Africa Brightens Its Day

Africa still wrestles with its colonial legacies.  Pierre Englebert's State Legitimacy and Development in Africa discusses illegitimate states whose modern functions are not contiguous with their pre-colonial functions, partly due to artificially drawn borders.  Their seemingly interminable corruption and inefficiency stem from the difficulty of managing these borders.  These states expend enormous resources supporting themselves instead of funding vital public goods.  State corruption precludes African entrepreneurs from counting on a fair shake from their own leaders.  This provides a window into what is going right in Africa.

Africa has room to grow.  The World Bank's data for Sub-Saharan Africa shows that it lags behind the MENA region in GNI per capita and life expectancy.  MENA's oil-producing countries have their own problems with artificial borders and corruption yet they outperform their southern neighbors.  The oil wealth of the MENA region is not the only explanation for its advantage over the rest of Africa.  A large number of the World Bank's heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) are in Sub-Saharan Africa.  None of the developing MENA countries appear in the HIPC group.  The explanation for the development differential between MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa isn't as simplistic as the presence of oil in the north and the burden of debt in the south.  Knowing that this disparity exists provides a context for national developmental goals; resource-rich African countries can export their way to success rather easily, while debt-burdened countries cannot.  This developmental gap needs further analysis.

Africa has the multilateral institutions it needs.  The African Union and African Development Bank speak for the continent.  Whether they speak for corrupt autocrats or ordinary Africans is up for debate.  State illegitimacy casts doubt on the ability of officials to push true development agendas without lining their own pockets.  Bottom-up agendas can build credibility in areas that top-down agendas can't reach.  Bankers Without Borders' Sub-Saharan program has completed multiple microeconomic assessments that allow investors to bypass dysfunctional state programs.  This philosophy supports the Center for Financial Inclusion's FI2020 goal of maximizing the participation of developing country citizens in the world's financial markets.  Even the UN Research Institute for Social Development recognizes the importance of non-state mechanisms for socioeconomic development.

Africa has the culture and infrastructure for innovation.  Nigeria's "Nollywood" produces more movies than the US.  The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is like a hybrid of the US's own intergovernmental bodies devoted to innovation.  The Africa Finance Corporation channels investors into infrastructure projects, although its initial capital and membership are limited.  A Google search of that organization with the word "corruption" reveals some troubling early stories of mismanagement.

The World Bank's data on value-added manufacturing reveals that Africa's efforts at developing a hi-tech economy have not yet borne fruit.  The Excel data download comes in handy for regional comparisons.  Both the MENA and Sub-Saharan regions trail the US and world averages for the portion of the economy devoted to value-added manufacturing.  Interestingly, both regions do track fairly closely to the numbers for the HIPC group.  If manufacturing doesn't differentiate MENA from Sub-Saharan Africa, then resource extraction is probably the key difference between those regions.

Development usually follows a clear pattern in the life of most nations, and it is hard to skip from agriculture and extractive sectors directly to high-tech innovation.  The US and Germany were large agricultural producers whose exports produced excess capital available for investment in manufacturing.  Many African nations have abundant natural resources.  They need leaders with the foresight to convert resource exports into capital surpluses for their domestic tech sectors.  The UN's Global Pulse reports on Big Data in development can show African leaders how to leverage their countries' unique gifts.

There is more to Africa than its outdated Western references can describe, just as Dayo Olopade's book The Bright Continent is more than a play on words for Africa's colonial nickname.  Her "kanju" self-starters take a System D approach to innovation.  The M-Pesa mobile payment system is the classic result of this mentality and even MIT Sloan recognizes its value.   Africans don't need to thank the West for its aid.  They should instead thank themselves for remaining open to the possibilities that development brings.  

China's Resource Pursuit Is Inseparable From Its Security Pursuit

Two distinguished geopolitical scholars presented their analysis of "China's Rise and the Global Resource Game" at the World Affairs Council of Northern California tonight.  I have not yet read their companion book By All Means Necessary but now it's on my list.  I have read the China National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) mission statements.  Read them yourselves to see the Politburo's strategic intent.  China's leadership absolutely believes the quest for resources bolsters its security, and that it must pursue a stronger security posture to obtain the commodities it needs.  The two are so intertwined that any outside attempt to interfere with one pursuit will imperil the other.  This is the fundamental fact that the West and China's Asian neighbors must understand when dealing with China.

I am inclined to agree with the authors that China's state-sponsored strategy of resource acquisition is tailored to microeconomic circumstances.  Coal is a terrific example.  China has almost as much coal as the United States but most of it is not nearly as high in quality.  That is why China still seeks to expand its coal capacity . . . by all means necessary.  One factor driving China's coal quest is a resurgence of resource nationalism in Mongolia, where some major Chinese coal producers had lost major investments when Mongolia recently decided to restrict foreign ownership of its resource projects.  I wonder if a PRC representative will address this at the next China Coal and Mining Expo.

China's energy quest does not stop with coal, and China analysts could do more to explain the country's challenges developing hydropower, natural gas, and solar technology.  China is determined to dam the Mekong and other major rivers, with little regard for the water needs of its downstream neighbors.  Refer to my previous Third Eye OSINT analysis of water security, and note my discovery that China does not participate in transboundary water management (TWM) mechanisms.  I will restate my belief that the US can play the role of honest broker in Asia.  It may have already begun to play this role.  Witness this agreement between China's NDRC and the US EPA.  The US is trying to align China with international norms mitigating climate change.  The next logical step is to help China build the capacity for settling disputes peacefully with its neighbors in ways that do not disrupt Asia's water-energy-food security nexus.

I sometimes chuckle to myself when analysts outside the mining sector try to describe China's rare earth element (REE) mining policies.  I gave an interview to the Gold Report in December 2011 on rare earth metals, and I predicted that China's ability to produce REEs would have more to do with global demand than with its export quotas.  The markets proved me to be correct in 2012.  The world prices of rare earth metals plummeted that year and have remained low.  Investors who went all-in on REE stocks at the top of that bubble have been hurting ever since.  China keeps its export quotas just high enough to exceed expected global demand, while it uses environmental laws as a stalking horse to consolidate domestic production and shut down underperforming mines.

I blogged about my experience on the TREM12 panel in March 2012, where I further elaborated on my REE market analysis in front of Washington DC policymakers and mining industry big shots.  I will continue to toot my own horn on this subject because the halls of power can benefit from my genius.  I'll boil down China's basic REE strategy in a nutshell.  The fact that China mines over 95% of the world's REE product is less important than the fact that it owns 100% of the world's oxide and concentrate refining capacity.  Even REE ore mined outside China must still be shipped to China for the final metallurgy that turns it into specialty alloys for industrial use.  Digging new REE mines in Canada and elsewhere gives the West little strategic leverage without a multi-year investment in the processing capacity and engineering knowledge that breaks China's real monopoly.  Full disclosure:  I have a small equity investment in a privately held company that is attempting to break this monopoly by establishing a world-class REE processing facility in North America.  I put my money where my mouth is because I am all about solutions.

I find the two authors' approach to "state capacity" intriguing.  The Wilson Center has a program for building state capacity that could have been a usable framework for the US military's advise and assist missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The NBER thinks state capacity germinates in common interest public goods.  Another NBER study traces the relationship between state capacity, taxation, and conflict.  Nation-building is a big topic for another article, but there are simple metrics for assessing state capacity.  The two authors' example of China's desire to import timber from Russia left me wondering which state they consider to be stronger.  It may be a question of which state is less dysfunctional, or which is less captive to an oligarchical elite.  Consider some comparative metrics for these two countries.

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranks China 80th and Russia 127th.
The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom ranks China 137th and Russia 140th.
The World Bank Logistics Performance Index ranks China 26th and Russia 95th.
Standard and Poor's rates sovereign credit as AA- for China and as BBB to BBB+ for Russia.
Freedom House's Freedom In The World Index rates China as 6.5 and Russia as 5.5 (on a scale where 1 is best and 7 is worst).

It looks to me like the People's Republic of China is a stronger state than the Russian Federation almost across the board.  Russia is slightly higher on Freedom House's scale but both countries are pretty much in the basement on that metric.  Adding more metrics can provide a fuller illustration.

I like hearing from the World Affairs Council's guests, especially when they come all the way out to San Francisco from the Council on Foreign Relations.  Now it's their turn to hear from me.  I would be overjoyed to add my own perspectives to the CFR's deliberations if someone would be generous enough to sponsor me for membership.  The CFR needs market expertise that bolsters its geopolitical bench strength.  Come and get it from Yours Truly, Anthony J. Alfidi, aka "Greatest Man Who Ever Lived."  

First Glance At Global Water Risk For 2014

Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Rime of the Ancient Mariner" pondered "Water, water, every where, nor any drop to drink."  That's one of the coolest lines I've ever seen in literature.  It's also a cool segue to discussing risks to global stability from a lack of access to potable water.  Three fourths of the earth's surface is covered in water but only a small amount is fit for human consumption.  That small amount will be subject to competition in the years ahead.

The World Resources Institute studies water risk through its Aqueduct global mapping tool.  I mentioned last year that a China-India resource conflict within 15 years (thus, by 2028) is my pet theory.  The Aqueduct map shows India more stressed for water than China in each scenario.  Perusing the Aqueduct's supporting publications reveals those river basins under the most stress from water extraction.  A large number of the highest-risk basins are in China, Central Asia, and the Middle East.  

Water supply risk gets a special mention in the World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report for 2014.  This report cites food and water crises as major risks but does not link them to a water-energy-food nexus that implies tradeoffs and prioritization of efforts.  A couple of paragraphs in Box 1.3 on page 15 do not do the topic justice.  I find it odd that the report places both water and food in the upper-right quadrant of its global risk matrix but an oil price shock is in the lower left quadrant.  It seems to me that an energy price shock in the water-energy-food nexus will almost immediately drive secondary effects in water and food.  The vulnerability of water production industrial control systems to cyberattack is another risk the WEF identified separately, even though that can also impact the water-energy-food nexus.

The UN's World Water Development Report (WWDR) will be an annual guide for policymakers once the next edition comes out this year.  While we wait for that publication, the UN-Water Analytical Brief from October 2013 expands upon the water-energy-food nexus as a basis for security.  The most positive observation in that brief is the recognition of transboundary water management (TWM) commissions where neighboring countries can discuss water management.  I am unclear at present whether these commissions can adjudicate disputes as binding arbitrators; I'm guessing that they cannot unless they point to signed UN conventions or other sources of international law.  I like that the brief assigns a dollar figure to watershed management in some regions.  

My first glance impression, based on the above studies and what I learned at the WorldAffairs 2013 conference last March, is that Pakistan will come under water pressure first and most severely of all the potential crisis regions.  Pakistan's water from the Indus River originates in India.  Pakistan will face a tradeoff between agriculture and hydropower if it doesn't get enough water for both functions.  This will force it to play an increasingly destabilizing game provoking India via Kashmir.  India will be tempted to retaliate by extending its influence into Afghanistan as a back-door way to destabilize Pakistan.  New Delhi is already preparing this strategic option by extending diplomatic and military overtures to Kabul.  India can win a conventional conflict with Pakistan over water access, provided the conflict does not go nuclear and China does not intervene with military force.

The Middle East is a different story.  Every major Middle East river is shared by two or more nations and national borders do not coincide with watershed boundaries.  Water is more important than oil because it has no substitutes, but the Middle East's vast oil and gas resources enable it to adapt water infrastructure to the region's needs.  Water systems present attractive terrorist targets but shared management among regional rivals can be a basis for cooperation that deters state-sponsored groups from attacking infrastructure.  The Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC) offers a way forward that is neutral toward infrastructure for delivery, as almost every Middle East nation borders the open sea and most are wealthy enough to afford desalination technology.

Water shortages are relevant to Syria's instability, possibly more so than the Arab Spring.  The country's population growth stressed its environment and a multi-year drought from 2006-11 drove millions of rural dwellers into food insecurity and urban migration.  The Assad regime subsidized water-intensive crops, favoring inefficient techniques (i.e., flooding over precision irrigation) that overdrew groundwater.

There's no shortage of knowledge about water resources.  I believe TWM entities will find it useful.  Trade in food and other commodities represents the transfer of virtual water, or embedded water, between regions.  The Global Water Partnership (GWP)  has a useful toolbox for applying integrated water resources management (IWRM) that impacts the virtual water trade.  The Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) awarded its most prestigious prize to the CGIAR International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and helps implement the UNDP Water Governance Facility (WGF).  These are all transnational sources of best practices.  Applying their lessons in Asia and the Middle East requires TWM bodies ready to go to work.

The lack of reputable TWM organizations in the Middle East and Asia will be a detriment to regional stability.  Arab recalcitrance over the US-sponsored Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan was a partial cause of the 1967 Six-Day War.  The only TWM organization covering Israel and its Arab neighbors I have found is the Arava Institute's Center for Trans-boundary Water Management.  The Carnegie Endowment presented its "Blue Peace" comprehensive IWRM plan in 2011, but I do not know whether any Middle Eastern nations signed on for implementation.  The Indian-based Strategic Foresight Group published "Water Cooperation for a Secure World," regarding the potential for water resource cooperation to reduce the risk of war.  My Web search for evidence of water cooperation between India and China indicates the two countries have been willing to share data, but long-term cooperation is hampered by their border disputes.

The world's water problems present an opportunity for the United States to emerge as an honest broker in regions key to its strategic interests.  The US can use a DIME-based outreach via USAID water and sanitation development programs focusing on efficiency and demand reduction.  The DIME approach's success metric should be a reduction in the target region's water footprint, using the Water Footprint Network's data.  Leveraging the World Bank's work on water development will give the DIME effort credibility.

Asia and the Middle East will have to manage their water resources in different ways, with or without US assistance.  The UN FAO Natural Resources and Environment Department has data and programs useful in resolving water disputes, most of which are now sub-national.  If regional rivals cannot peacefully adjudicate water disputes through TWM commissions, they will come into conflict.  There is no substitute for water.  The Pacific Institute maintains a Water Conflict Chronology.  The list of conflicts is likely to grow in the future.  

BRICS Offer Hollow Talk On Development Bank And Reinsurance

It's hard to say just what the BRICS are all about.  They share no common culture or language.  They mostly have scarce natural resources with the exception of Russia's hydrocarbons, South Africa's minerals, and China's hydroelectricity.  They compensate for their differences by finding things to do together, proudly stating to the world they they do not subscribe to the Anglo-American financial hegemony . . . except of course when it's absolutely necessary.

The BRICS have proposed to create their own BRICS Development Bank.  They are not ready to launch it because they have not funded its contingent reserve, which would require them all to liquidate sufficient US dollar holdings.  Selling US$100B worth of Treasuries is no small task and would not escape the currency markets' attention.  It remains to be seen whether the reserve will be a mix of the participants' currencies or some instrument resembling the IMF's Special Drawing Rights.

They also seek to establish their own transnational reinsurance firm.  I believe the public stance that it will serve to underwrite infrastructure investments is only one rationale.  The reinsurance firm and development bank together could theoretically send transaction confirmations that will not be subject to US interdiction through its control of the SWIFT network.  This alternative financial regime would be one way to avoid punitive sanctions against the BRICS' trading partners.  Setting up an alternative communication network means designing protocols for encryption, transmission, and storage that the NSA cannot penetrate.  No alternative financial hegemony can emerge until the BRICS own a secure network.

The BRICS are not ready for prime time as a geopolitical bloc.  This is not to say they cannot eventually emerge as an alternative to the US-led Atlantic alliance but consensus will be difficult with no clearly dominant power.  They have difficulty coordinating policy because they do not share common cultures, borders, or history.  Contrast this with US leadership during the Cold War.  Its economic strength enabled it to control institutions like the IMF and World Bank that could enforce international norms.  The BRICS bloc is about as coordinated and purposeful as the Non-Aligned Movement in the Cold War, and it's proving to be just as ineffective.  They should stick to their original use as an acronym among Goldman Sachs' research ideas.  

The Haiku of OSINT for 07/10/13

Power Africa
So many small agencies
Doing the same work

Uncle Sam's Proliferating Development Agencies Will "Power Africa"

I have read the fact sheet on Power Africa, the Administration's new effort to bring economic development to a long-neglected part of the world.  I am totally in favor of a smart US development effort in Africa to counter China's huge influence.  Power Africa is interagency and leverages the private sector; so far so good.  Reading the list of agencies involved has started to make me wonder how the US got so many.

US Agency for International Development (USAID):  This is the oldest official home for foreign aid in the US Government and used to be part of the State Department.  I never understood why it was carved out into a separate agency.  The Executive Office of the President and National Security Council have a span of control that is not infinitely wide.  Every separate agency complicates Cabinet-level accountability, appropriations, reporting, auditing, you name it.  If I could wave a magic wand over Washington DC, I'd put USAID back in State so the White House can more easily pin the rose on a lead agency for an interagency development project.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC):  This one's been around a while too.  I'm assuming it's involved to reduce the cost of capital for those private companies named as participants in Power Africa. The one private participant that doesn't need any more such breaks is General Electric.  Its GE Capital unit has been tagged "systemically important" and will not be allowed to fail anyway.

U.S. Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im):  I'm glad this one is on board but I'd prefer that it target its help to small and medium-size US businesses that want to export to Africa.  The named businesses are all heavy hitters.  Smaller businesses need to attend the Corporate Council on Africa's 9th Biennial US-Africa Business Summit this coming October so they know how to open doors over there.

Millennium Challenge Corporation:  This one is the youngest of the agencies, less than a decade old and designed exclusively to fight poverty.  I just don't understand why it's not part of USAID.  It has the same mission!

US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA):  Here's another miscellaneous independent agency that does the same thing as OPIC and Ex-Im!  It needs to be merged with one of those agencies.

US African Development Foundation (USADF):  Wow, here's another one I've never heard of until now.    It's been around for three decades and now has a clear role to play thanks to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  It's nice to conceive of these kinds of agencies as entrepreneurial because of their small size and limited oversight, but I just wonder how many others are out there and whether they duplicate something a larger agency does.

BTW, I've also never heard of Africa Finance Corporation but it's in this project too.  They must be the most reputable local partner Uncle Sam could find.  Its multilateral nature means Africans can handle African affairs quite well.

I want Power Africa to succeed.  I also want its enabling agencies to support their private sector partners effectively.  IMHO that will require, at some point, a review of whether some of the federal executive agencies involved are duplicative and need to be merged.  That in itself would set a good example for our African partners who look to the US as a model of transparency and efficiency.

Kudos to Somaly Mam for Liberating Women

Somaly Mam is a legendary human rights worker who shared her experiences with a capacity audience at WAC NorCal this month.  She spoke plainly and from the heart about her work.  Her namesake Somaly Mam Foundation does great work in helping oppressed women escape from captivity.  The International Museum of Women and the Vital Voices Global Partnership helped get her message out.

Today is Fathers' Day in the US, which is an appropriate reason to comment on Ms. Mam's message.  She noted that anti-trafficking programs tend to demonize men, but both genders need to be educated on how to stop trafficking.  Volunteers at her centers in Cambodia teach women skills that will help them escape from trafficking.

Her talk got me thinking about whether captive women would benefit from mobile connectivity to the outside world.  I suspect that Westerners assume that digital technology hasn't penetrated developing nations' rural areas.  That may be incorrect.  The World Bank estimates that mobile phone coverage reaches three quarters of the world's population.  The UN Development Programme has a plan to use mobile technology to accelerate its Millennium Development Goals.  Any non-profit that seeks to reach an underprivileged captive audience would do well to write apps that their beneficiaries can use.  The problem facing women in captive situations is that their captors may confiscate their mobile devices.  I don't have a good answer to that problem.  Perhaps non-profit app writers could encrypt their apps to avoid the captor's detection.

Ms. Mam reports that multinational corporations are getting better at monitoring their supply chains to ensure subcontractors don't engage in human trafficking.  The hospitality industry has developed protocols to ensure franchises in developing countries aren't used for illicit activity.  Unfortunately, human trafficking is also a problem here in the United States.  A web search reveals just how much attention various government agencies give this serious problem.  The US State Department staffs a monitoring office and chairs a Presidential interagency task force.  The FBI investigates human smuggling.  DHS tracks human traffickers and protects their victims.  ICE has tools to track human trafficking as it crosses our borders.  This campaign is a demonstration of American values that the world needs to hear about more often.

Somaly Mam is a modern hero for her tireless work.  Human trafficking is a criminal effort facilitated by the same outlaw groups that distribute narcotics and black-market weaponry.  The rest of the world has a lot more work to do to stop human trafficking.

Daniel Green, "Reconstructing Afghanistan" At The MMC

Daniel Green, Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, spoke recently at the Marines Memorial Club on "Reconstructing Afghanistan."  This was another lecture co-sponsored by the World Affairs Council, where I used to hold a membership until I got too busy with all of my Web blogging action.  I attended and took good notes.  My observations are in italics.

Mr. Green talked about his experiences on a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, the stomping grounds for Hamid Karzai's early supporters.  His brief description of the topography tells us how hard it is to build infrastructure in parts of A-stan.  The population lives along green belts near rivers in a mostly desert province.  Check out pics online of terraced farms in parts of A-stan.  Then try to imagine the futility of building millions of dollars worth of roads and sewer systems to service an agricultural village whose annual economic productivity can probably be measured in the low five figures. 

Mr. Green mentioned that Karzai's status as head of the Popalzai tribe gave him credibility as a Durrani leader, but didn't go further into A-stan's history.  Here's the significance.  The Durrani Empire was probably Afghanistan's golden age, when it was expansive enough to hold both Persia and India at bay.  A legitimate Durrani lineage helps explain Karzai's staying power.  It also explains Mr. Green's comment that the Oruzgan governor was not necessarily into good governance but remained a Karzai ally.  Their politics aren't like ours, folks, and their standards for good governance are not what we would demand in the Anglo-West. 

Oruzgan province was mostly safe when Mr. Green's PRT arrived in 2005 but only seven months later the Taliban had stepped up activities with more sophisticated attacks.  More foreign fighters showed up to join the party.  The PRT had to shut down its good governance projects due to the violence.  The U.S. didn't understand the importance of village-level engagement and spent little developmental aid on small villages due to its orientation on conventional nation-state governance.  Maybe we should check out the book and movie versions of The Ugly American before we do any more nation-building in countries that don't function as nations. 

One thing Mr. Green wanted to emphasize is that the U.S. drawdown through 2014 is not at all synonymous with a complete departure.  The U.S. is staying in Afghanistan, in some form, for a very long time.  The Afghans interpret White House pronouncements as a departure, so being the survivors they are they will hedge their strategic bets.  Keep that in mind the next time you hear Hamid Karzai making friendly moves toward Iran or India.  He's being more pro-Afghanistan than anti-American and his moves play well with his home audience.  Remember also that the Taliban are primarily a Pashtun movement, and his own Pashtun lineage matters.  Karzai's public comments that may rile the U.S. will give him crucial credibility at the negotiating table if he is to ever successfully disarm the Taliban and re-orient them toward nonviolence.  We miss the nuances of this in the Western media.

America's bad strategic habits in foreign intervention are all to familiar to Mr. Green.  He noted how we tend to underestimate problems and later throw money and technology at them because that's what we understand.  He likes the AfPak Hands program and thinks it needs special management; it can be an antidote to the short-term thinking paradigm the U.S. uses to solve long-term problems.  I for one would love to become an AfPak Hand.  There's no way we can understand that region without a cadre of people dedicated to its permanent study.

The mention of village stability operations caught my attention in the lecture.  This is an effort by NATO/ISAF conventional forces to position themselves inside villages and build tribal-based defense forces around them.  This immediately reminded me of Army Special Forces Major Jim Gant's concept of Tribal Engagement Teams.  If you've never heard of it, read about it in the milblogosphere.  I had the chance to ask Mr. Green afterwards if village stability ops were based on Maj. Gant's ideas; he said the approach was heavily informed by Maj. Gant's work and is spreading rapidly.  Wow, we actually learned something and applied it.  America is number one!

Mr. Green obliquely mentioned that U.S. policy on Pakistan needs review because we are partially subsidizing covert wars against ourselves by supporting Pakistan.  The unspoken limitation of any substantive policy review is the dependence of U.S. forces on a ground line of communications (i.e., a logistics corridor) from the port of Karachi.  Any force footprint larger than roughly a division will need resupply from some direction other than the northern rail corridor, which is inefficient because changes in rail gauges through the 'Stans slow down railcar movement.  Reviewing our support for Pakistan means reducing our force structure so Pakistani logistics doesn't hold us hostage.  This is part of the rationale behind announcements of drawdowns until 2014.  I hear your frustration, Mr. Green. 

He framed a choice comment about fighting with allies very diplomatically.  NATO countries seem to prefer the political benefit of participation in ISAF over actual fighting.  Many NATO forces have immature COIN approaches, learned little from Iraq, and restrict their fighting with too many caveats.  Winston Churchill had a choice quote about fighting with allies, but he assumed allies would actually do some real fighting.  There's a running joke that ISAF stands for "I Saw America Fight."

Here's an observation on the interagency effort that's worth repeating.  Mr. Green was disappointed that USAID had devolved from a competent organization in the 1960s to having too few field agents, little COIN understanding, and a limited focus on contract monitoring.  This dovetailed into his comment about NGOs lacking accountability, staying in the capital too much, and undermining Afghan sovereignty.  This is the logical result of outsourcing government functions.  Governance is the core of an aid effort, and legitimacy comes from government-to-government contact.  Perhaps the U.S. Army should detail some civil affairs troops to USAID, because synching the CMOC doesn't seem to be working if our institutions are that weak.

BTW, there may be a better way to do opium mitigation.  Mr. Green said Marine forces are working this in Helmand province.  The U.S. should give those opium farmers some biodiesel reactors so they can turn poppies into fuel.  Granted, that's only a concept.  It won't be viable unless farmers could sell their biodiesel for more than what they'd make for a comparable opium crop. 

A couple more observations are worth repeating.  Al Qaeda sticks out like a sore thumb in A-stan and may fill the vacuum if the U.S. leaves completely.  The Arab Spring encourages reform without reliance upon Al Qaeda's extremism.  I wonder if Mr. Green knows of the Muslim Brotherhood's extensive network in the Middle East; there may not be much reform with them in charge after elections are held.  Embedding U.S. personnel 24/7 with Afghan forces is effective.  Local police are less educated and professional than the Afghan army.  Having an enduring U.S. ground presence is essential to avoid throwing away what we've gained from our dislodgement of the Taliban and Al Qaeda; ground forces develop intelligence on local personalities and safe havens that enable strike packages against high value targets.  That last comment brings out what a military force does in COIN and also reveals the military's limits.  It takes a lot of nation-building effort to get sufficient intel for even a limited strike on one bad guy's hideout.  The nation-building renders his hideout untenable by making local villages secure and prosperous.  That is why the U.S. will be in Afghanistan, in some fashion, for a long time.  Oh, yeah, there's a lot of very valuable minerals there too.