is to ever successfully disarm the Taliban and re-orient them toward nonviolence. We miss the nuances of this in the Western media.
America's bad strategic habits in foreign intervention are all to familiar to Mr. Green. He noted how we tend to underestimate problems and later throw money and technology at them because that's what we understand. He likes the AfPak Hands program and thinks it needs special management; it can be an antidote to the short-term thinking paradigm the U.S. uses to solve long-term problems. I for one would love to become an AfPak Hand. There's no way we can understand that region without a cadre of people dedicated to its permanent study.
The mention of village stability operations caught my attention in the lecture. This is an effort by NATO/ISAF conventional forces to position themselves inside villages and build tribal-based defense forces around them. This immediately reminded me of Army Special Forces Major Jim Gant's concept of Tribal Engagement Teams. If you've never heard of it, read about it in the milblogosphere. I had the chance to ask Mr. Green afterwards if village stability ops were based on Maj. Gant's ideas; he said the approach was heavily informed by Maj. Gant's work and is spreading rapidly. Wow, we actually learned something and applied it. America is number one!
Mr. Green obliquely mentioned that U.S. policy on Pakistan needs review because we are partially subsidizing covert wars against ourselves by supporting Pakistan. The unspoken limitation of any substantive policy review is the dependence of U.S. forces on a ground line of communications (i.e., a logistics corridor) from the port of Karachi. Any force footprint larger than roughly a division will need resupply from some direction other than the northern rail corridor, which is inefficient because changes in rail gauges through the 'Stans slow down railcar movement. Reviewing our support for Pakistan means reducing our force structure so Pakistani logistics doesn't hold us hostage. This is part of the rationale behind announcements of drawdowns until 2014. I hear your frustration, Mr. Green.
He framed a choice comment about fighting with allies very diplomatically. NATO countries seem to prefer the political benefit of participation in ISAF over actual fighting. Many NATO forces have immature COIN approaches, learned little from Iraq, and restrict their fighting with too many caveats. Winston Churchill had a choice quote about fighting with allies, but he assumed allies would actually do some real fighting. There's a running joke that ISAF stands for "I Saw America Fight."
Here's an observation on the interagency effort that's worth repeating. Mr. Green was disappointed that USAID had devolved from a competent organization in the 1960s to having too few field agents, little COIN understanding, and a limited focus on contract monitoring. This dovetailed into his comment about NGOs lacking accountability, staying in the capital too much, and undermining Afghan sovereignty. This is the logical result of outsourcing government functions. Governance is the core of an aid effort, and legitimacy comes from government-to-government contact. Perhaps the U.S. Army should detail some civil affairs troops to USAID, because synching the CMOC doesn't seem to be working if our institutions are that weak.
BTW, there may be a better way to do opium mitigation. Mr. Green said Marine forces are working this in Helmand province. The U.S. should give those opium farmers some biodiesel reactors so they can turn poppies into fuel. Granted, that's only a concept. It won't be viable unless farmers could sell their biodiesel for more than what they'd make for a comparable opium crop.
A couple more observations are worth repeating. Al Qaeda sticks out like a sore thumb in A-stan and may fill the vacuum if the U.S. leaves completely. The Arab Spring encourages reform without reliance upon Al Qaeda's extremism. I wonder if Mr. Green knows of the Muslim Brotherhood's extensive network in the Middle East; there may not be much reform with them in charge after elections are held. Embedding U.S. personnel 24/7 with Afghan forces is effective. Local police are less educated and professional than the Afghan army. Having an enduring U.S. ground presence is essential to avoid throwing away what we've gained from our dislodgement of the Taliban and Al Qaeda; ground forces develop intelligence on local personalities and safe havens that enable strike packages against high value targets. That last comment brings out what a military force does in COIN and also reveals the military's limits. It takes a lot of nation-building effort to get sufficient intel for even a limited strike on one bad guy's hideout. The nation-building renders his hideout untenable by making local villages secure and prosperous. That is why the U.S. will be in Afghanistan, in some fashion, for a long time. Oh, yeah, there's a lot of very valuable minerals there too.
Thursday, September 29, 2011
Analysis Of Gen. James N. Mattis' Shultz Lecture
In August I had the distinct pleasure of hearing Gen. James N. Mattis (USMC), commander of U.S. Central Command, address the Marines Memorial Club as part of its George P. Shultz Lecture Series. You can watch a video recording of his lecture online. If it seems like waiting over a month to post a review is a long time, bear with me. I was waiting for another geopolitical shoe to drop, and that shoe recently landed.
Gen. Mattis' remarks were quite substantial. He noted that Iraq lacked an Arab Spring uprising. I wonder whether that is because the Muslim Brotherhood has no Iraqi chapter that can instigate one or if Iraqis are just so sick of unrest that they can't muster any enthusiasm for further social disruption. I wanted to hear more details about Iranian Quds force units operating in Iraq and whether they've penetrated Muqtada al-Sadr's organization. The General mentioned they're operating in Syria too and are the only thing keeping the Assad regime in power. I think Gen. Mattis' assessment of Syria gives Iran too much credit; the Assad family has plenty of support among Syria's business class, it has successfully isolated or co-opted many of the regime's opponents, and defections from the Syrian military have not significantly degraded its combat power.
As an aside, Iran's ability to manipulate events in the Arab world will always be circumscribed by its Shiite and Persian identity, no matter how many rockets it ships to Hezbollah or how many special operators it can send to Iraq and Syria. Did Iran send Quds operators to Bahrain during its Arab Spring unrest? It has claimed that country as historically Iranian but couldn't influence the outcome there thanks to the GCC's deployment of the Peninsula Shield Force. Score that as a Saudi victory over Iran in their never-ending contest for leadership of the Islamic world. Anyway, back to the lecture.
Gen. Mattis' summary of progress in Afghanistan is spot-on. IMHO the American military has finally internalized the successful COIN approaches that stabilized Central America in the 1980s. The military effort in Afghanistan is now facilitating Taliban defections provided those defectors renounce violence and support the Afghan government. Requiring them to break ties with Al Qaeda is probably unnecessary IMHO. The U.S. has mostly defeated Al Qaeda and is now threatened by other terrorist networks that regenerate in Pakistan (more on that below).
The General was distinctly proud of CENTCOM's military-to-military contacts in support of diplomacy in the region. Hey folks, that's DIME at work, and the military is very willing to play ball with the other elements of national power. The Egyptian military seems eager to hold elections and turn over power, but IMHO we all may regret the lack of formal organization in Egyptian politics. The Muslim Brotherhood is the most well-organized political actor in Egypt and will easily play a leading role in an elected government. Islamic thinkers are fond of using the "democracy as train station" metaphor, meaning democracy is merely a way station enabling Islamists who can seize power and enact Sharia law. Egypt under Sharia would pose a major threat to Israel's security, but neither I nor Gen. Mattis are capable of speculating on whether that outcome is probable.
Now, about that other shoe I mentioned up front. Gen. Mattis' comments on Pakistan were very circumspect, mentioning that they fear India but have moved troops into their west to help the U.S. The U.S. military is traditionally very restrained in public comments that may contradict the government's publicly stated diplomatic positions; once again, we do DIME quite well, thank you very much. The U.S. government's diplomatic position on Pakistan is subtly shifting. Adm. Michael Mullen, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently excoriated Pakistan's ISI for aiding and abetting the Haqqani network's recent attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. It is not clear whether uniformed ISI officials exercised C2 over the attacking cell, but the support the ISI provides to Haqqani fighters has long been clear. It was safe for Adm. Mullen to vent because he is about to leave government service, so he has no reason to fear career repercussions for his candor. It is becoming safer for others in the military to pick up an anti-Pakistan line now that the rest of the U.S. government is turning against Pakistan's proxies. The Treasury Department has recently sanctioned some Haqqani Network leaders. I believe it is a matter of time before the rest of the network will be formally sanctioned. That will make them fair game for the full range of U.S. offensive action, including covert disruption of their supporters.
The U.S. is slowly but surely distancing itself from Pakistan due to that country's increasingly public tilt toward China as a benefactor and its profound lack of cooperation with U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The rupture will not be complete until the bulk of U.S. combat forces have departed Afghanistan because those forces need a line of communication through Pakistan for support.
This Shultz Lecture Series is a big treat for geopolitical junkies and Marines Memorial Club members like yours truly. The Life Membership I paid for ten years ago has paid off many times over. It was even cool to see George Shultz himself get up and about at the venue. The guy just doesn't know how to slow down.
Gen. Mattis' remarks were quite substantial. He noted that Iraq lacked an Arab Spring uprising. I wonder whether that is because the Muslim Brotherhood has no Iraqi chapter that can instigate one or if Iraqis are just so sick of unrest that they can't muster any enthusiasm for further social disruption. I wanted to hear more details about Iranian Quds force units operating in Iraq and whether they've penetrated Muqtada al-Sadr's organization. The General mentioned they're operating in Syria too and are the only thing keeping the Assad regime in power. I think Gen. Mattis' assessment of Syria gives Iran too much credit; the Assad family has plenty of support among Syria's business class, it has successfully isolated or co-opted many of the regime's opponents, and defections from the Syrian military have not significantly degraded its combat power.
As an aside, Iran's ability to manipulate events in the Arab world will always be circumscribed by its Shiite and Persian identity, no matter how many rockets it ships to Hezbollah or how many special operators it can send to Iraq and Syria. Did Iran send Quds operators to Bahrain during its Arab Spring unrest? It has claimed that country as historically Iranian but couldn't influence the outcome there thanks to the GCC's deployment of the Peninsula Shield Force. Score that as a Saudi victory over Iran in their never-ending contest for leadership of the Islamic world. Anyway, back to the lecture.
Gen. Mattis' summary of progress in Afghanistan is spot-on. IMHO the American military has finally internalized the successful COIN approaches that stabilized Central America in the 1980s. The military effort in Afghanistan is now facilitating Taliban defections provided those defectors renounce violence and support the Afghan government. Requiring them to break ties with Al Qaeda is probably unnecessary IMHO. The U.S. has mostly defeated Al Qaeda and is now threatened by other terrorist networks that regenerate in Pakistan (more on that below).
The General was distinctly proud of CENTCOM's military-to-military contacts in support of diplomacy in the region. Hey folks, that's DIME at work, and the military is very willing to play ball with the other elements of national power. The Egyptian military seems eager to hold elections and turn over power, but IMHO we all may regret the lack of formal organization in Egyptian politics. The Muslim Brotherhood is the most well-organized political actor in Egypt and will easily play a leading role in an elected government. Islamic thinkers are fond of using the "democracy as train station" metaphor, meaning democracy is merely a way station enabling Islamists who can seize power and enact Sharia law. Egypt under Sharia would pose a major threat to Israel's security, but neither I nor Gen. Mattis are capable of speculating on whether that outcome is probable.
Now, about that other shoe I mentioned up front. Gen. Mattis' comments on Pakistan were very circumspect, mentioning that they fear India but have moved troops into their west to help the U.S. The U.S. military is traditionally very restrained in public comments that may contradict the government's publicly stated diplomatic positions; once again, we do DIME quite well, thank you very much. The U.S. government's diplomatic position on Pakistan is subtly shifting. Adm. Michael Mullen, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently excoriated Pakistan's ISI for aiding and abetting the Haqqani network's recent attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. It is not clear whether uniformed ISI officials exercised C2 over the attacking cell, but the support the ISI provides to Haqqani fighters has long been clear. It was safe for Adm. Mullen to vent because he is about to leave government service, so he has no reason to fear career repercussions for his candor. It is becoming safer for others in the military to pick up an anti-Pakistan line now that the rest of the U.S. government is turning against Pakistan's proxies. The Treasury Department has recently sanctioned some Haqqani Network leaders. I believe it is a matter of time before the rest of the network will be formally sanctioned. That will make them fair game for the full range of U.S. offensive action, including covert disruption of their supporters.
The U.S. is slowly but surely distancing itself from Pakistan due to that country's increasingly public tilt toward China as a benefactor and its profound lack of cooperation with U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The rupture will not be complete until the bulk of U.S. combat forces have departed Afghanistan because those forces need a line of communication through Pakistan for support.
This Shultz Lecture Series is a big treat for geopolitical junkies and Marines Memorial Club members like yours truly. The Life Membership I paid for ten years ago has paid off many times over. It was even cool to see George Shultz himself get up and about at the venue. The guy just doesn't know how to slow down.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
Analysis of Peter Tomsen, "Rethinking American Policy In Afghanistan"
I recently had the privilege of hearing a lecture at the World Affairs Council of Northern California from Peter Tomsen, a former U.S. diplomat and expert on Afghanistan. His lecture covered a wide swath of Afghan history and linked the U.S. counterinsurgency effort to the historical experiences of other empires that entered Afghanistan. He did of course plug his book The Wars Of Afghanistan, but his lecture was far more than a summary of the book's chapters.
Mr. Tomsen argued that the U.S.'s entry into Afghanistan, like that of empires before, ignored the history of Afghanistan as a primarily tribal nation with a weak central government astride the "high ground" of Central Asia. High ground is usually more valuable in a tactical sense than a strategic one, but the rationale for a foreign presence in Afghanistan is more nuanced. The country was a waystation on the Silk Road trade routes between China and the West, and the Khyber Pass has long been the gateway for imperial invasions (first Indian, then British) into Central Asia.
Afghanistan's only real period of regional hegemony, the Durrani Empire, existed in the interregnum between the decline of India's Mogul empire and the rise of Britain and Russia. I found it interesting that Mr. Tomsen didn't mention that Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's President since the American invasion, is from a tribe that traces its lineage to the Durrani ruling family. That is doubtless one of the sources for his legitimacy.
At any rate, Mr. Tomsen dropped some interesting tidbits:
- U.S. outsourcing its Afghan policy to Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal was a big mistake.
- All three major Taliban fronts in Afghanistan - the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction - are run by the Pakistani ISI.
- Over 80% of the suicide bombers in Afghanistan are Pakistani!
- Iran meddles in Afghanistan; it seeks a broader regional role to counter potential encirclement by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.
- China likes using Pakistan as a hedge against India and would not necessarily endorse any U.S. containment of Pakistani Islamic militancy, even if that risked stirring up Islamic separatists in its own "East Turkestan."
His take on Pakistan's perception of Afghanistan as a source of strategic depth in a potential fight against India is an invaluable insight for Americans trying to understand the "Af-Pak" equation. Pakistan viewed India's diplomatic opening to Afghanistan with suspicion; this in turn stoked further Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan to thwart encirclement by India. I have a pet thesis that compares Pakistan to Prussia in light of a major strategic similarity: Both countries' militarized elites exported instability into their respective "greater abroads" to compensate for their lack of internal unity.
My interpretation of Mr. Tomsen's arguments includes the following:
- The American emphasis on building strong national Afghan institutions like a central government and modern army has upset the historical equilibrium between Kabul and the countryside.
- Leaning hard on Pakistan to clean up its act and pursue terrorists is impossible as long as the primary line of communication (LOC) for NATO/ISAF's force runs through Karachi. The so-called "northern corridor" through the 'stans is insufficient for handling military logistics due to the different rail gauges in use. NATO and the U.S. thus have little alternative but to rely upon ground logistics delivered from the port of Karachi through Pakistan by road, with all the pilferage and bribery that entails.
- Iran's dispatch of warships through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean was more than a strategic breakout directed against Israel. It could also have sent a message to Central Asian rivals.
- Pakistan will keep playing the U.S. for a fool as long as it has China as a back-up hegemon. The only thing that would radically change this equation in the U.S.'s favor would be a clear strategic tilt toward India. A shift on that scale would really spook Beijing but would only be viable after a large U.S. drawdown eliminates the need for a LOC through Pakistan.
Mr. Tomsen eventually argued for taking a long-term view in American foreign policy toward the region. I'll offer my own proposed policy approach. A stable Afghanistan would be open for business in both continental trade and local resource exploration. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. estimates of trillion-dollar metal deposits are recoverable, as the aerial electromagnetic surveys used to derive those estimates are not nearly as accurate as multiple drill core samples from likely veins. Stepping back from involvement in Kabul-centric nation-building will help restore Afghanistan's traditional equilibrium and give us more flexibility in dealing with the country's regional power-brokers (read "warlords" if you will, but that's how business gets done with the leading tribes). If the U.S. wants to forestall Chinese dominance of Afghan mineral resources, we must make deals now with tribal and regional leaders who will be around regardless of who governs in Kabul.
Mr. Tomsen argued that the U.S.'s entry into Afghanistan, like that of empires before, ignored the history of Afghanistan as a primarily tribal nation with a weak central government astride the "high ground" of Central Asia. High ground is usually more valuable in a tactical sense than a strategic one, but the rationale for a foreign presence in Afghanistan is more nuanced. The country was a waystation on the Silk Road trade routes between China and the West, and the Khyber Pass has long been the gateway for imperial invasions (first Indian, then British) into Central Asia.
Afghanistan's only real period of regional hegemony, the Durrani Empire, existed in the interregnum between the decline of India's Mogul empire and the rise of Britain and Russia. I found it interesting that Mr. Tomsen didn't mention that Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's President since the American invasion, is from a tribe that traces its lineage to the Durrani ruling family. That is doubtless one of the sources for his legitimacy.
At any rate, Mr. Tomsen dropped some interesting tidbits:
- U.S. outsourcing its Afghan policy to Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal was a big mistake.
- All three major Taliban fronts in Afghanistan - the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction - are run by the Pakistani ISI.
- Over 80% of the suicide bombers in Afghanistan are Pakistani!
- Iran meddles in Afghanistan; it seeks a broader regional role to counter potential encirclement by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.
- China likes using Pakistan as a hedge against India and would not necessarily endorse any U.S. containment of Pakistani Islamic militancy, even if that risked stirring up Islamic separatists in its own "East Turkestan."
His take on Pakistan's perception of Afghanistan as a source of strategic depth in a potential fight against India is an invaluable insight for Americans trying to understand the "Af-Pak" equation. Pakistan viewed India's diplomatic opening to Afghanistan with suspicion; this in turn stoked further Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan to thwart encirclement by India. I have a pet thesis that compares Pakistan to Prussia in light of a major strategic similarity: Both countries' militarized elites exported instability into their respective "greater abroads" to compensate for their lack of internal unity.
My interpretation of Mr. Tomsen's arguments includes the following:
- The American emphasis on building strong national Afghan institutions like a central government and modern army has upset the historical equilibrium between Kabul and the countryside.
- Leaning hard on Pakistan to clean up its act and pursue terrorists is impossible as long as the primary line of communication (LOC) for NATO/ISAF's force runs through Karachi. The so-called "northern corridor" through the 'stans is insufficient for handling military logistics due to the different rail gauges in use. NATO and the U.S. thus have little alternative but to rely upon ground logistics delivered from the port of Karachi through Pakistan by road, with all the pilferage and bribery that entails.
- Iran's dispatch of warships through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean was more than a strategic breakout directed against Israel. It could also have sent a message to Central Asian rivals.
- Pakistan will keep playing the U.S. for a fool as long as it has China as a back-up hegemon. The only thing that would radically change this equation in the U.S.'s favor would be a clear strategic tilt toward India. A shift on that scale would really spook Beijing but would only be viable after a large U.S. drawdown eliminates the need for a LOC through Pakistan.
Mr. Tomsen eventually argued for taking a long-term view in American foreign policy toward the region. I'll offer my own proposed policy approach. A stable Afghanistan would be open for business in both continental trade and local resource exploration. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. estimates of trillion-dollar metal deposits are recoverable, as the aerial electromagnetic surveys used to derive those estimates are not nearly as accurate as multiple drill core samples from likely veins. Stepping back from involvement in Kabul-centric nation-building will help restore Afghanistan's traditional equilibrium and give us more flexibility in dealing with the country's regional power-brokers (read "warlords" if you will, but that's how business gets done with the leading tribes). If the U.S. wants to forestall Chinese dominance of Afghan mineral resources, we must make deals now with tribal and regional leaders who will be around regardless of who governs in Kabul.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)