Commentary On USSOUTHCOM Commander's MMA Lecture, January 2012

I've gotta hand it to the Marines Memorial Club.  They bring in the heavy hitters all the time.  Gen. Douglas Fraser, USAF, commander of U.S. Southern Command, lectured there on January 24, 2012 and I attended to hear firsthand about what Uncle Sam is doing south of the border.  My subjective observations are in italics below.

The general's slides weren't working but to military types that's no big deal.  Military leaders march on, with or without PowerPoint.  You can get the rundown of the command's area on the site.  One factoid that jumped out at me was that the U.S. is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country.  Ay carumba!  Unchecked illegal immigration will eventually force the U.S. into an identity crisis.  Citizens need to know the facts about how current immigration policy is unlike anything in American history.  


The general's overview of Central and South American economics sounded like a textbook description of fourth-generation warfare reaching maturity, except there is no textbook for this subject.  Latin America's healthy commodity trade with China helped it weather the global economic downturn.  Ah ha, the U.S. national security state is noticing Chinese strategic penetration in the Western Hemisphere.  That's why it's imperative for the U.S. to conclude free trade agreements with our southern partners, to ring-fence their markets from further Chinese influence.  We really need to re-energize the FTAA.  The general mentioned that a large, informal economy flourishes with rampant poverty and unemployment, and than criminal organizations operate with impunity thanks to weak governance.  Such weakness now apparently includes U.S. institutions, with Mexican drug cartels penetrating U.S. cities.  This is a perfect description of System D, with an amoral edge.  Note what I said about unchecked immigration above.  Failure to enforce existing immigration laws breeds contempt for legal systems in general.  This breakdown in governance in Latin America is not inevitable in the U.S but the hour is getting late for a counter-effort. 


Gen. Fraser's understanding of how drug cartels operate is more nuanced than the Hollywood portrayals of huge, monolithic crime families.  The cartels rely on microenterprises in "networks of networks" that enable innovations.  This sounds like entrepreneurs operating hackerspaces, an innovation we can expect from a System D economy.  I wonder if microfinance would be useful as a way to either grow non-drug alternative economic structures, or to track small/medium enterprises that freelance in support of the narcotic trade.  What does their supply chain look like?


The general took questions from the audience.  A very politely phrased question on whether legalization of drugs would be a viable policy drew an equally polite answer from the general.  He endorsed a healthy political debate over legalization's merits but cautioned us to consider secondary effects.  Criminal networks will still resort to extortion and kidnapping if they lose drug revenue.  We should also consider the public health effects of spending more money on addiction treatment and the hidden costs of absenteeism if we remove drug use from law enforcement's purview.  The U.S. abandoned its prohibition of alcohol, but cocaine and methamphetamine are not the same things as booze.  If we must start somewhere with an experiment, perhaps marijuana is the best candidate.  Some variants of the hemp plant have multiple commercial uses, as the U.S. Government knew quite well in World War II.  


Iran is gaining influence in the Americas with diplomatic outreach and funding for Shiite centers.  Their strategic aim is to circumvent sanctions.  This is not a strategic breakout until Iran has control of some kind of living system in the Western Hemisphere, like a logistics source (i.e., a port where it can resupply warships).  Iran will have a hard time avoiding sanctions if its currency is unacceptable as payment.  The financial squeeze the U.S. is putting on Iran now bites hard.  Hezbollah has penetrated Latin America.  This terrorist network is implicated in the drug trade.  The Lebanese expatriate community in Latin America, particularly Mexico, merits monitoring.  


China's role is growing beyond seeking dependable commodity supplies.  Its sales of military aircraft, radar, and personal protective equipment to Latin countries is dramatically rising.  There's a wealth of information - no pun intended - on China's deals in Latin America.  National security studies of this influence are old news and often buried in archives.  We need to know a lot more about the viability of the living system China is building in our hemisphere.  The Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia is a network of influence and intelligence reporting that has always been loyal to its motherland.  Identifying and monitoring a similar Chinese diaspora in Latin America should be a valid intelligence mission for the U.S.  The oddity of Latin America and China specialists collaborating ought to become less odd.  The U.S. has never repudiated the Monroe Doctrine.  It is a policy precedent we can use under the right circumstances.  


Gen. Fraser was most concerned about Haiti due to its urgent needs and said the U.S. drawdown will free up military units for USSOUTHCOM missions.  That is optimistic given the Pentagon's announced force cuts for the next five years.  U.S. missions in Latin America will be limited by budgets.  Concern over Haiti's recovery is valid because the U.S. drawdown may not leave enough force structure for a return mission there.  The general closed with references to local development of water and other resources that can build community capacity.  Economic development with stronger governance will IMHO just enable more fertile growth of those narcotic microenterprises he mentioned earlier.  Perhaps the U.S. should seed System D with agents and entities it controls if we can't field conventional forces down there.  That would be an open-source COIN technique worth mastering.  


I'm now a little smarter (and a lot more curious) about Latin America thanks to Gen. Fraser.  I look forward to hearing from his successor at the Marines Memorial Club.  The hits just keep on coming.  

Iraq Potential Unity Diminished But Not Destroyed

Strategy Page is raising an alarm about the Iraqi political system careening off its democratic rails.  I am not so alarmed.  Violence is normal in the Arab world and the use of terror attacks, extralegal threats, and intimidation should not surprise Western observers.  Iraq will never clone a Western political process no matter how much advice the United States provides.  Iraqi self-governance will retain facets of brutality that are ingrained in Arab political culture.  

In December 2009, I estimated Iraq's chances for "success" as a unitary state at 60%. I stand by that estimate. Suicide bombings have not yet returned to the epidemic levels at the height of the war. Iraq's generational dynamics are such that a full Sunni-Shiite civil war is unlikely because many survivors of the last Sunni-Shiite conflict, the Iran-Iraq War, are still alive and remember the horror. Only the intervention of Sunni Arab neighbors would upset the balance and they don't trust each other enough to work together (GCC Shield Force notwithstanding).  That Shield Force was able to stabilize Bahrain, a small country, with a short-duration deployment.  It is too small to pose an existential threat to the Iraqi military establishment.  Arab military coalitions are ineffective because Arabs don't trust each other.  Only those Arab forces that acted in concert with a Western sponsor (as in the first Persian Gulf War under US leadership) can operate at even a minimal level of effectiveness.  This means that other Sunni Arab states have little hope of influencing Iraqi politics with a threat of land invasion.  Iraqi Shiites have little appetite for mass expulsions or worse directed against its Sunni minority because they value integration with the world economy after decades of deprivation under UN sanctions.  They will continue to find ways to make life uncomfortable for Sunnis but they value their new investment links with the outside world too much to risk anything more harsh.  


We shouldn't use Anglo-Western standards of normalcy to judge Arab internal stability. There will be more bombings. That does not mean Iraqi self-governance will fail. 

The Haiku of OSINT for 01/18/12

Software theft at Fed
Cyber crime or something more?
China has banks too

U.S. Calls Iran's Bluff In Strait Of Hormuz

I covered U.S.-Iranian tensions in a recent blog post.  It is obvious that the U.S. has the strategic upper hand and is taking pains to ensure Iran's leadership understands the situation.  Stated concerns over a "rogue Iranian naval officer" doing something unpredictable are probably a red herring to cover the U.S. naval posture.

The U.S. is also taking pains to shape the information battlespace.  Stories about using dolphins to hunt underwater mines show off a capability Iran lacks.  Feel-good stories about saving Iranian seaman hijacked by pirates send a strong message that the Iranian navy can't even safeguard its own commercial traffic.  Analysts enamored with Iran's potential use of Sunburn or other anti-ship missiles ignore the U.S. Navy's Rolling Airframe Missile.  The SeaRAM system is notable for its absence from recent media coverage.  The silence speaks volumes.  Iran should hear the message.  

Cold Conflict Between U.S. And Iran

Tensions in the Persian Gulf are slightly higher than normal at the moment.  The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq is complete and nature abhors a vacuum.  Iran's naval exercises are an effort to buttress the regional influence it has gained in Iraq.

The U.S. is countering Iran with diplomatic and economic actions rather than military confrontation.  U.S. economic sanctions are forcing down the value of Iranian currency, which will immediately hurt the buying power of Iranian consumers.  Iran is fighting back with a hollow threat to shut the Strait of Hormuz and cause an oil price spike.  That would be suicidal for Iran because most of its oil is produced in Khuzestan province and must transit the Strait of Hormuz to get to Asian markets.  The U.S. recognizes Iran's strategic weakness and likely relishes the pain its actions inflict upon Iran as retaliation for the capture of an RQ-170 drone.  Iran presently presents rhetoric and not aggression because it has not yet exhausted its financial reserves.

The CNN news item linked above about the Strait threat briefly mentions the relative percentage of GDP the U.S. and Iran commit to their military budgets.  That is an amateurish analysis.  Relative force arrays and capabilities each side brings to bear in the Strait of Hormuz are much more relevant.  Iran's navy cannot match a U.S. naval carrier battle group in a direct confrontation.  The last direct U.S.-Iranian naval encounter, Operation Praying Mantis, was a limited engagement but ended in a lopsided victory for the U.S.  Iran would thus need to rely upon standoff weapon systems in any effort to neutralize U.S. warships.  Iran may possess some number of Sunburn anti-ship missiles or other similar systems.  It would thus be imperative for U.S. national reconnaissance efforts to locate all of Iran's potential missile launch platforms and designate them as preplanned targets prior to hostilities.  The U.S. has outstanding ISR capabilities; Iran's comparable ISR is questionable, with or without a purloined RQ-170.

The U.S. is a responsible world actor.  Its Navy is professional enough to monitor Iran's declared military exercises from international waters without provoking a reaction.  Iran is not nearly as mature.  Any miscalculation that risks open hostilities is much more likely from Iran, given its economic deprivation and relative weakness, than from the U.S.

Daniel Green, "Reconstructing Afghanistan" At The MMC

Daniel Green, Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, spoke recently at the Marines Memorial Club on "Reconstructing Afghanistan."  This was another lecture co-sponsored by the World Affairs Council, where I used to hold a membership until I got too busy with all of my Web blogging action.  I attended and took good notes.  My observations are in italics.

Mr. Green talked about his experiences on a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, the stomping grounds for Hamid Karzai's early supporters.  His brief description of the topography tells us how hard it is to build infrastructure in parts of A-stan.  The population lives along green belts near rivers in a mostly desert province.  Check out pics online of terraced farms in parts of A-stan.  Then try to imagine the futility of building millions of dollars worth of roads and sewer systems to service an agricultural village whose annual economic productivity can probably be measured in the low five figures. 

Mr. Green mentioned that Karzai's status as head of the Popalzai tribe gave him credibility as a Durrani leader, but didn't go further into A-stan's history.  Here's the significance.  The Durrani Empire was probably Afghanistan's golden age, when it was expansive enough to hold both Persia and India at bay.  A legitimate Durrani lineage helps explain Karzai's staying power.  It also explains Mr. Green's comment that the Oruzgan governor was not necessarily into good governance but remained a Karzai ally.  Their politics aren't like ours, folks, and their standards for good governance are not what we would demand in the Anglo-West. 

Oruzgan province was mostly safe when Mr. Green's PRT arrived in 2005 but only seven months later the Taliban had stepped up activities with more sophisticated attacks.  More foreign fighters showed up to join the party.  The PRT had to shut down its good governance projects due to the violence.  The U.S. didn't understand the importance of village-level engagement and spent little developmental aid on small villages due to its orientation on conventional nation-state governance.  Maybe we should check out the book and movie versions of The Ugly American before we do any more nation-building in countries that don't function as nations. 

One thing Mr. Green wanted to emphasize is that the U.S. drawdown through 2014 is not at all synonymous with a complete departure.  The U.S. is staying in Afghanistan, in some form, for a very long time.  The Afghans interpret White House pronouncements as a departure, so being the survivors they are they will hedge their strategic bets.  Keep that in mind the next time you hear Hamid Karzai making friendly moves toward Iran or India.  He's being more pro-Afghanistan than anti-American and his moves play well with his home audience.  Remember also that the Taliban are primarily a Pashtun movement, and his own Pashtun lineage matters.  Karzai's public comments that may rile the U.S. will give him crucial credibility at the negotiating table if he is to ever successfully disarm the Taliban and re-orient them toward nonviolence.  We miss the nuances of this in the Western media.

America's bad strategic habits in foreign intervention are all to familiar to Mr. Green.  He noted how we tend to underestimate problems and later throw money and technology at them because that's what we understand.  He likes the AfPak Hands program and thinks it needs special management; it can be an antidote to the short-term thinking paradigm the U.S. uses to solve long-term problems.  I for one would love to become an AfPak Hand.  There's no way we can understand that region without a cadre of people dedicated to its permanent study.

The mention of village stability operations caught my attention in the lecture.  This is an effort by NATO/ISAF conventional forces to position themselves inside villages and build tribal-based defense forces around them.  This immediately reminded me of Army Special Forces Major Jim Gant's concept of Tribal Engagement Teams.  If you've never heard of it, read about it in the milblogosphere.  I had the chance to ask Mr. Green afterwards if village stability ops were based on Maj. Gant's ideas; he said the approach was heavily informed by Maj. Gant's work and is spreading rapidly.  Wow, we actually learned something and applied it.  America is number one!

Mr. Green obliquely mentioned that U.S. policy on Pakistan needs review because we are partially subsidizing covert wars against ourselves by supporting Pakistan.  The unspoken limitation of any substantive policy review is the dependence of U.S. forces on a ground line of communications (i.e., a logistics corridor) from the port of Karachi.  Any force footprint larger than roughly a division will need resupply from some direction other than the northern rail corridor, which is inefficient because changes in rail gauges through the 'Stans slow down railcar movement.  Reviewing our support for Pakistan means reducing our force structure so Pakistani logistics doesn't hold us hostage.  This is part of the rationale behind announcements of drawdowns until 2014.  I hear your frustration, Mr. Green. 

He framed a choice comment about fighting with allies very diplomatically.  NATO countries seem to prefer the political benefit of participation in ISAF over actual fighting.  Many NATO forces have immature COIN approaches, learned little from Iraq, and restrict their fighting with too many caveats.  Winston Churchill had a choice quote about fighting with allies, but he assumed allies would actually do some real fighting.  There's a running joke that ISAF stands for "I Saw America Fight."

Here's an observation on the interagency effort that's worth repeating.  Mr. Green was disappointed that USAID had devolved from a competent organization in the 1960s to having too few field agents, little COIN understanding, and a limited focus on contract monitoring.  This dovetailed into his comment about NGOs lacking accountability, staying in the capital too much, and undermining Afghan sovereignty.  This is the logical result of outsourcing government functions.  Governance is the core of an aid effort, and legitimacy comes from government-to-government contact.  Perhaps the U.S. Army should detail some civil affairs troops to USAID, because synching the CMOC doesn't seem to be working if our institutions are that weak.

BTW, there may be a better way to do opium mitigation.  Mr. Green said Marine forces are working this in Helmand province.  The U.S. should give those opium farmers some biodiesel reactors so they can turn poppies into fuel.  Granted, that's only a concept.  It won't be viable unless farmers could sell their biodiesel for more than what they'd make for a comparable opium crop. 

A couple more observations are worth repeating.  Al Qaeda sticks out like a sore thumb in A-stan and may fill the vacuum if the U.S. leaves completely.  The Arab Spring encourages reform without reliance upon Al Qaeda's extremism.  I wonder if Mr. Green knows of the Muslim Brotherhood's extensive network in the Middle East; there may not be much reform with them in charge after elections are held.  Embedding U.S. personnel 24/7 with Afghan forces is effective.  Local police are less educated and professional than the Afghan army.  Having an enduring U.S. ground presence is essential to avoid throwing away what we've gained from our dislodgement of the Taliban and Al Qaeda; ground forces develop intelligence on local personalities and safe havens that enable strike packages against high value targets.  That last comment brings out what a military force does in COIN and also reveals the military's limits.  It takes a lot of nation-building effort to get sufficient intel for even a limited strike on one bad guy's hideout.  The nation-building renders his hideout untenable by making local villages secure and prosperous.  That is why the U.S. will be in Afghanistan, in some fashion, for a long time.  Oh, yeah, there's a lot of very valuable minerals there too. 

"China - Threat Or Challenge?" Lecture By Roger Dong

The War Memorial Veterans Building in San Francisco is getting put to good use.  Last week I attended a lecture on modern China by my colleague Roger Dong (Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret.), a veteran China analyst.  The thesis in his talk "China - Threat Or Challenge?" (his answer: Yes!) is that China's assertive strategy demands a response from the U.S. and its allies.  Much of what follows is a synopsis of Roger's major points, along with my own observations as noted in italics. 

China's modernization miracle started with Deng Xiaoping, the only member of Chairman Mao Zedong's inner circle who had studied abroad and knew how to run a modern state.  His agricultural reforms got the state out of farming, and - voila! - starvation stopped.  Deng wasn't all sweetness and light, of course.  He is widely believed to have given the order to have Tiananmen Square cleared of protesters in 1989. 

The economic miracle continued in China after that dust-up.  China's annual GDP growth has averaged 9.9% for 32 years.  The biggest extant threat to this continued growth is the possibility of renewed recession in the U.S. and Europe, which together account for 40% of China's export market.  China's pegging of the renminbi to the U.S. dollar is a national imperative because it keeps China's export prices competitive.  Memories of the Revolution drive a pro-growth policy as an antidote to unrest.  I've noted recently that, given a noticeable slowdown in exports, China has made more public noises about switching from an export-driven growth policy to a consumption-driven policy.  I think it will be very interesting to see how severely this change in national economic planning will test China's social cohesion in the midst of other growth-related problems (environmental damage, bad bank loans hidden in municipal entities, and other problems the Chinese haven't mentioned to the West).

Roger noted that China takes a deliberate approach to training its next generation of national leaders.  The Chinese Communist Party grooms Politburo members and senior diplomats for years, rotating them through positions so they are always oriented to their designated area of expertise.  For example, the Chinese foreign ministry sends its U.S. experts on tours of duty to the U.S. and then links them with U.S. Embassy activities in Beijing upon their return.  I've also heard anecdotes from other China-watchers that officers who separate from the Chinese military are placed directly into industries that China considers strategically important so they can be groomed as future business leaders.  If true, this approach ensures business activity stays closely aligned with national security strategy.  The five-year economic plans overlap changes in senior political leadership to provide continuity.  China's internal security budget exceeds its national defense budget, in a sign of the leadership's deep insecurity about the potential for unrest.  That surprised me.  I recall reading idle speculation around the time of the Hainan plane incident in 2001 that the U.S. would be well served by a strategy that leverages internal dissent and regional/ethnic differences in China.  Can China break up under sufficient pressure, like the former Soviet Union? I now think that can be a very realistic strategy in light of Roger's insights. 

Let's move from basic strategy to recent events.  Roger said that the Asian financial collapse of the late 1990s gave China a stronger position relative to its neighbors.  China used this new strength to build goodwill with Asian nations whom had traditionally feared its ambitions.  This effort was apparently for naught.  China's recent naval assertiveness has destroyed this goodwill and revived old fears of its intentions.  Asian nations once again look to the U.S. for security assurances.  This is a window of opportunity that the U.S. cannot afford to waste.  The U.S. had begun a gradual shift in overseas force deployments and basing from Europe to Asia in the early days of President George W. Bush's administration.  This realignment was interrupted by the 9/11 attacks and the wars in Afghanistan.  When those wars end, the U.S. realignment to Asia must resume. 

Roger has noted some encouraging signs that the U.S. is taking its Asia security policy very seriously.  President Obama announced at the Nov. 2011 ASEAN meeting that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is a U.S. national interest, in a clear message to China.  The intended basing of 2500 U.S. Marines in Australia is an equally clear message that the U.S. is committed to the security of the Western Pacific.  The U.S.'s strong relationship with Singapore continues thanks to the city-state's generous provision for U.S. aircraft carrier berthing and participation in U.S. military exercises.  U.S. fast-attack submarines in the Pacific and logistics stocks on Guam are further signs of the importance the U.S. places on meeting China's strength in Asia. 

Roger threw our audience some more tidbits.  Foreign powers' historic conquests in China drive Beijing's paranoia about building its military capability.  China's ICBMs mainly target the U.S.; I wonder what combination of the remainder target Russia and/or India.  Note that the Politburo members are not military veterans.  That reminds me of some articles I've recently read about China's lack of an equivalent to the U.S. National Security Council.  No Chinese NSC means no interagency synchronization, which makes it harder for Beijing's civilian leaders to control their military. 

The U.S.-China crisis over the Taiwan Strait in 1996 forced the PLA Navy to confront the U.S. Navy's carrier superiority.  The PLA Navy has matured since then and has developed a tri-dimensional doctrine of air/surface/submarine operations.  Now China's procurement efforts are catching up to doctrine.  China's purchase of a Russian aircraft carrier is a source of national pride but probably a strategic bluff.  It has no on-board catapult system that can launch the Shenyang J-15, China's primary naval fighter aircraft.  Chinese doctrine may be mature, but its implementation via hardware has a ways to go. 

The PLA Navy's minor efforts seem to be on track.  The SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missile is probably intended for use against U.S. aircraft carriers.  China's Yuan-class diesel-electric submarine is a more immediate threat than China's nascent nuclear submarine force.  One wonders how a Chinese sub was able to surface in the middle of a U.S. carrier battle group.  Can Chinese subs actively track and outmaneuver a U.S. carrier battle group?  Or did the sub simply loiter along an expected route for the carrier group and guess an opportune time for a lucky surface maneuver?  This is a relevant area for U.S. intelligence analysts to explore, because it will reveal gaps in Chinese technical capabilities that demand innovation and audacity from fleet commanders. 

Roger noted the recent claim by a group of Georgetown University researchers that China has built 3000 miles of tunnels, probably for military use.  He also noted that mitigating the tunnels themselves is less important than neutralizing the systems for power, water, and life support that make the tunnels viable mobility corridors.  I think we could learn a lot from the tunnel mitigation efforts the South Korean military employs along the DMZ. 

Roger wrapped up with some recent facts, noting that China plans to remove silt from behind the Three Gorges Dam with deepwater dredges to keep it operating; that Russia and China's natural enmity will limit their cooperation; that Chinese corruption is mainly a local government problem and that China's national policy of attracting biotech R&D has been successful; and that Mongolia was a key location for listening posts during the Cold War.  Hmm, that last observation caught my eye.  I did a web search for "Mongolia listening post" and got a bunch of interesting hits.  That country may have the ability to play the U.S., Russia, and China off against each other for money, technology, and other goodies. 

The Q&A was fun.  I asked Roger whether he thought senior Chinese leaders were still ideological Communists devoted to equalizing everyone's living standards.  Roger noted that China tolerates many home-grown billionaires and millionaires, so the existence of economic inequality posits that pursuing ideology for its own sake is not nearly as important as economic growth and material well-being.  Roger's lecture gave me more food for thought about whether my pet theory of a new Cold War in Asia between China and India can be supported with open-source observations.  I will continue to look for indicators of China-India rivalry, along with analysis of how the U.S. responds.  Good job Roger Dong!  You got me thinking, which my friends tell me can be dangerous.