New Chinese empire
Disguise with development
Seeking paid tribute
Disguise with development
Seeking paid tribute
Showing posts with label empire. Show all posts
Showing posts with label empire. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 4, 2014
Mistaking The Rise Of China As Something Other Than Imperial Restoration
Yesterday I went to the Commonwealth Club for what I expected to be a good lecture on the rise of China. The presenter, Orville Schell, was a vaunted old China hand from the Asia Society, one of the most trusted names in the think-tank world. The Commonwealth Club has pushed this topic before, and I'll note for the record that I have not yet read Wealth and Power. I need to read it to understand why this coverage of China's rise leaves out a significant number of salient details.
I have no argument with the thesis that decades of humiliation at the hands of Western powers motivates Chinese nationalism, and this resurgent nationalism in turn has motivated China's strong economic growth. My own thesis is that Western observers are once again missing other unique forces driving that nationalism. Ignoring these forces means the West will once again misjudge future turning points in China's internal development and external strategy, just as it missed the turn to modernization after the Cultural Revolution.
The "Chinese Dream" of wealth and power that will secure China's identity is more than some belated response to 19th century colonialism. China's governmental style has never lost its Confucian foundation despite Mao's efforts to break down traditional Chinese cultural traits. The Chinese Communist Party simply subsumed the old patronage relationships that always characterized imperial China. Only the images changed, and grafting the Party's authority onto a suborned governing structure does not change the Confucian nature of its authority. Modern Chinese interpret the "mandate of heaven" as continued economic growth. Failure to meet this expectation will cause China's emerging bourgeoisie to question the Party's legitimacy. That question is about a decade away from becoming reality by virtue of demographics.
China's unassimilated minorities must figure into any Western analysis of that country's stability but Western analysts disappoint me by continuing to refer to China as monolithic. This failure to see ethnic nuances is one fatal flaw that early scholars of Oriental despotism such as Karl August Wittfogel never corrected. The PRC's own written constitution refers to the "nations of China." China's insecurity, as expressed in its reassertion of historic claims over seemingly inconsequential islands, is the product of an unfinished nationalist attempt to reconcile some irreconcilable minorities to Han and Manchu primacy. Nationalism as a unifying impulse is the only way China can contain restive Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongolians when economic growth begins to falter. China's unresolved territorial disputes with India over Arunachal Pradesh (aka South Tibet) and other areas are the perfect future rationales for more saber-rattling. I do not expect those areas to be quiet for long once China is unable to meet its own middle class's economic expectations for a "mandate of heaven" in its standard of living.
Oh BTW, those seemingly inconsequential islands are fairly consequential after all. Securing unchallenged basing rights to uninhabited rocks allows China to extend its exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS far beyond its coastal waters. This provides legal precedent for regulating fishing, crabbing, and even ocean transit in a manner that reflects the tributary relationships imperial China once imposed upon its weaker Asian neighbors. China's desire to assert an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the entire East China Sea reflects the same impulse. The US Navy guarantees freedom of navigation through Pacific sea lanes, free of charge to all comers. There is no assurance in Asian history that Chinese naval dominance will be as generous. Any PLA Navy attempt to charge a tariff for transit will provoke an outcry that will demand an international response.
Chinese nationalism is not the self-deterministic expression familiar to Western scholars. It is a resurgence of the ancient imperialist impulse that runs through much of China's pre-modern history. The Beijing Consensus uses economic development and nationalism to restore China's self-image as an empire. The Chinese Dream is the domestic mythos covering that policy consensus. Faltering economic development means nationalism becomes the stronger impulse to maintain the unifying self-image. This is why neoliberal interpreters of the Washington Consensus for economic development misapply the Beijing Consensus as a competing development model for emerging markets. It is no such thing. It is traditional Chinese imperialism, directed simultaneously at China's unassimilated minorities and weaker neighbors. Western analysts can increase their understanding of Asian dynamics by updating some forgotten concepts like the hydraulic empire without Wittfogel's ideological limitations. Himalayan hydrology has everything to do with the water-energy-food security nexus driving China's internal development and its relationship with India over contested territories. The Asia Society and Commonwealth Club should study this Alfidi Capital thesis in more detail. I'm available for speaking engagements in front of VIP audiences, if you know what I mean.
I have no argument with the thesis that decades of humiliation at the hands of Western powers motivates Chinese nationalism, and this resurgent nationalism in turn has motivated China's strong economic growth. My own thesis is that Western observers are once again missing other unique forces driving that nationalism. Ignoring these forces means the West will once again misjudge future turning points in China's internal development and external strategy, just as it missed the turn to modernization after the Cultural Revolution.
The "Chinese Dream" of wealth and power that will secure China's identity is more than some belated response to 19th century colonialism. China's governmental style has never lost its Confucian foundation despite Mao's efforts to break down traditional Chinese cultural traits. The Chinese Communist Party simply subsumed the old patronage relationships that always characterized imperial China. Only the images changed, and grafting the Party's authority onto a suborned governing structure does not change the Confucian nature of its authority. Modern Chinese interpret the "mandate of heaven" as continued economic growth. Failure to meet this expectation will cause China's emerging bourgeoisie to question the Party's legitimacy. That question is about a decade away from becoming reality by virtue of demographics.
China's unassimilated minorities must figure into any Western analysis of that country's stability but Western analysts disappoint me by continuing to refer to China as monolithic. This failure to see ethnic nuances is one fatal flaw that early scholars of Oriental despotism such as Karl August Wittfogel never corrected. The PRC's own written constitution refers to the "nations of China." China's insecurity, as expressed in its reassertion of historic claims over seemingly inconsequential islands, is the product of an unfinished nationalist attempt to reconcile some irreconcilable minorities to Han and Manchu primacy. Nationalism as a unifying impulse is the only way China can contain restive Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongolians when economic growth begins to falter. China's unresolved territorial disputes with India over Arunachal Pradesh (aka South Tibet) and other areas are the perfect future rationales for more saber-rattling. I do not expect those areas to be quiet for long once China is unable to meet its own middle class's economic expectations for a "mandate of heaven" in its standard of living.
Oh BTW, those seemingly inconsequential islands are fairly consequential after all. Securing unchallenged basing rights to uninhabited rocks allows China to extend its exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS far beyond its coastal waters. This provides legal precedent for regulating fishing, crabbing, and even ocean transit in a manner that reflects the tributary relationships imperial China once imposed upon its weaker Asian neighbors. China's desire to assert an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the entire East China Sea reflects the same impulse. The US Navy guarantees freedom of navigation through Pacific sea lanes, free of charge to all comers. There is no assurance in Asian history that Chinese naval dominance will be as generous. Any PLA Navy attempt to charge a tariff for transit will provoke an outcry that will demand an international response.
Chinese nationalism is not the self-deterministic expression familiar to Western scholars. It is a resurgence of the ancient imperialist impulse that runs through much of China's pre-modern history. The Beijing Consensus uses economic development and nationalism to restore China's self-image as an empire. The Chinese Dream is the domestic mythos covering that policy consensus. Faltering economic development means nationalism becomes the stronger impulse to maintain the unifying self-image. This is why neoliberal interpreters of the Washington Consensus for economic development misapply the Beijing Consensus as a competing development model for emerging markets. It is no such thing. It is traditional Chinese imperialism, directed simultaneously at China's unassimilated minorities and weaker neighbors. Western analysts can increase their understanding of Asian dynamics by updating some forgotten concepts like the hydraulic empire without Wittfogel's ideological limitations. Himalayan hydrology has everything to do with the water-energy-food security nexus driving China's internal development and its relationship with India over contested territories. The Asia Society and Commonwealth Club should study this Alfidi Capital thesis in more detail. I'm available for speaking engagements in front of VIP audiences, if you know what I mean.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
Analysis of Peter Tomsen, "Rethinking American Policy In Afghanistan"
I recently had the privilege of hearing a lecture at the World Affairs Council of Northern California from Peter Tomsen, a former U.S. diplomat and expert on Afghanistan. His lecture covered a wide swath of Afghan history and linked the U.S. counterinsurgency effort to the historical experiences of other empires that entered Afghanistan. He did of course plug his book The Wars Of Afghanistan, but his lecture was far more than a summary of the book's chapters.
Mr. Tomsen argued that the U.S.'s entry into Afghanistan, like that of empires before, ignored the history of Afghanistan as a primarily tribal nation with a weak central government astride the "high ground" of Central Asia. High ground is usually more valuable in a tactical sense than a strategic one, but the rationale for a foreign presence in Afghanistan is more nuanced. The country was a waystation on the Silk Road trade routes between China and the West, and the Khyber Pass has long been the gateway for imperial invasions (first Indian, then British) into Central Asia.
Afghanistan's only real period of regional hegemony, the Durrani Empire, existed in the interregnum between the decline of India's Mogul empire and the rise of Britain and Russia. I found it interesting that Mr. Tomsen didn't mention that Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's President since the American invasion, is from a tribe that traces its lineage to the Durrani ruling family. That is doubtless one of the sources for his legitimacy.
At any rate, Mr. Tomsen dropped some interesting tidbits:
- U.S. outsourcing its Afghan policy to Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal was a big mistake.
- All three major Taliban fronts in Afghanistan - the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction - are run by the Pakistani ISI.
- Over 80% of the suicide bombers in Afghanistan are Pakistani!
- Iran meddles in Afghanistan; it seeks a broader regional role to counter potential encirclement by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.
- China likes using Pakistan as a hedge against India and would not necessarily endorse any U.S. containment of Pakistani Islamic militancy, even if that risked stirring up Islamic separatists in its own "East Turkestan."
His take on Pakistan's perception of Afghanistan as a source of strategic depth in a potential fight against India is an invaluable insight for Americans trying to understand the "Af-Pak" equation. Pakistan viewed India's diplomatic opening to Afghanistan with suspicion; this in turn stoked further Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan to thwart encirclement by India. I have a pet thesis that compares Pakistan to Prussia in light of a major strategic similarity: Both countries' militarized elites exported instability into their respective "greater abroads" to compensate for their lack of internal unity.
My interpretation of Mr. Tomsen's arguments includes the following:
- The American emphasis on building strong national Afghan institutions like a central government and modern army has upset the historical equilibrium between Kabul and the countryside.
- Leaning hard on Pakistan to clean up its act and pursue terrorists is impossible as long as the primary line of communication (LOC) for NATO/ISAF's force runs through Karachi. The so-called "northern corridor" through the 'stans is insufficient for handling military logistics due to the different rail gauges in use. NATO and the U.S. thus have little alternative but to rely upon ground logistics delivered from the port of Karachi through Pakistan by road, with all the pilferage and bribery that entails.
- Iran's dispatch of warships through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean was more than a strategic breakout directed against Israel. It could also have sent a message to Central Asian rivals.
- Pakistan will keep playing the U.S. for a fool as long as it has China as a back-up hegemon. The only thing that would radically change this equation in the U.S.'s favor would be a clear strategic tilt toward India. A shift on that scale would really spook Beijing but would only be viable after a large U.S. drawdown eliminates the need for a LOC through Pakistan.
Mr. Tomsen eventually argued for taking a long-term view in American foreign policy toward the region. I'll offer my own proposed policy approach. A stable Afghanistan would be open for business in both continental trade and local resource exploration. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. estimates of trillion-dollar metal deposits are recoverable, as the aerial electromagnetic surveys used to derive those estimates are not nearly as accurate as multiple drill core samples from likely veins. Stepping back from involvement in Kabul-centric nation-building will help restore Afghanistan's traditional equilibrium and give us more flexibility in dealing with the country's regional power-brokers (read "warlords" if you will, but that's how business gets done with the leading tribes). If the U.S. wants to forestall Chinese dominance of Afghan mineral resources, we must make deals now with tribal and regional leaders who will be around regardless of who governs in Kabul.
Mr. Tomsen argued that the U.S.'s entry into Afghanistan, like that of empires before, ignored the history of Afghanistan as a primarily tribal nation with a weak central government astride the "high ground" of Central Asia. High ground is usually more valuable in a tactical sense than a strategic one, but the rationale for a foreign presence in Afghanistan is more nuanced. The country was a waystation on the Silk Road trade routes between China and the West, and the Khyber Pass has long been the gateway for imperial invasions (first Indian, then British) into Central Asia.
Afghanistan's only real period of regional hegemony, the Durrani Empire, existed in the interregnum between the decline of India's Mogul empire and the rise of Britain and Russia. I found it interesting that Mr. Tomsen didn't mention that Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's President since the American invasion, is from a tribe that traces its lineage to the Durrani ruling family. That is doubtless one of the sources for his legitimacy.
At any rate, Mr. Tomsen dropped some interesting tidbits:
- U.S. outsourcing its Afghan policy to Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal was a big mistake.
- All three major Taliban fronts in Afghanistan - the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction - are run by the Pakistani ISI.
- Over 80% of the suicide bombers in Afghanistan are Pakistani!
- Iran meddles in Afghanistan; it seeks a broader regional role to counter potential encirclement by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.
- China likes using Pakistan as a hedge against India and would not necessarily endorse any U.S. containment of Pakistani Islamic militancy, even if that risked stirring up Islamic separatists in its own "East Turkestan."
His take on Pakistan's perception of Afghanistan as a source of strategic depth in a potential fight against India is an invaluable insight for Americans trying to understand the "Af-Pak" equation. Pakistan viewed India's diplomatic opening to Afghanistan with suspicion; this in turn stoked further Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan to thwart encirclement by India. I have a pet thesis that compares Pakistan to Prussia in light of a major strategic similarity: Both countries' militarized elites exported instability into their respective "greater abroads" to compensate for their lack of internal unity.
My interpretation of Mr. Tomsen's arguments includes the following:
- The American emphasis on building strong national Afghan institutions like a central government and modern army has upset the historical equilibrium between Kabul and the countryside.
- Leaning hard on Pakistan to clean up its act and pursue terrorists is impossible as long as the primary line of communication (LOC) for NATO/ISAF's force runs through Karachi. The so-called "northern corridor" through the 'stans is insufficient for handling military logistics due to the different rail gauges in use. NATO and the U.S. thus have little alternative but to rely upon ground logistics delivered from the port of Karachi through Pakistan by road, with all the pilferage and bribery that entails.
- Iran's dispatch of warships through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean was more than a strategic breakout directed against Israel. It could also have sent a message to Central Asian rivals.
- Pakistan will keep playing the U.S. for a fool as long as it has China as a back-up hegemon. The only thing that would radically change this equation in the U.S.'s favor would be a clear strategic tilt toward India. A shift on that scale would really spook Beijing but would only be viable after a large U.S. drawdown eliminates the need for a LOC through Pakistan.
Mr. Tomsen eventually argued for taking a long-term view in American foreign policy toward the region. I'll offer my own proposed policy approach. A stable Afghanistan would be open for business in both continental trade and local resource exploration. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. estimates of trillion-dollar metal deposits are recoverable, as the aerial electromagnetic surveys used to derive those estimates are not nearly as accurate as multiple drill core samples from likely veins. Stepping back from involvement in Kabul-centric nation-building will help restore Afghanistan's traditional equilibrium and give us more flexibility in dealing with the country's regional power-brokers (read "warlords" if you will, but that's how business gets done with the leading tribes). If the U.S. wants to forestall Chinese dominance of Afghan mineral resources, we must make deals now with tribal and regional leaders who will be around regardless of who governs in Kabul.
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