Ayatollah bit the dust
Goodbye extremists
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Saturday, February 28, 2026
Friday, December 31, 2021
Sunday, December 31, 2017
Thursday, October 22, 2015
Relative Cultural Power: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey
The tripartite struggle for leadership of the Islamic world between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey rages on in the modern world. These regional powers probe each other's peripheries indirectly. Turkey's deliberate blind eye to the rise of ISIL, for example, was a gamble that instability in Shiite Syria would drain Iran's strategic strength. Regional powers also compete with cultural influence. Modern social science provides data for a useful comparison of these three nations' cultural "soft power" in their regional competition.
Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede has a lifetime of work on cultural power on his personal website. We don't have to go all the way to the Netherlands to use his wisdom. Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory is a lens through which we can view a nation's cultural inclinations. Comparing the six Hofstede scores of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey can tell us how they are likely to interact as regional powers. The Hofstede Centre has enough data on each of these countries to make meaningful comparisons.
I pulled the Hofstede Centre's country comparison drop-down menu for the three countries in question. I also viewed their data on the United States as a baseline for comparison. The US scores high on individualism, masculinity, and indulgence. Iran scores higher than the US on power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Saudi Arabia scores higher than the US on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. Turkey also scores higher than the US on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. The obvious first impression from this baseline comparison is that these three Middle Eastern powers have very different cultural priorities than the US. Their higher power distance scores predispose them to accept autocratic regimes. High preferences for uncertainty avoidance would favor maintenance of their existing social orders and formal rules, even if this comes at a high cost in economic losses or human suffering.
Comparing the three countries to each other reveals that Saudi Arabia has by far the highest power distance and masculinity. This implies that Saudi Arabia has the most to lose from disruptions to its social order by ISIL or other non-state actors, and that it would respond to such disruption in a more masculine way. Note that a masculine policy from Saudi Arabia is not necessarily the same as an effective military response. Saudi armed forces are notoriously ineffective, as their difficulties in combating Yemen's Houthi faction make clear. The strong Saudi commitment to fighting in Yemen leaves it strategically vulnerable to any ISIL penetration of its northern border. Any social stress from fighting an insurgency on two borders would be exceptionally acute for Saudi Arabia given its high Hofstede scored for masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.
Third Eye OSINT assess that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will continue to prefer proxy fights against ISIL and each other in the near term. The countries' strong preferences for maintaining social order, as measured by their Hofstede scores, currently outweigh any inclination to express their rivalry in more masculine forms like direct combat. Cultural norms offer one predictive approach in conjunction with other considerations of geostrategy, such as demographic pressures, economic cycles, and competition for resources. The three primary Middle Eastern rivals will continue to test each other's influence. Their cultural preferences indicate how severely they will react to existential threats from non-state actors like ISIL.
Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede has a lifetime of work on cultural power on his personal website. We don't have to go all the way to the Netherlands to use his wisdom. Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory is a lens through which we can view a nation's cultural inclinations. Comparing the six Hofstede scores of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey can tell us how they are likely to interact as regional powers. The Hofstede Centre has enough data on each of these countries to make meaningful comparisons.
I pulled the Hofstede Centre's country comparison drop-down menu for the three countries in question. I also viewed their data on the United States as a baseline for comparison. The US scores high on individualism, masculinity, and indulgence. Iran scores higher than the US on power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Saudi Arabia scores higher than the US on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. Turkey also scores higher than the US on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. The obvious first impression from this baseline comparison is that these three Middle Eastern powers have very different cultural priorities than the US. Their higher power distance scores predispose them to accept autocratic regimes. High preferences for uncertainty avoidance would favor maintenance of their existing social orders and formal rules, even if this comes at a high cost in economic losses or human suffering.
Comparing the three countries to each other reveals that Saudi Arabia has by far the highest power distance and masculinity. This implies that Saudi Arabia has the most to lose from disruptions to its social order by ISIL or other non-state actors, and that it would respond to such disruption in a more masculine way. Note that a masculine policy from Saudi Arabia is not necessarily the same as an effective military response. Saudi armed forces are notoriously ineffective, as their difficulties in combating Yemen's Houthi faction make clear. The strong Saudi commitment to fighting in Yemen leaves it strategically vulnerable to any ISIL penetration of its northern border. Any social stress from fighting an insurgency on two borders would be exceptionally acute for Saudi Arabia given its high Hofstede scored for masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.
Third Eye OSINT assess that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will continue to prefer proxy fights against ISIL and each other in the near term. The countries' strong preferences for maintaining social order, as measured by their Hofstede scores, currently outweigh any inclination to express their rivalry in more masculine forms like direct combat. Cultural norms offer one predictive approach in conjunction with other considerations of geostrategy, such as demographic pressures, economic cycles, and competition for resources. The three primary Middle Eastern rivals will continue to test each other's influence. Their cultural preferences indicate how severely they will react to existential threats from non-state actors like ISIL.
Monday, March 9, 2015
Domestic Politics Drive US-Israel-Iran Strategic Monologues
Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to the US Congress this month stirred up the usual posturing from American politicians. Their equivalents in Israel and Iran, the other two audiences for Mr. Netanyahu's speech, will eventually be heard. Third Eye OSINT judges that recent noises from leaders of the US, Israel, and Iran have more to do with moving public opinion in those countries than with reaching any diplomatic agreements.
All perspectives on US/Iran/Israel relations are of interest. CFR's description of Iran's nuclear program raises enough concerns about the program's intent to warrant continuing IAEA monitoring and verification in Iran. There is no reason for any of the P5+1 parties to pursue side deals with Iran outside this negotiating framework given its legitimacy in the eyes of the UN. The US's own estimate is that Iran is years away from weaponizing its nuclear program. The CFR's description of a 2007 NIE describes the difficulty Iran has in producing sufficient weapons-grade material. The Stuxnet virus' attack on Iran's facilities pushed the weaponization date even further into the future. Talk of crossing red lines is premature.
All of the recent public actions by both Israel's and Iran's leaders are fodder for internal audiences. Mr. Netanyahu gains politically by frightening his people with an external threat. His Likud party still polls strongly but he cannot ignore the growing chorus of former Israeli national security figures who have come out publicly against Israeli policies. Anti-Iran rhetoric shores up his electoral base.
Iran's mullahs want their people to think the Iranian nuclear program is more dangerous than it is to keep the reformers sidelined. Strategic feints are an old practice in history. Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq went to great lengths to convince its own battlefield commanders that WMDs were an option, believing that mention of such programs would deter Iran or even the US from striking the regime. Iran's hardened facilities and uranium enrichment technology obviously have military potential. Whether Israel is the eventual target of an Iranian nuclear strike is open to debate. Tehran has little to gain from a strike on Israel that would almost certainly bring US retaliation. It has more to gain by rattling a nuclear saber against nearby rivals, specifically Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Even US politicians feel the impulse to contribute rhetoric fit for their domestic base. Republican Congresspeople sent a letter to Iran with vague warnings about the validity of US-Iran diplomatic agreements. Once again, domestic audiences matter, and positioning for the 2016 election cycle means putting tough rhetoric on the record. Iran responded with an understanding of legal precedents that surpassed that of the GOP letter's authors. An American legal scholar from the George W. Bush administration took the GOP to task on the Lawfare blog for their lack of understanding. Israeli and Iranian leaders have yet to reveal whether their understanding of their own legal systems needs remedial attention. They may surprise us yet.
Both Israel and Iran also have something to gain externally by going through these motions in public. Iran wants a bigger bargaining chip to terminate sanctions, so making its nuclear program seem dangerous is a diplomatic gamble. Israel has obviously won a major diplomatic breakthrough with Saudi Arabia if the Saudis quietly approve of Israel's stance against Iran. American diplomacy is always at work and could probably have forged a P5+1 agreement sooner if not for some clumsiness. Media exposure of President Obama's Nov. 2014 letter to Tehran about ISIS was an embarrassment. Predictably, Iran's response was noncommittal once the entire US negotiating position was laid bare. Trading nuclear concessions for acquiescence to a more active Iranian ground campaign is a deal best done in back channels. US fumbling invites Israel and Iran to air their frustrations in public rather than behind closed doors.
The most explosive conflict in the Middle East isn't even Israel vs. Iran. The intensifying Sunni vs. Shia civil war within Islam is the main threat to regional stability. The leading Sunni states (Saudi Arabia first, Turkey second) are unwilling to directly confront Iran for leadership of the Islamic world, so they cynically allow Israel to do their heavy lifting for them. They won't be able to postpone the open civil war for long; ISIS is just the latest explosion of Sunni anger against Shiite proxies (Syria first, rump Iraq second).
Public speeches on geopolitics are always the tips of icebergs. They are monologues intended for multiple audiences. The primary audience is usually domestic. Hidden diplomatic initiatives rarely take their cues from public statements, except in states like North Korea where a megalomaniac leader personifies the state. The US has yet to demonstrate its ability to competently navigate both the public diplomacy and back channel communication that can set the framework for a successful P5+1 agreement. Rhetoric about leading from behind and "strategic patience" are no substitute for competence. Dialogue suffers and the world is left with monologues.
All perspectives on US/Iran/Israel relations are of interest. CFR's description of Iran's nuclear program raises enough concerns about the program's intent to warrant continuing IAEA monitoring and verification in Iran. There is no reason for any of the P5+1 parties to pursue side deals with Iran outside this negotiating framework given its legitimacy in the eyes of the UN. The US's own estimate is that Iran is years away from weaponizing its nuclear program. The CFR's description of a 2007 NIE describes the difficulty Iran has in producing sufficient weapons-grade material. The Stuxnet virus' attack on Iran's facilities pushed the weaponization date even further into the future. Talk of crossing red lines is premature.
All of the recent public actions by both Israel's and Iran's leaders are fodder for internal audiences. Mr. Netanyahu gains politically by frightening his people with an external threat. His Likud party still polls strongly but he cannot ignore the growing chorus of former Israeli national security figures who have come out publicly against Israeli policies. Anti-Iran rhetoric shores up his electoral base.
Iran's mullahs want their people to think the Iranian nuclear program is more dangerous than it is to keep the reformers sidelined. Strategic feints are an old practice in history. Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq went to great lengths to convince its own battlefield commanders that WMDs were an option, believing that mention of such programs would deter Iran or even the US from striking the regime. Iran's hardened facilities and uranium enrichment technology obviously have military potential. Whether Israel is the eventual target of an Iranian nuclear strike is open to debate. Tehran has little to gain from a strike on Israel that would almost certainly bring US retaliation. It has more to gain by rattling a nuclear saber against nearby rivals, specifically Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Even US politicians feel the impulse to contribute rhetoric fit for their domestic base. Republican Congresspeople sent a letter to Iran with vague warnings about the validity of US-Iran diplomatic agreements. Once again, domestic audiences matter, and positioning for the 2016 election cycle means putting tough rhetoric on the record. Iran responded with an understanding of legal precedents that surpassed that of the GOP letter's authors. An American legal scholar from the George W. Bush administration took the GOP to task on the Lawfare blog for their lack of understanding. Israeli and Iranian leaders have yet to reveal whether their understanding of their own legal systems needs remedial attention. They may surprise us yet.
Both Israel and Iran also have something to gain externally by going through these motions in public. Iran wants a bigger bargaining chip to terminate sanctions, so making its nuclear program seem dangerous is a diplomatic gamble. Israel has obviously won a major diplomatic breakthrough with Saudi Arabia if the Saudis quietly approve of Israel's stance against Iran. American diplomacy is always at work and could probably have forged a P5+1 agreement sooner if not for some clumsiness. Media exposure of President Obama's Nov. 2014 letter to Tehran about ISIS was an embarrassment. Predictably, Iran's response was noncommittal once the entire US negotiating position was laid bare. Trading nuclear concessions for acquiescence to a more active Iranian ground campaign is a deal best done in back channels. US fumbling invites Israel and Iran to air their frustrations in public rather than behind closed doors.
The most explosive conflict in the Middle East isn't even Israel vs. Iran. The intensifying Sunni vs. Shia civil war within Islam is the main threat to regional stability. The leading Sunni states (Saudi Arabia first, Turkey second) are unwilling to directly confront Iran for leadership of the Islamic world, so they cynically allow Israel to do their heavy lifting for them. They won't be able to postpone the open civil war for long; ISIS is just the latest explosion of Sunni anger against Shiite proxies (Syria first, rump Iraq second).
Public speeches on geopolitics are always the tips of icebergs. They are monologues intended for multiple audiences. The primary audience is usually domestic. Hidden diplomatic initiatives rarely take their cues from public statements, except in states like North Korea where a megalomaniac leader personifies the state. The US has yet to demonstrate its ability to competently navigate both the public diplomacy and back channel communication that can set the framework for a successful P5+1 agreement. Rhetoric about leading from behind and "strategic patience" are no substitute for competence. Dialogue suffers and the world is left with monologues.
Sunday, June 22, 2014
Responsibility To Protect Doctrine And Iranian Dissidents In Iraq
The responsibility to protect (R2P) is an emerging norm in international relations. It modifies the inviolability of state sovereignty and allows the international community to intervene in a state's internal affairs to prevent genocide. The UN system has two special advisers developing this norm within the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. Determining how well states are enforcing this norm is now a worthy US foreign policy objective. Let's pick a test case from the Middle East.
The People's Mojahedin of Iran (aka Mojahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK) are a longstanding Iranian dissident group that first opposed the Shah and later opposed the Islamic revolutionary government. MEK had a history of causing trouble in several countries but cleaned up its act in recent years. It convinced a critical mass of prominent Americans to lobby for its removal from the US State Department's list of designated terrorist organizations. Its exile within Iraq left the Shiite-led government with both a bargaining chip and a humanitarian responsibility.
Iraq could have used MEK's status as a showpiece for its commitment to human rights. Keeping the group disarmed and safeguarded was a no-brainer opportunity to show the Middle East that Iraq was serious about not interfering in its neighbors' affairs. The Al-Maliki government instead squandered this opportunity by allowing armed elements, with the alleged collusion of its armed forces, to raid MEK's enclaves in 2013. The influence Tehran now possesses in Baghdad may have been an enabling factor in the attacks against MEK. The mechanisms of anti-MEK action are less important than the precedent they set. Baghdad's inability or unwillingness to ensure fair treatment of a dissident group was a clear signal to Sunnis that they could expect no better treatment from a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad.
The international community can easily assemble pretexts for renewed intervention in Iraq under R2P doctrine. The anti-MEK violence was the beginning. ISIS has begun imposing sharia law in Mosul and other cities it has taken hostage in the last few weeks. The Sunni tribes who acquiesced to ISIS's advance will soon regret their "inshallah" nonchalance toward that group's power grab. The Al-Maliki government in Baghdad has proven itself unable to protect expatriate dissidents and its own minority populations. That is a clear breach of R2P. The human cost of nonintervention under R2P grows progressively worse with delay. Ron Capps' Seriously Not All Right describes the horror of genocide in the face of the international community's delayed intervention in several conflicts. UN invocation of R2P would signal to Iraq's Sunnis and stranded MEK activists that help is justified.
The People's Mojahedin of Iran (aka Mojahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK) are a longstanding Iranian dissident group that first opposed the Shah and later opposed the Islamic revolutionary government. MEK had a history of causing trouble in several countries but cleaned up its act in recent years. It convinced a critical mass of prominent Americans to lobby for its removal from the US State Department's list of designated terrorist organizations. Its exile within Iraq left the Shiite-led government with both a bargaining chip and a humanitarian responsibility.
Iraq could have used MEK's status as a showpiece for its commitment to human rights. Keeping the group disarmed and safeguarded was a no-brainer opportunity to show the Middle East that Iraq was serious about not interfering in its neighbors' affairs. The Al-Maliki government instead squandered this opportunity by allowing armed elements, with the alleged collusion of its armed forces, to raid MEK's enclaves in 2013. The influence Tehran now possesses in Baghdad may have been an enabling factor in the attacks against MEK. The mechanisms of anti-MEK action are less important than the precedent they set. Baghdad's inability or unwillingness to ensure fair treatment of a dissident group was a clear signal to Sunnis that they could expect no better treatment from a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad.
The international community can easily assemble pretexts for renewed intervention in Iraq under R2P doctrine. The anti-MEK violence was the beginning. ISIS has begun imposing sharia law in Mosul and other cities it has taken hostage in the last few weeks. The Sunni tribes who acquiesced to ISIS's advance will soon regret their "inshallah" nonchalance toward that group's power grab. The Al-Maliki government in Baghdad has proven itself unable to protect expatriate dissidents and its own minority populations. That is a clear breach of R2P. The human cost of nonintervention under R2P grows progressively worse with delay. Ron Capps' Seriously Not All Right describes the horror of genocide in the face of the international community's delayed intervention in several conflicts. UN invocation of R2P would signal to Iraq's Sunnis and stranded MEK activists that help is justified.
Thursday, November 28, 2013
Friday, June 7, 2013
Reducing Nuclear Weapons Presents Several Opportunities
Amb. Steven Pifer spoke at the World Affairs Council about reducing nuclear weapons. His work at the Brookings Institution Arms Control Initiative advocates further reductions in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals, and he even thinks the world can get to zero nuclear weapons. He is not alone in this opinion. Luminaries have lined up behind the Global Zero movement to make it happen.
The prospect of zeroing out nukes pops up every few years. One Georgetown-Harvard scholar made an argument for nuclear security in the style of Jonathan Swift. That prompted a serious response that a world free of nuclear weapons must come after conditions of peace and security that render them irrelevant. DOD's Nuclear Posture Review Report from April 2010 acknowledges that a nuclear-free world is a worthwhile goal, within an indefinite time frame.
Amb. Pifer's talk at WAC NorCal revealed some "inside baseball" on arms control that I've never heard before. Arms control has matured beyond considering the "throw weight" of multi-warhead delivery systems whose warheads may have different yields. Official math counts a bomber as a single delivery system and the limits on their deployment are not as firm as rules for ICBMs. Bombers have a flight time to target of 8-10 hours, so limits on their numbers are flexible because they can be recalled in flight. The US is confident that its "national technical means" can locate most of our competitors' ICBMs and the FAS Nuclear Information Project has good unclassified estimates of warhead counts. Tactical and "surplus strategic" warheads are kept in storage; they are not loaded on deployed systems. The US military maintains one reserve warhead for every one deployed.
I'm intrigued by the ambassador's proposal for a joint NATO/Russia cooperative missile defense. This would coordinate two independent systems through a joint operations center. The rationale for cooperation is that radars on Russian territory have the best view of Iran. Sharing data would make NATO and Russia seem less like adversaries and more like allies, sending a tremendous positive message to Russia. Amb. Pifer has written that the US's restructuring of its BMD plan for Europe opens the door for Moscow to cooperate.
He noted further at the WAC NorCal talk that if Iran achieves full nuclear capability, Pakistan would be immediately prompted to arm Saudi Arabia with nukes. A strike by the US or Israel would only delay Iran's nuke program. It would stop all IAEA inspection visits to Iran and the world would lose access to the country's data. The IAEA's access to their data now has led to the conclusion that Iran cannot enrich uranium at this time. I'll observe that the ancient Arab-Persia rivalry cannot be contained if both sides own nukes. I am not at all confident that leaders in Riyadh and Tehran are as rational as the Cold War strategists in Washington and Moscow. Nuclear arms control in the Middle East means prevention of proliferation. I'll endorse the ambassador's NATO/Russia cooperative idea.
I believe there is precedent for the US and Russia to open their military networks in such a cooperative way. The US and Russia opened joint video monitoring centers in December 1999 to gain visibility of each others' nuclear power plants in advance of any Y2K problems. The US and Russia also jointly staffed each others' nuclear warfighting command centers on New Year's Eve 1999 as a human fail-safe assurance against systems failures. DOD guidance on establishing the Center for Year 2000 Strategic Stability (CY2KSS) needs to be dusted off and reused for cooperative missile defense. I was on duty that evening too, at one of the US Forces Korea secure command centers in the Republic of Korea. My small contribution to Y2K assurance was to ensure our own C4ISR systems were running through the midnight hour as 1999 became 2000.
I say get the JASON advisory group involved in getting nukes to zero. They need something to do or else they might get careless and knock over some beakers by accident. I'd love to help but I'm not qualified. I predict that the NATO/Russia cooperative missile defense joint operations center will be a windfall for folks in Eastern Europe, or wherever it stands up.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Iraq Liberation Ten Year Anniversary Scorecard
Ten years ago today, the United States led a coalition of the willing to liberate Iraq from the Saddam Hussein regime. Let's run through the neighborhood and examine the strategic results.
Iraq. The liberated Iraqi people suffered anywhere from 109,000 to over 1,000,000 deaths, depending on who does the counting and whether it includes sectarian violence and deaths from disease or malnutrition. Iraq is no longer governed by an autocrat but its democratic institutions are still weak. The country is still periodically beset by sectarian violence and instability. The good news is that Iraq has functioning democratic institutions and is producing oil for export, although energy supermajors are beginning to sour on Iraq's business climate and poor infrastructure. The bad news is that the Sunni and Kurd minorities are not full partners in Iraq's governance. Iraq is a winner, just barely.
Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been ascendant since the overthrow of the Saddam regime. Its remaining regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel, are unwilling to officially cooperate to restrain potential Iranian hegemony. A continued U.S. military presence in the Middle East deters Iran's overt ambitions. This does not deter Iran from using asymmetric methods to influence the Syrian insurrection (Quds Force support to the Assad regime) or the Iraqi government (support to Shiite sect leaders). Iran is probably the biggest winner of the war.
Saudi Arabia. American assurances sustain the kingdom against external threats. Oil revenue sustains it against internal unrest. The House of Saud bribed its citizens to ignore the Arab Spring and the gamble paid off. The Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force stopped Bahrain's unrest from spreading. It's business as usual in Riyadh as if nothing changed in Baghdad. Saudi Arabia is a big winner.
Kuwait. The Saddam regime posed an existential threat to Kuwait as long as it existed. Kuwait now has a much freer hand in dealing with its neighbors. A large U.S. military presence in the Emirate ensures its security. Kuwait is a big winner.
Israel. The oldest democracy in the Middle East is no longer faced with the threat of land invasion or ballistic missile attack from Iraq. The Palestinian insurgency is still a problem but it has one less Arab sponsor. Israel is a big winner.
United States. America's years in Iraq cost over 4400 combat-related casualties and have afflicted thousands more veterans with combinations of mild ailments and severe wounds. The best estimates of the financial costs exceed US$2T including direct appropriations, interest on debt, supplementary expenses in related budget lines (State Department aid), and deferred costs of veterans' care. The opportunity costs of careers unfulfilled and businesses interrupted by repeated mobilizations of the military reserve components are incalculable. The U.S. gained no permanent military basing rights other than the right to continue a large advisory mission under the supervision of its embassy in Baghdad. Concessions for U.S.-based energy producers were mostly limited to support services and a U.S.-Iraq trade framework has taken eight years to implement. The U.S. strategic position as guarantor of the balance of power in the Middle East is unchanged; this came at an enormous cost in lives, prestige, material, and treasure. The United States cannot lose as long as it remains engaged in the Middle East with all elements of its national power, but the price of truly winning is now higher than ever.
Iraq. The liberated Iraqi people suffered anywhere from 109,000 to over 1,000,000 deaths, depending on who does the counting and whether it includes sectarian violence and deaths from disease or malnutrition. Iraq is no longer governed by an autocrat but its democratic institutions are still weak. The country is still periodically beset by sectarian violence and instability. The good news is that Iraq has functioning democratic institutions and is producing oil for export, although energy supermajors are beginning to sour on Iraq's business climate and poor infrastructure. The bad news is that the Sunni and Kurd minorities are not full partners in Iraq's governance. Iraq is a winner, just barely.
Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been ascendant since the overthrow of the Saddam regime. Its remaining regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel, are unwilling to officially cooperate to restrain potential Iranian hegemony. A continued U.S. military presence in the Middle East deters Iran's overt ambitions. This does not deter Iran from using asymmetric methods to influence the Syrian insurrection (Quds Force support to the Assad regime) or the Iraqi government (support to Shiite sect leaders). Iran is probably the biggest winner of the war.
Saudi Arabia. American assurances sustain the kingdom against external threats. Oil revenue sustains it against internal unrest. The House of Saud bribed its citizens to ignore the Arab Spring and the gamble paid off. The Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force stopped Bahrain's unrest from spreading. It's business as usual in Riyadh as if nothing changed in Baghdad. Saudi Arabia is a big winner.
Kuwait. The Saddam regime posed an existential threat to Kuwait as long as it existed. Kuwait now has a much freer hand in dealing with its neighbors. A large U.S. military presence in the Emirate ensures its security. Kuwait is a big winner.
Israel. The oldest democracy in the Middle East is no longer faced with the threat of land invasion or ballistic missile attack from Iraq. The Palestinian insurgency is still a problem but it has one less Arab sponsor. Israel is a big winner.
United States. America's years in Iraq cost over 4400 combat-related casualties and have afflicted thousands more veterans with combinations of mild ailments and severe wounds. The best estimates of the financial costs exceed US$2T including direct appropriations, interest on debt, supplementary expenses in related budget lines (State Department aid), and deferred costs of veterans' care. The opportunity costs of careers unfulfilled and businesses interrupted by repeated mobilizations of the military reserve components are incalculable. The U.S. gained no permanent military basing rights other than the right to continue a large advisory mission under the supervision of its embassy in Baghdad. Concessions for U.S.-based energy producers were mostly limited to support services and a U.S.-Iraq trade framework has taken eight years to implement. The U.S. strategic position as guarantor of the balance of power in the Middle East is unchanged; this came at an enormous cost in lives, prestige, material, and treasure. The United States cannot lose as long as it remains engaged in the Middle East with all elements of its national power, but the price of truly winning is now higher than ever.
Sunday, March 17, 2013
Tuesday, March 5, 2013
Good Riddance to Hugo Chavez
The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez should be a cause for celebration among free people everywhere. Venezuelans should rejoice that a strongman who redistributed wealth from productive makers to lazy takers can no longer impair their economy. Enumerating the positive consequences of this event is easy.
Iran no longer has a Latin American partner that can facilitate its strategic breakouts. The personal relationship between Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad facilitated the latter's inclination to show off what little military technology his country possessed.
Cuba's Communist Castro brothers have lost their last true soul brother in the Southern Hemisphere. If Cuba's free health care system couldn't help a head of state dying of cancer, it won't be any more beneficial for an average Jose. Whoops, there goes that selling point for Havana. Maybe Bolivia and Ecuador can make the Castros' day by sending them some tropical fruit.
The U.S. now has a golden opportunity to shape Latin American attitudes by re-engaging new Venezuelan leadership. Foggy Bottom needs to be reviewing bios of Venezuela's loyal opposition to determine who can work productively with the outside world.
Monday, February 20, 2012
Commentary On USSOUTHCOM Commander's MMA Lecture, January 2012
I've gotta hand it to the Marines Memorial Club. They bring in the heavy hitters all the time. Gen. Douglas Fraser, USAF, commander of U.S. Southern Command, lectured there on January 24, 2012 and I attended to hear firsthand about what Uncle Sam is doing south of the border. My subjective observations are in italics below.
The general's slides weren't working but to military types that's no big deal. Military leaders march on, with or without PowerPoint. You can get the rundown of the command's area on the site. One factoid that jumped out at me was that the U.S. is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country. Ay carumba! Unchecked illegal immigration will eventually force the U.S. into an identity crisis. Citizens need to know the facts about how current immigration policy is unlike anything in American history.
The general's overview of Central and South American economics sounded like a textbook description of fourth-generation warfare reaching maturity, except there is no textbook for this subject. Latin America's healthy commodity trade with China helped it weather the global economic downturn. Ah ha, the U.S. national security state is noticing Chinese strategic penetration in the Western Hemisphere. That's why it's imperative for the U.S. to conclude free trade agreements with our southern partners, to ring-fence their markets from further Chinese influence. We really need to re-energize the FTAA. The general mentioned that a large, informal economy flourishes with rampant poverty and unemployment, and than criminal organizations operate with impunity thanks to weak governance. Such weakness now apparently includes U.S. institutions, with Mexican drug cartels penetrating U.S. cities. This is a perfect description of System D, with an amoral edge. Note what I said about unchecked immigration above. Failure to enforce existing immigration laws breeds contempt for legal systems in general. This breakdown in governance in Latin America is not inevitable in the U.S but the hour is getting late for a counter-effort.
Gen. Fraser's understanding of how drug cartels operate is more nuanced than the Hollywood portrayals of huge, monolithic crime families. The cartels rely on microenterprises in "networks of networks" that enable innovations. This sounds like entrepreneurs operating hackerspaces, an innovation we can expect from a System D economy. I wonder if microfinance would be useful as a way to either grow non-drug alternative economic structures, or to track small/medium enterprises that freelance in support of the narcotic trade. What does their supply chain look like?
The general took questions from the audience. A very politely phrased question on whether legalization of drugs would be a viable policy drew an equally polite answer from the general. He endorsed a healthy political debate over legalization's merits but cautioned us to consider secondary effects. Criminal networks will still resort to extortion and kidnapping if they lose drug revenue. We should also consider the public health effects of spending more money on addiction treatment and the hidden costs of absenteeism if we remove drug use from law enforcement's purview. The U.S. abandoned its prohibition of alcohol, but cocaine and methamphetamine are not the same things as booze. If we must start somewhere with an experiment, perhaps marijuana is the best candidate. Some variants of the hemp plant have multiple commercial uses, as the U.S. Government knew quite well in World War II.
Iran is gaining influence in the Americas with diplomatic outreach and funding for Shiite centers. Their strategic aim is to circumvent sanctions. This is not a strategic breakout until Iran has control of some kind of living system in the Western Hemisphere, like a logistics source (i.e., a port where it can resupply warships). Iran will have a hard time avoiding sanctions if its currency is unacceptable as payment. The financial squeeze the U.S. is putting on Iran now bites hard. Hezbollah has penetrated Latin America. This terrorist network is implicated in the drug trade. The Lebanese expatriate community in Latin America, particularly Mexico, merits monitoring.
China's role is growing beyond seeking dependable commodity supplies. Its sales of military aircraft, radar, and personal protective equipment to Latin countries is dramatically rising. There's a wealth of information - no pun intended - on China's deals in Latin America. National security studies of this influence are old news and often buried in archives. We need to know a lot more about the viability of the living system China is building in our hemisphere. The Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia is a network of influence and intelligence reporting that has always been loyal to its motherland. Identifying and monitoring a similar Chinese diaspora in Latin America should be a valid intelligence mission for the U.S. The oddity of Latin America and China specialists collaborating ought to become less odd. The U.S. has never repudiated the Monroe Doctrine. It is a policy precedent we can use under the right circumstances.
Gen. Fraser was most concerned about Haiti due to its urgent needs and said the U.S. drawdown will free up military units for USSOUTHCOM missions. That is optimistic given the Pentagon's announced force cuts for the next five years. U.S. missions in Latin America will be limited by budgets. Concern over Haiti's recovery is valid because the U.S. drawdown may not leave enough force structure for a return mission there. The general closed with references to local development of water and other resources that can build community capacity. Economic development with stronger governance will IMHO just enable more fertile growth of those narcotic microenterprises he mentioned earlier. Perhaps the U.S. should seed System D with agents and entities it controls if we can't field conventional forces down there. That would be an open-source COIN technique worth mastering.
I'm now a little smarter (and a lot more curious) about Latin America thanks to Gen. Fraser. I look forward to hearing from his successor at the Marines Memorial Club. The hits just keep on coming.
The general's slides weren't working but to military types that's no big deal. Military leaders march on, with or without PowerPoint. You can get the rundown of the command's area on the site. One factoid that jumped out at me was that the U.S. is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country. Ay carumba! Unchecked illegal immigration will eventually force the U.S. into an identity crisis. Citizens need to know the facts about how current immigration policy is unlike anything in American history.
The general's overview of Central and South American economics sounded like a textbook description of fourth-generation warfare reaching maturity, except there is no textbook for this subject. Latin America's healthy commodity trade with China helped it weather the global economic downturn. Ah ha, the U.S. national security state is noticing Chinese strategic penetration in the Western Hemisphere. That's why it's imperative for the U.S. to conclude free trade agreements with our southern partners, to ring-fence their markets from further Chinese influence. We really need to re-energize the FTAA. The general mentioned that a large, informal economy flourishes with rampant poverty and unemployment, and than criminal organizations operate with impunity thanks to weak governance. Such weakness now apparently includes U.S. institutions, with Mexican drug cartels penetrating U.S. cities. This is a perfect description of System D, with an amoral edge. Note what I said about unchecked immigration above. Failure to enforce existing immigration laws breeds contempt for legal systems in general. This breakdown in governance in Latin America is not inevitable in the U.S but the hour is getting late for a counter-effort.
Gen. Fraser's understanding of how drug cartels operate is more nuanced than the Hollywood portrayals of huge, monolithic crime families. The cartels rely on microenterprises in "networks of networks" that enable innovations. This sounds like entrepreneurs operating hackerspaces, an innovation we can expect from a System D economy. I wonder if microfinance would be useful as a way to either grow non-drug alternative economic structures, or to track small/medium enterprises that freelance in support of the narcotic trade. What does their supply chain look like?
The general took questions from the audience. A very politely phrased question on whether legalization of drugs would be a viable policy drew an equally polite answer from the general. He endorsed a healthy political debate over legalization's merits but cautioned us to consider secondary effects. Criminal networks will still resort to extortion and kidnapping if they lose drug revenue. We should also consider the public health effects of spending more money on addiction treatment and the hidden costs of absenteeism if we remove drug use from law enforcement's purview. The U.S. abandoned its prohibition of alcohol, but cocaine and methamphetamine are not the same things as booze. If we must start somewhere with an experiment, perhaps marijuana is the best candidate. Some variants of the hemp plant have multiple commercial uses, as the U.S. Government knew quite well in World War II.
Iran is gaining influence in the Americas with diplomatic outreach and funding for Shiite centers. Their strategic aim is to circumvent sanctions. This is not a strategic breakout until Iran has control of some kind of living system in the Western Hemisphere, like a logistics source (i.e., a port where it can resupply warships). Iran will have a hard time avoiding sanctions if its currency is unacceptable as payment. The financial squeeze the U.S. is putting on Iran now bites hard. Hezbollah has penetrated Latin America. This terrorist network is implicated in the drug trade. The Lebanese expatriate community in Latin America, particularly Mexico, merits monitoring.
China's role is growing beyond seeking dependable commodity supplies. Its sales of military aircraft, radar, and personal protective equipment to Latin countries is dramatically rising. There's a wealth of information - no pun intended - on China's deals in Latin America. National security studies of this influence are old news and often buried in archives. We need to know a lot more about the viability of the living system China is building in our hemisphere. The Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia is a network of influence and intelligence reporting that has always been loyal to its motherland. Identifying and monitoring a similar Chinese diaspora in Latin America should be a valid intelligence mission for the U.S. The oddity of Latin America and China specialists collaborating ought to become less odd. The U.S. has never repudiated the Monroe Doctrine. It is a policy precedent we can use under the right circumstances.
Gen. Fraser was most concerned about Haiti due to its urgent needs and said the U.S. drawdown will free up military units for USSOUTHCOM missions. That is optimistic given the Pentagon's announced force cuts for the next five years. U.S. missions in Latin America will be limited by budgets. Concern over Haiti's recovery is valid because the U.S. drawdown may not leave enough force structure for a return mission there. The general closed with references to local development of water and other resources that can build community capacity. Economic development with stronger governance will IMHO just enable more fertile growth of those narcotic microenterprises he mentioned earlier. Perhaps the U.S. should seed System D with agents and entities it controls if we can't field conventional forces down there. That would be an open-source COIN technique worth mastering.
I'm now a little smarter (and a lot more curious) about Latin America thanks to Gen. Fraser. I look forward to hearing from his successor at the Marines Memorial Club. The hits just keep on coming.
Friday, January 13, 2012
U.S. Calls Iran's Bluff In Strait Of Hormuz
I covered U.S.-Iranian tensions in a recent blog post. It is obvious that the U.S. has the strategic upper hand and is taking pains to ensure Iran's leadership understands the situation. Stated concerns over a "rogue Iranian naval officer" doing something unpredictable are probably a red herring to cover the U.S. naval posture.
The U.S. is also taking pains to shape the information battlespace. Stories about using dolphins to hunt underwater mines show off a capability Iran lacks. Feel-good stories about saving Iranian seaman hijacked by pirates send a strong message that the Iranian navy can't even safeguard its own commercial traffic. Analysts enamored with Iran's potential use of Sunburn or other anti-ship missiles ignore the U.S. Navy's Rolling Airframe Missile. The SeaRAM system is notable for its absence from recent media coverage. The silence speaks volumes. Iran should hear the message.
The U.S. is also taking pains to shape the information battlespace. Stories about using dolphins to hunt underwater mines show off a capability Iran lacks. Feel-good stories about saving Iranian seaman hijacked by pirates send a strong message that the Iranian navy can't even safeguard its own commercial traffic. Analysts enamored with Iran's potential use of Sunburn or other anti-ship missiles ignore the U.S. Navy's Rolling Airframe Missile. The SeaRAM system is notable for its absence from recent media coverage. The silence speaks volumes. Iran should hear the message.
Tuesday, January 3, 2012
Cold Conflict Between U.S. And Iran
Tensions in the Persian Gulf are slightly higher than normal at the moment. The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq is complete and nature abhors a vacuum. Iran's naval exercises are an effort to buttress the regional influence it has gained in Iraq.
The U.S. is countering Iran with diplomatic and economic actions rather than military confrontation. U.S. economic sanctions are forcing down the value of Iranian currency, which will immediately hurt the buying power of Iranian consumers. Iran is fighting back with a hollow threat to shut the Strait of Hormuz and cause an oil price spike. That would be suicidal for Iran because most of its oil is produced in Khuzestan province and must transit the Strait of Hormuz to get to Asian markets. The U.S. recognizes Iran's strategic weakness and likely relishes the pain its actions inflict upon Iran as retaliation for the capture of an RQ-170 drone. Iran presently presents rhetoric and not aggression because it has not yet exhausted its financial reserves.
The CNN news item linked above about the Strait threat briefly mentions the relative percentage of GDP the U.S. and Iran commit to their military budgets. That is an amateurish analysis. Relative force arrays and capabilities each side brings to bear in the Strait of Hormuz are much more relevant. Iran's navy cannot match a U.S. naval carrier battle group in a direct confrontation. The last direct U.S.-Iranian naval encounter, Operation Praying Mantis, was a limited engagement but ended in a lopsided victory for the U.S. Iran would thus need to rely upon standoff weapon systems in any effort to neutralize U.S. warships. Iran may possess some number of Sunburn anti-ship missiles or other similar systems. It would thus be imperative for U.S. national reconnaissance efforts to locate all of Iran's potential missile launch platforms and designate them as preplanned targets prior to hostilities. The U.S. has outstanding ISR capabilities; Iran's comparable ISR is questionable, with or without a purloined RQ-170.
The U.S. is a responsible world actor. Its Navy is professional enough to monitor Iran's declared military exercises from international waters without provoking a reaction. Iran is not nearly as mature. Any miscalculation that risks open hostilities is much more likely from Iran, given its economic deprivation and relative weakness, than from the U.S.
The U.S. is countering Iran with diplomatic and economic actions rather than military confrontation. U.S. economic sanctions are forcing down the value of Iranian currency, which will immediately hurt the buying power of Iranian consumers. Iran is fighting back with a hollow threat to shut the Strait of Hormuz and cause an oil price spike. That would be suicidal for Iran because most of its oil is produced in Khuzestan province and must transit the Strait of Hormuz to get to Asian markets. The U.S. recognizes Iran's strategic weakness and likely relishes the pain its actions inflict upon Iran as retaliation for the capture of an RQ-170 drone. Iran presently presents rhetoric and not aggression because it has not yet exhausted its financial reserves.
The CNN news item linked above about the Strait threat briefly mentions the relative percentage of GDP the U.S. and Iran commit to their military budgets. That is an amateurish analysis. Relative force arrays and capabilities each side brings to bear in the Strait of Hormuz are much more relevant. Iran's navy cannot match a U.S. naval carrier battle group in a direct confrontation. The last direct U.S.-Iranian naval encounter, Operation Praying Mantis, was a limited engagement but ended in a lopsided victory for the U.S. Iran would thus need to rely upon standoff weapon systems in any effort to neutralize U.S. warships. Iran may possess some number of Sunburn anti-ship missiles or other similar systems. It would thus be imperative for U.S. national reconnaissance efforts to locate all of Iran's potential missile launch platforms and designate them as preplanned targets prior to hostilities. The U.S. has outstanding ISR capabilities; Iran's comparable ISR is questionable, with or without a purloined RQ-170.
The U.S. is a responsible world actor. Its Navy is professional enough to monitor Iran's declared military exercises from international waters without provoking a reaction. Iran is not nearly as mature. Any miscalculation that risks open hostilities is much more likely from Iran, given its economic deprivation and relative weakness, than from the U.S.
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