Relative Cultural Power: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey

The tripartite struggle for leadership of the Islamic world between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey rages on in the modern world. These regional powers probe each other's peripheries indirectly. Turkey's deliberate blind eye to the rise of ISIL, for example, was a gamble that instability in Shiite Syria would drain Iran's strategic strength. Regional powers also compete with cultural influence. Modern social science provides data for a useful comparison of these three nations' cultural "soft power" in their regional competition.

Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede has a lifetime of work on cultural power on his personal website. We don't have to go all the way to the Netherlands to use his wisdom. Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory is a lens through which we can view a nation's cultural inclinations. Comparing the six Hofstede scores of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey can tell us how they are likely to interact as regional powers. The Hofstede Centre has enough data on each of these countries to make meaningful comparisons.

I pulled the Hofstede Centre's country comparison drop-down menu for the three countries in question. I also viewed their data on the United States as a baseline for comparison. The US scores high on individualism, masculinity, and indulgence. Iran scores higher than the US on power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Saudi Arabia scores higher than the US on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. Turkey also scores higher than the US on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. The obvious first impression from this baseline comparison is that these three Middle Eastern powers have very different cultural priorities than the US. Their higher power distance scores predispose them to accept autocratic regimes. High preferences for uncertainty avoidance would favor maintenance of their existing social orders and formal rules, even if this comes at a high cost in economic losses or human suffering.

Comparing the three countries to each other reveals that Saudi Arabia has by far the highest power distance and masculinity. This implies that Saudi Arabia has the most to lose from disruptions to its social order by ISIL or other non-state actors, and that it would respond to such disruption in a more masculine way. Note that a masculine policy from Saudi Arabia is not necessarily the same as an effective military response. Saudi armed forces are notoriously ineffective, as their difficulties in combating Yemen's Houthi faction make clear. The strong Saudi commitment to fighting in Yemen leaves it strategically vulnerable to any ISIL penetration of its northern border. Any social stress from fighting an insurgency on two borders would be exceptionally acute for Saudi Arabia given its high Hofstede scored for masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.

Third Eye OSINT assess that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will continue to prefer proxy fights against ISIL and each other in the near term. The countries' strong preferences for maintaining social order, as measured by their Hofstede scores, currently outweigh any inclination to express their rivalry in more masculine forms like direct combat. Cultural norms offer one predictive approach in conjunction with other considerations of geostrategy, such as demographic pressures, economic cycles,  and competition for resources. The three primary Middle Eastern rivals will continue to test each other's influence. Their cultural preferences indicate how severely they will react to existential threats from non-state actors like ISIL.

Iraq Liberation Ten Year Anniversary Scorecard

Ten years ago today, the United States led a coalition of the willing to liberate Iraq from the Saddam Hussein regime.  Let's run through the neighborhood and examine the strategic results.

Iraq.  The liberated Iraqi people suffered anywhere from 109,000 to over 1,000,000 deaths, depending on who does the counting and whether it includes sectarian violence and deaths from disease or malnutrition.  Iraq is no longer governed by an autocrat but its democratic institutions are still weak.  The country is still periodically beset by sectarian violence and instability.  The good news is that Iraq has functioning democratic institutions and is producing oil for export, although energy supermajors are beginning to sour on Iraq's business climate and poor infrastructure.  The bad news is that the Sunni and Kurd minorities are not full partners in Iraq's governance.  Iraq is a winner, just barely.

Iran.  The Islamic Republic of Iran has been ascendant since the overthrow of the Saddam regime.  Its remaining regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel, are unwilling to officially cooperate to restrain potential Iranian hegemony.  A continued U.S. military presence in the Middle East deters Iran's overt ambitions.  This does not deter Iran from using asymmetric methods to influence the Syrian insurrection (Quds Force support to the Assad regime) or the Iraqi government (support to Shiite sect leaders).  Iran is probably the biggest winner of the war.

Saudi Arabia.  American assurances sustain the kingdom against external threats.  Oil revenue sustains it against internal unrest.  The House of Saud bribed its citizens to ignore the Arab Spring and the gamble paid off.  The Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force stopped Bahrain's unrest from spreading.  It's business as usual in Riyadh as if nothing changed in Baghdad.  Saudi Arabia is a big winner.

Kuwait.  The Saddam regime posed an existential threat to Kuwait as long as it existed.  Kuwait now has a much freer hand in dealing with its neighbors.  A large U.S. military presence in the Emirate ensures its security.  Kuwait is a big winner.

Israel.  The oldest democracy in the Middle East is no longer faced with the threat of land invasion or ballistic missile attack from Iraq.  The Palestinian insurgency is still a problem but it has one less Arab sponsor.  Israel is a big winner.

United States.  America's years in Iraq cost over 4400 combat-related casualties and have afflicted thousands more veterans with combinations of mild ailments and severe wounds.  The best estimates of the financial costs exceed US$2T including direct appropriations, interest on debt, supplementary expenses in related budget lines (State Department aid), and deferred costs of veterans' care.  The opportunity costs of careers unfulfilled and businesses interrupted by repeated mobilizations of the military reserve components are incalculable.  The U.S. gained no permanent military basing rights other than the right to continue a large advisory mission under the supervision of its embassy in Baghdad.   Concessions for U.S.-based energy producers were mostly limited to support services and a U.S.-Iraq trade framework has taken eight years to implement.  The U.S. strategic position as guarantor of the balance of power in the Middle East is unchanged; this came at an enormous cost in lives, prestige, material, and treasure.  The United States cannot lose as long as it remains engaged in the Middle East with all elements of its national power, but the price of truly winning is now higher than ever.