US Conservatives Ally With Boko Haram And Refuse to #BringBackOurGirls

Boko Haram, a radical Islamist terror gang, abducted hundreds of Nigerian girls several weeks ago.  The women of the US Senate gathered in support of the #BringBackOurGirls social media meme.  This is so obviously a good idea that you'd think every decent American could see the wisdom in claiming the moral high ground.  Alas, America's loudest conservative pundits registered their objections to the photo below.

Leading voices on the Right have denounced the photo and its meme as weak and pointless.  They have no idea how wrong they are.  Napoleon Bonaparte said it best:  "The moral is to the physical as three to one."  He meant that claiming the moral high ground is an absolute advantage in fighting a conflict.  It clarifies strategic goals to allies and gives domestic morale a boost.  The West is in a multi-decade struggle with radical Islam.  Every time we demonstrate the moral clarity of Western Civilization, we rally neutral people in the developing world to our cause and force jihadis to explain their atrocities.

The anti-female rhetoric I've heard from my conservative colleagues on this photo is disgusting.  They sound pathetic by trotting out old misogynistic stereotypes that working women have tried hard to banish.  The language some Americans have used to describe the Senators is the kind of verbiage a Salafist sheikh might use to describe his harem.  That is not the face America should present to the world.

These hashtags aren't just photo ops anymore.  Social media that goes viral now drives strategic decision making.  This is the power of "information operations" and I assure you that plenty of people in the US national security establishment take crafting these narratives very seriously.  If you disagree, consider how the US will benefit once we share credit for the girls' safe return.

I'd like to know if any of my fellow conservatives see the irony in all of these anti-hashtag comments in light of the Democratic Party's charge that the GOP engages in a "war on women."  I've seen a bunch of comments criticizing women for wanting girls to be safe.  Meanwhile, the US is doing what it can to help Nigerians bring them back.  Do any of you see how getting behind this message sends a powerful signal to Africans who wonder whether the US stands with their hopes?  Seriously, I'd like some answers.

Do any of you conservatives know what millions of Africans are saying right now?  They are openly questioning the radical Islamic groups that have grown throughout the continent.  They do that specifically because of this incident's notoriety.  Getting Americans on the right side of that message is a powerful adjunct to our diplomacy.  Do you people really not see this?

This isn't about Benghazi.  I'm less interested in placing blame for past oversights than in solving a present problem.  American leaders made plenty of missteps in the Cold War but our bipartisan foreign policy won in the end partly because our messaging to the world was based on a morally sound foundation.  Messages of freedom, dignity, and prosperity matter, just as Ronald Reagan taught us with "Morning in America."  Ronald Reagan also taught us that America would not tolerate Islamic terrorists getting away with the Achille Lauro hijacking; he told other would-be murderers, "You can run, but you can't hide."  I believe the Gipper would be totally on board with hunting down Boko Haram fighters and rescuing their captive girls.

I'm throwing it down right now, people.  Anyone who disagrees with what these women Senators have to say in their hashtag should put up a photo of themselves with a #Don'tBringBackTheGirls tag.  I dare you to do something that stupid.  See how well that plays in 2016 when Hillary's operatives run the "GOP anti-women" canard all over again.  I am amazed that Republicans are willing to cede the moral high ground to both Democrats and Boko Haram out of pure spite.  Conservatives should be better than this if they are to convince Americans that the GOP is fit to govern.

It is true that US foreign assistance programs are sometimes messy.  It is difficult to advance a freedom agenda in authoritarian countries.  We succeeded in countries like South Korea and Thailand even though they had military governments for part of their modern history.  Engagement is hard.  The alternative is to cede contested countries to powers that have clear anti-West agendas.  I'll take the 50% solution if I think it can get to 100% with continued US involvement.

Republicans can't seem to say anything positive about Administration figures who have this crisis on their radar.  Hmmm, the Democrats are doing nothing but tweeting?  I guess the Democratic President who directed our national security team to work with the Nigerians doesn't count.  I know exactly how capable the US can be and that's why all of the partisan criticism I'm seeing here is handcuffing the GOP.

Partisanship during the Cold War stopped at the water's edge, and our bipartisan foreign policy won that competition with the Soviet Union.  Today's conservatives (thanks to some Tea Party nutcases) have so little positive news to offer America that they can't resist harassing our own female political leaders.  American conservatives have done a whole lot more than make themselves look like fools.  They have missed a golden opportunity to demonstrate American resolve in the face of the violent jihadi movements they claim to hate so much.  The conservative loudmouths criticizing the #BringBackOurGirls meme have a profoundly immature understanding of information operations.  They have in fact aligned themselves in support of Boko Haram.  

Hidden Narratives in Afghanistan

Critics of the US/NATO mission in Afghanistan point to unintended consequences of military actions.  Their objections have merit if substantiating evidence exists.

One commonly heard allegation is that many attacks on US forces are the result of ordinary Afghans' frustrations with humiliating raids and cultural offenses.  Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made much of these claims and insisted that the US-Afghan security pact include severe restrictions on such raids.  The fact that the US agreed to this restriction shows that its basis has merit.  International news media reports of US troops raiding hospitals do not help America's image.  The rationale for Afghan forces' attacks on their international allies is difficult to pin down.  Analysis reveals a mix of cultural misunderstandings that escalate into perceived offenses, triggering many attacks.  If the most likely attackers are ethnic Pashtuns recruited into Afghan forces from border regions with Pakistan, US forces should focus fratricide prevention efforts on that specific population.

Drone strikes have been a continual point of contention between the US and its Af-Pak partners.  A drone is only as accurate as the intelligence feeding its controller.  Local sources who report faulty information on an HVT's whereabouts may be using US firepower to settle personal scores.  The pending force drawdown will severely limit the number of reliable sources US forces can successfully cultivate.

Human Rights Watch noted in 2001 that combatants employed landmines in Afghanistan long before US forces arrived.  Much of rural Afghanistan still contains mines that kill and main civilians.  The international community does its part to remove landmine hazards through the Halo Trust's de-mining efforts and other organizations.  The US should include funding for de-mining programs as part of its continued US support to Afghan rural development.

The predominant media narrative for the US intervention in Afghanistan is one of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and missed opportunities.  The US's enduring presence in Afghanistan must begin to tell a new narrative in 2014.  The story should lead with something other than interjections into tribal conflict.  

Analysis of Peter Tomsen, "Rethinking American Policy In Afghanistan"

I recently had the privilege of hearing a lecture at the World Affairs Council of Northern California from Peter Tomsen, a former U.S. diplomat and expert on Afghanistan.  His lecture covered a wide swath of Afghan history and linked the U.S. counterinsurgency effort to the historical experiences of other empires that entered Afghanistan.  He did of course plug his book The Wars Of Afghanistan, but his lecture was far more than a summary of the book's chapters.

Mr. Tomsen argued that the U.S.'s entry into Afghanistan, like that of empires before, ignored the history of Afghanistan as a primarily tribal nation with a weak central government astride the "high ground" of Central Asia.  High ground is usually more valuable in a tactical sense than a strategic one, but the rationale for a foreign presence in Afghanistan is more nuanced.  The country was a waystation on the Silk Road trade routes between China and the West, and the Khyber Pass has long been the gateway for imperial invasions (first Indian, then British) into Central Asia. 

Afghanistan's only real period of regional hegemony, the Durrani Empire, existed in the interregnum between the decline of India's Mogul empire and the rise of Britain and Russia.  I found it interesting that Mr. Tomsen didn't mention that Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's President since the American invasion, is from a tribe that traces its lineage to the Durrani ruling family.  That is doubtless one of the sources for his legitimacy.   

At any rate, Mr. Tomsen dropped some interesting tidbits:
- U.S. outsourcing its Afghan policy to Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal was a big mistake. 
- All three major Taliban fronts in Afghanistan - the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction - are run by the Pakistani ISI. 
- Over 80% of the suicide bombers in Afghanistan are Pakistani!
- Iran meddles in Afghanistan; it seeks a broader regional role to counter potential encirclement by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.
- China likes using Pakistan as a hedge against India and would not necessarily endorse any U.S. containment of Pakistani Islamic militancy, even if that risked stirring up Islamic separatists in its own "East Turkestan."

His take on Pakistan's perception of Afghanistan as a source of strategic depth in a potential fight against India is an invaluable insight for Americans trying to understand the "Af-Pak" equation.  Pakistan viewed India's diplomatic opening to Afghanistan with suspicion; this in turn stoked further Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan to thwart encirclement by India.  I have a pet thesis that compares Pakistan to Prussia in light of a major strategic similarity:  Both countries' militarized elites exported instability into their respective "greater abroads" to compensate for their lack of internal unity. 

My interpretation of Mr. Tomsen's arguments includes the following:
- The American emphasis on building strong national Afghan institutions like a central government and modern army has upset the historical equilibrium between Kabul and the countryside.
- Leaning hard on Pakistan to clean up its act and pursue terrorists is impossible as long as the primary line of communication (LOC) for NATO/ISAF's force runs through Karachi.  The so-called "northern corridor" through the 'stans is insufficient for handling military logistics due to the different rail gauges in use.  NATO and the U.S. thus have little alternative but to rely upon ground logistics delivered from the port of Karachi through Pakistan by road, with all the pilferage and bribery that entails. 
- Iran's dispatch of warships through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean was more than a strategic breakout directed against Israel.  It could also have sent a message to Central Asian rivals. 
- Pakistan will keep playing the U.S. for a fool as long as it has China as a back-up hegemon.  The only thing that would radically change this equation in the U.S.'s favor would be a clear strategic tilt toward India.  A shift on that scale would really spook Beijing but would only be viable after a large U.S. drawdown eliminates the need for a LOC through Pakistan. 

Mr. Tomsen eventually argued for taking a long-term view in American foreign policy toward the region.  I'll offer my own proposed policy approach.  A stable Afghanistan would be open for business in both continental trade and local resource exploration.  It remains to be seen whether the U.S. estimates of trillion-dollar metal deposits are recoverable, as the aerial electromagnetic surveys used to derive those estimates are not nearly as accurate as multiple drill core samples from likely veins.  Stepping back from involvement in Kabul-centric nation-building will help restore Afghanistan's traditional equilibrium and give us more flexibility in dealing with the country's regional power-brokers (read "warlords" if you will, but that's how business gets done with the leading tribes).  If the U.S. wants to forestall Chinese dominance of Afghan mineral resources, we must make deals now with tribal and regional leaders who will be around regardless of who governs in Kabul.