Relative Cultural Power: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey

The tripartite struggle for leadership of the Islamic world between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey rages on in the modern world. These regional powers probe each other's peripheries indirectly. Turkey's deliberate blind eye to the rise of ISIL, for example, was a gamble that instability in Shiite Syria would drain Iran's strategic strength. Regional powers also compete with cultural influence. Modern social science provides data for a useful comparison of these three nations' cultural "soft power" in their regional competition.

Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede has a lifetime of work on cultural power on his personal website. We don't have to go all the way to the Netherlands to use his wisdom. Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory is a lens through which we can view a nation's cultural inclinations. Comparing the six Hofstede scores of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey can tell us how they are likely to interact as regional powers. The Hofstede Centre has enough data on each of these countries to make meaningful comparisons.

I pulled the Hofstede Centre's country comparison drop-down menu for the three countries in question. I also viewed their data on the United States as a baseline for comparison. The US scores high on individualism, masculinity, and indulgence. Iran scores higher than the US on power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Saudi Arabia scores higher than the US on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. Turkey also scores higher than the US on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. The obvious first impression from this baseline comparison is that these three Middle Eastern powers have very different cultural priorities than the US. Their higher power distance scores predispose them to accept autocratic regimes. High preferences for uncertainty avoidance would favor maintenance of their existing social orders and formal rules, even if this comes at a high cost in economic losses or human suffering.

Comparing the three countries to each other reveals that Saudi Arabia has by far the highest power distance and masculinity. This implies that Saudi Arabia has the most to lose from disruptions to its social order by ISIL or other non-state actors, and that it would respond to such disruption in a more masculine way. Note that a masculine policy from Saudi Arabia is not necessarily the same as an effective military response. Saudi armed forces are notoriously ineffective, as their difficulties in combating Yemen's Houthi faction make clear. The strong Saudi commitment to fighting in Yemen leaves it strategically vulnerable to any ISIL penetration of its northern border. Any social stress from fighting an insurgency on two borders would be exceptionally acute for Saudi Arabia given its high Hofstede scored for masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.

Third Eye OSINT assess that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will continue to prefer proxy fights against ISIL and each other in the near term. The countries' strong preferences for maintaining social order, as measured by their Hofstede scores, currently outweigh any inclination to express their rivalry in more masculine forms like direct combat. Cultural norms offer one predictive approach in conjunction with other considerations of geostrategy, such as demographic pressures, economic cycles,  and competition for resources. The three primary Middle Eastern rivals will continue to test each other's influence. Their cultural preferences indicate how severely they will react to existential threats from non-state actors like ISIL.

The Haiku of OSINT for 07/20/13

Turkey on the brink
Islamist faction rising
Second Caliphate

Turkey's Identity Crisis On The Brink

Turkey is clearly at a cultural crossroads.  On one hand, its political elite has clearly moved the country in a more Islamic direction and taken steps to mute the military's role as guardian of the government's secular orientation.  On the other hand, the recent demonstrations against development of Taksim Gezi Park reveal that a remnant of the society is not willing to go peacefully into an ultra-conservative future.

Modern Turkey had all of the outward trappings of a tolerant society and reliable Western security partner throughout the second half of the 20th century.  Turkey has sought EU membership for over a quarter-century.  The Erdogan government's embrace of conservative moral codes that align explicitly with Islam jeopardize its pursuit of that membership.  Turkey even developed security ties with Israel; it threw that productive relationship away with tacit support for Gaza blockade runners.  Turkish-Israeli reconciliation is still a possibility, and unofficial cooperation against common threats (Syria, Iran) is always a possibility.

The reconstruction plans for the park involve erecting a shopping mall modeled after the Halil Pasha Artillery Barracks.  This is more than a post-modern tribute to Turkey's Ottoman past.  Every major policy initiative of the Erdogan government, from its stance on public morals to its support for anti-Assad rebels in Syria, is a step towards Turkey's reassertion of its pre-Ataturk identity as the center of the Caliphate.  Turkey's political elite is ready to embrace Islam and regional interventionism and is willing to drag its secular professionals along for the ride.  The national identity crisis is ready for resolution, one way or the other.

The Erdogan government's forceful handling of the protestors has not yet carried the day for order.  It remains to be seen just how much of Istanbul's educated, secular middle class will continue to suspend their economic lives and risk arrest or injury.  Sustained popular uprisings usually begin with widespread labor or bourgeoisie economic grievances in provincial areas and eventually encroach upon a national capital.  These protestors have cultural grievances but are economically secure.  There is some evidence their protests are spreading to the rest of Turkey.  Arab Spring protestors wanted cheaper food staples and more jobs.  This protest has little in common with the Arab Spring.  Turkey ranks higher than the world average on the Heritage Index and Turkey's GDP growth in recent years has been very healthy, although FDI is dropping precipitously and inflation is rising.

Erdogan's statesmanship on peacefully resolving the Kurdish issue has probably endeared him to many Turks who are weary of years of unrest.  Turkey's international standing and internal business climate will be enhanced by stability in its Kurdish regions, park protests notwithstanding.  Secular Turks outside Istanbul would be hard-pressed to ignore this significant diplomatic progress just to continue sympathizing with protestors.

The protestors in Istanbul have a limited window of opportunity to make their case for moderation to the rest of Turkey's secular middle class.  The Erdogan government has demonstrated its willingness to disperse the protestors and the rest of Turkey probably won't mind so long as the economy delivers prosperity.  The race between worsening economic data and a government determined to bring order is still on.  The Erdogan government can make non-fatal concessions on cultural issues that would address several of the capital protestors' grievances and split much of the national opposition.  That may be enough to calm things down without a hard crackdown that would further damage the economy.