China builds on reefs
Dredging shoals for basing claims
Begging a challenge
Dredging shoals for basing claims
Begging a challenge
Tuesday, February 24, 2015
China Creeping Toward Strait Of Malacca
China is building the world's most expensive sand castles on rocky reefs in the South China Sea. Okay, they're obviously more substantial than sand castles, but they are far from innocuous. The contest for control of the region's sea lanes is on like Donkey Kong.
Open-source overhead photos of several newly built Chinese islands do not reveal sufficient space for runways capable of handling fixed-wing aircraft, nor do they appear to have sufficiently deep channels or long piers to accommodate the refueling and resupply of large warships. The islands are thus mostly ill-suited to sustain the kind of island-hopping campaign the US employed during World War II to gain dominance of the Western Pacific. The lack of such capability may be temporary as China succeeds in dredging enough infill around its larger claims to support paved runways.
Coast guard cutters and patrol boats are shallow-draft naval vessels that could berth at these artificial islands for short periods, but the islands are too small to store logistical supplies needed to replenish large task forces of deep-draft vessels. China is thus not making a serious attempt at this time to challenge the US Navy's preeminent freedom of navigation role in the area. The Chinese attempt at dominance is most likely economic in the short term: staking claims to fishing waters and oil exploration blocks.
The QZ article linked above correctly notes that China's legal claims to EEZs around the islands are weak, but China has shown an increasing disdain for international conventions such as UNCLOS or the need to seek international arbitration. The islands will eventually prove useful as way stations for crews of fishing boats and oil exploration vessels.
China is currently testing the will of its neighbors to confront its fishing and energy expeditions. More confrontations drive demand within China for a more robust blue-water navy, built around the 70-year old doctrine of aircraft carrier battle groups. A carrier battle group is designed to exert persistent control over geographic features called "choke points" that constrict naval movement. The Strait of Malacca is the nearest such choke point to China's island dredging campaign in the South China Sea. Control of the Strait of Malacca is the ultimate prize in this region.
Hainan Island is approximately 933 km from the Spratlys and 479 km from the Paracels, two island groups where China is most actively building artificial reefs. China may have a land-based capacity at Hainan to counter challenges to its possession of these islands in the absence of a mature carrier battle group. For example, its CJ-10 cruise missile can range 800 km and may be adaptable into an anti-ship variant. The CJ-10A air-launched variant can range over 2000 km, but its accuracy against sea-based targets with a conventional warhead is not clear.
The Chinese PLA Navy does not possess a base network comparable to the US possessions of Guam, Wake Island, Kwajalein Atoll, and other islands that support both naval and aerial expeditions. China will reveal just how seriously it takes its territorial claims when it switches focus from dredging tiny shoals to building the underway replenishment capability its PLA Navy will need (in the absence of larger bases) to support an expeditionary fleet.
Open-source overhead photos of several newly built Chinese islands do not reveal sufficient space for runways capable of handling fixed-wing aircraft, nor do they appear to have sufficiently deep channels or long piers to accommodate the refueling and resupply of large warships. The islands are thus mostly ill-suited to sustain the kind of island-hopping campaign the US employed during World War II to gain dominance of the Western Pacific. The lack of such capability may be temporary as China succeeds in dredging enough infill around its larger claims to support paved runways.
Coast guard cutters and patrol boats are shallow-draft naval vessels that could berth at these artificial islands for short periods, but the islands are too small to store logistical supplies needed to replenish large task forces of deep-draft vessels. China is thus not making a serious attempt at this time to challenge the US Navy's preeminent freedom of navigation role in the area. The Chinese attempt at dominance is most likely economic in the short term: staking claims to fishing waters and oil exploration blocks.
The QZ article linked above correctly notes that China's legal claims to EEZs around the islands are weak, but China has shown an increasing disdain for international conventions such as UNCLOS or the need to seek international arbitration. The islands will eventually prove useful as way stations for crews of fishing boats and oil exploration vessels.
China is currently testing the will of its neighbors to confront its fishing and energy expeditions. More confrontations drive demand within China for a more robust blue-water navy, built around the 70-year old doctrine of aircraft carrier battle groups. A carrier battle group is designed to exert persistent control over geographic features called "choke points" that constrict naval movement. The Strait of Malacca is the nearest such choke point to China's island dredging campaign in the South China Sea. Control of the Strait of Malacca is the ultimate prize in this region.
Hainan Island is approximately 933 km from the Spratlys and 479 km from the Paracels, two island groups where China is most actively building artificial reefs. China may have a land-based capacity at Hainan to counter challenges to its possession of these islands in the absence of a mature carrier battle group. For example, its CJ-10 cruise missile can range 800 km and may be adaptable into an anti-ship variant. The CJ-10A air-launched variant can range over 2000 km, but its accuracy against sea-based targets with a conventional warhead is not clear.
The Chinese PLA Navy does not possess a base network comparable to the US possessions of Guam, Wake Island, Kwajalein Atoll, and other islands that support both naval and aerial expeditions. China will reveal just how seriously it takes its territorial claims when it switches focus from dredging tiny shoals to building the underway replenishment capability its PLA Navy will need (in the absence of larger bases) to support an expeditionary fleet.
Tuesday, December 30, 2014
Impressions of the Naval War College Foundation Symposium in San Francisco 2014
The Naval War College Foundation held its annual symposium in San Francisco on April 12, 2014. I attended but did not publish my thoughts immediately. I was delayed initially by a major schedule commitment I had immediately afterward. I also wanted to see if the participants' analysis could survive several months of real-world events. This article reflects my own thinking in response to the material presented.
The symposium was named "How to Build a Superpower: Thoughts on China's Plan for Global Expansion." The headline topic was China, but Russian aggression in Ukraine was on everyone's minds that day. Two new terms kicked things off: "Cyber Westphalia" and Mutually Secured Systemic Resilience (MS2R). A Web search of that first term brings up links to discussions of nation-states deterring each other's aggression in the borderless domain of the electromagnetic spectrum. A search for that second term brings up nothing. One of those terms is thus fruitful for future blog articles. The key lesson is that control of the sea includes dominance of undersea telecom cables. Scale, proximity, and precision are three systemic advantages.
There is no grand unified theory for large-scale complex socio-technical systems (LTSs?) available in open sources. The closest is the ultra-large-scale system (ULSS) specific to the cyber-electromagnetic domain. The ULSS does not cover the sociological aspect of the LTS. Cyber doctrine is maturing. The spectrum of cyber-EM conflict is as broad as kinetic conflict in the land, sea, and aerospace domains.
Resilience in defense and targeted disruption in offense characterize cyber conflict. It is tempting to see the current US-North Korea conflict over the Sony hacking in this light. Sony was not resilient, and entire sectors of the US economy may be similarly unprepared. Targeted disruption is a perfectly appropriate response to a rogue state's encouragement of vandalism.
China's digital Great Wall separating its domestic networks from the outside world is well known. Capabilities honed in suppressing dissent are very useful in stealing technology from economic competitors. Strong US intellectual property controls offer resilience in defense. China's large but uncoordinated cyber effort is spread between the state and its SOEs, opening vectors for targeted disruption. The West has capabilities but lacks will.
The NWC's cyber presenter advised us to read Sun Tzu in cyber terms. Her proposed US strategy is to match deception and opaqueness to our scale / proximity / precision advantage. China's ancient Confucian mindset persists in cyber space. The Party retains the mandate of heaven so long as it delivers economic growth. Stalling growth opens a window of vulnerability. Use the bulletproof networks.
China and North Korea have a contentious relationship. They are no longer "as close as lips and teeth," to borrow a translation. Japan's dominance of the dagger-shaped peninsula was an interruption of thousands of years of Chinese imperial patronage and hegemony. The large China-DPRK trade imbalance in the junior partner's favor must make Beijing wonder what it gets in return. The mandarins certainly do not get North Korea's reportedly large deposits of high-grade rare earth elements. Continued Kim family purges of KWP China hands must irk Beijing to no end.
The US, China, South Korea, and Japan calibrate their regional moves as hedges against North Korean instability. No one is willing to admit in open sources whether North Korea can weaponize a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead. This is why the US cannot rule out the outlier of a surprise strike. The inability of US elites to comprehend the North Korean nuclear program and missile program as existential threats indict their ability to safeguard a democratic society. Kim Jong-Un does not have reformist impulses. KGS NightWatch would concur.
South Korea policy elites should spend as much time studying South Africa's "Truth and Reconciliation" post-apartheid process as they do with other forms of transitional justice if they wish to preserve order in a collapsed DPRK. They should also smuggle some Choco-Pies into the North to destabilize its black market. I am serious. Seoul's Blue House should read my Third Eye OSINT article on "Mishandling One of the Two Koreas" for insights into Office 39.
China has an active space program. It is not a suitable partner for the US space program after our rupture with Russia. Open sources have little to say about US workarounds if China neutralizes our space assets. A resilient society has more workarounds than a closed society. China's odd approaches to legal classification and organizational structure pose analytical challenges. The inscrutable Orient was never just an Occidental myth. Anyway, the US easily falls for China's baloney about its space program. We should not be so gullible. Copying components is easier than replicating full systems and managerial competence.
Great power ASAT shootouts in low-earth orbit test the international community's limited tolerance for the weaponization of space. Cold War precedents for overflight of other nations' territory offer little moral suasion to the Chinese. The US cannot successfully co-opt China into openness as long as they can steal all the IP they need. Other means of penetration become imperative. An international effort to mitigate orbital debris fields could be a ripe area for US-China cooperation. Debris is a proportionately larger threat to smaller space-faring nations (i.e., South Korea) than to those with many satellites who can afford to lose one.
China watches Russia, and Russia watches China. They both covet superpower status. Each has something the other wants. Russia wants an export market for it oil and gas. China wants to test the limits of its expansionist impulse. The case for an anti-US conspiracy is weak given the history of imperial rivalries in Asia. Russian military exercises in its own far east are only nominally directed against the US; their more likely opponent is closer at hand. Russia's demographic decline and its geopolitical isolation from the West likely doom it to developing country status. Chinese encroachment into Siberia drives Russian paranoia. These two bears do not hibernate and they inhabit the same hunting grounds.
Compare "The Rising Sea Dragon in Asia" to the analysis at the NWC's China Maritime Studies Institute. One source will prove to have more predictive value in about thirteen years as China's demographics overwhelm its economy's ability to deliver satisfaction.
If much of this article comes across as a tease, then that is a condition my readers shall tolerate. Consider it my contribution to opaqueness. I am breaking from my usual discussion of public events by not fully disclosing many of the notes I took. Some of the insights therein are not meant to be shared. I intend to retain the strategic advantage they bring me. The departure this year of USPACOM's outspoken Naval intelligence officer is regrettable, because the red star is rising in the East.
The symposium was named "How to Build a Superpower: Thoughts on China's Plan for Global Expansion." The headline topic was China, but Russian aggression in Ukraine was on everyone's minds that day. Two new terms kicked things off: "Cyber Westphalia" and Mutually Secured Systemic Resilience (MS2R). A Web search of that first term brings up links to discussions of nation-states deterring each other's aggression in the borderless domain of the electromagnetic spectrum. A search for that second term brings up nothing. One of those terms is thus fruitful for future blog articles. The key lesson is that control of the sea includes dominance of undersea telecom cables. Scale, proximity, and precision are three systemic advantages.
There is no grand unified theory for large-scale complex socio-technical systems (LTSs?) available in open sources. The closest is the ultra-large-scale system (ULSS) specific to the cyber-electromagnetic domain. The ULSS does not cover the sociological aspect of the LTS. Cyber doctrine is maturing. The spectrum of cyber-EM conflict is as broad as kinetic conflict in the land, sea, and aerospace domains.
Resilience in defense and targeted disruption in offense characterize cyber conflict. It is tempting to see the current US-North Korea conflict over the Sony hacking in this light. Sony was not resilient, and entire sectors of the US economy may be similarly unprepared. Targeted disruption is a perfectly appropriate response to a rogue state's encouragement of vandalism.
China's digital Great Wall separating its domestic networks from the outside world is well known. Capabilities honed in suppressing dissent are very useful in stealing technology from economic competitors. Strong US intellectual property controls offer resilience in defense. China's large but uncoordinated cyber effort is spread between the state and its SOEs, opening vectors for targeted disruption. The West has capabilities but lacks will.
The NWC's cyber presenter advised us to read Sun Tzu in cyber terms. Her proposed US strategy is to match deception and opaqueness to our scale / proximity / precision advantage. China's ancient Confucian mindset persists in cyber space. The Party retains the mandate of heaven so long as it delivers economic growth. Stalling growth opens a window of vulnerability. Use the bulletproof networks.
China and North Korea have a contentious relationship. They are no longer "as close as lips and teeth," to borrow a translation. Japan's dominance of the dagger-shaped peninsula was an interruption of thousands of years of Chinese imperial patronage and hegemony. The large China-DPRK trade imbalance in the junior partner's favor must make Beijing wonder what it gets in return. The mandarins certainly do not get North Korea's reportedly large deposits of high-grade rare earth elements. Continued Kim family purges of KWP China hands must irk Beijing to no end.
The US, China, South Korea, and Japan calibrate their regional moves as hedges against North Korean instability. No one is willing to admit in open sources whether North Korea can weaponize a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead. This is why the US cannot rule out the outlier of a surprise strike. The inability of US elites to comprehend the North Korean nuclear program and missile program as existential threats indict their ability to safeguard a democratic society. Kim Jong-Un does not have reformist impulses. KGS NightWatch would concur.
South Korea policy elites should spend as much time studying South Africa's "Truth and Reconciliation" post-apartheid process as they do with other forms of transitional justice if they wish to preserve order in a collapsed DPRK. They should also smuggle some Choco-Pies into the North to destabilize its black market. I am serious. Seoul's Blue House should read my Third Eye OSINT article on "Mishandling One of the Two Koreas" for insights into Office 39.
China has an active space program. It is not a suitable partner for the US space program after our rupture with Russia. Open sources have little to say about US workarounds if China neutralizes our space assets. A resilient society has more workarounds than a closed society. China's odd approaches to legal classification and organizational structure pose analytical challenges. The inscrutable Orient was never just an Occidental myth. Anyway, the US easily falls for China's baloney about its space program. We should not be so gullible. Copying components is easier than replicating full systems and managerial competence.
Great power ASAT shootouts in low-earth orbit test the international community's limited tolerance for the weaponization of space. Cold War precedents for overflight of other nations' territory offer little moral suasion to the Chinese. The US cannot successfully co-opt China into openness as long as they can steal all the IP they need. Other means of penetration become imperative. An international effort to mitigate orbital debris fields could be a ripe area for US-China cooperation. Debris is a proportionately larger threat to smaller space-faring nations (i.e., South Korea) than to those with many satellites who can afford to lose one.
China watches Russia, and Russia watches China. They both covet superpower status. Each has something the other wants. Russia wants an export market for it oil and gas. China wants to test the limits of its expansionist impulse. The case for an anti-US conspiracy is weak given the history of imperial rivalries in Asia. Russian military exercises in its own far east are only nominally directed against the US; their more likely opponent is closer at hand. Russia's demographic decline and its geopolitical isolation from the West likely doom it to developing country status. Chinese encroachment into Siberia drives Russian paranoia. These two bears do not hibernate and they inhabit the same hunting grounds.
Compare "The Rising Sea Dragon in Asia" to the analysis at the NWC's China Maritime Studies Institute. One source will prove to have more predictive value in about thirteen years as China's demographics overwhelm its economy's ability to deliver satisfaction.
If much of this article comes across as a tease, then that is a condition my readers shall tolerate. Consider it my contribution to opaqueness. I am breaking from my usual discussion of public events by not fully disclosing many of the notes I took. Some of the insights therein are not meant to be shared. I intend to retain the strategic advantage they bring me. The departure this year of USPACOM's outspoken Naval intelligence officer is regrettable, because the red star is rising in the East.
Wednesday, September 10, 2014
The Haiku of OSINT for 09/10/14
Fight Islamic State
Air power will not suffice
Need to send ground troops
Air power will not suffice
Need to send ground troops
Announcing America's New Counter-ISIL Strategy
The CEO of Alfidi Capital paid close attention to tonight's national address articulating a new strategy against ISIL. Third Eye OSINT stream-of-consciousness reaction to its major points was powered by pure genius. Stand by for a recap.
Making the case for emerging threats in the MENA region means understanding their sociocultural context. Radical Islam animates ISIL, pure and simple. Claiming it is not an authentic Islamic force invites ridicule in the souks of Cairo and Riyadh.
Citing barbaric tactics and genocide correctly places the threat in a category requiring international response. This supports international conventions dating back decades and more recent responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine.
Air strikes are easy against equipment we recognize, i.e. captured US materiel. The US can quickly exhaust its high-value target list of easily identifiable vehicles. The harder part is destroying ISIL's very mobile C2 network of bad actors.
I like the word "destroy." The US must DESTROY any armed force that threatens violence against our homeland, national leadership, or citizens abroad. The widely-shared photo of someone outside the White House displaying ISIL's flag on a smartphone proves how easily a threat can reach our own C2 nodes.
The national leadership endorses strikes in Syria. Terrorists deserve no safe havens. Training and equipping proxy forces is not as easy as rhetoric makes it sound. The moderate Syrian opposition is mostly cut off and surrounded in many areas where it was formerly active, according to open source reporting.
I'm pretty sure I could assess Iraqi armed forces' condition from my laptop, using open media. US advisers knew the condition of the Iraqi partners they trained all throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom. Western journalists who have covered Iraq since the US troop withdrawal in 2011 knew about the endemic corruption and incompetence in the Iraqi military. NPR's Fresh Air broadcast today discussed this in detail.
Excuse me . . how and why are we enlisting Arab nations' help? Many Gulf sheikhs privately funded Syrian radicals who joined ISIL. Wealthy Kuwaitis and Qataris were willfully blind to the misuse of donated funds intended for humanitarian projects in Syria. There's nothing secret there and it's all in open source media.
Ruling out US ground forces lengthens the time needed for a counteroffensive. Unready Iraqi forces cannot carry the load until they can reconstitute in safe havens far from ISIL-controlled areas. This means extensive retraining under American supervision in either Kurdistan or the Shiite south of Iraq.
Referencing America's economic and scientific strength is obviously intended for a foreign audience, especially the Ebola comment. Foreign intelligence services will review the inventory of America's aid programs mentioned and ask their American ambassadors how they will benefit by joining this coalition of the willing.
Ending with "vanquished from the earth" is a good call that articulates a desired end state. The US is in "it to win it" but only with air power for the time being. Air campaigns against highly mobile urban insurgencies are not effective without ground forces conducting COIN in liberated territory. US planners will eventually realize the need to introduce competent ground forces. Active-duty US military members should not make vacation plans for 2015.
The American response to ISIL's emergent threat was delayed by a politically-driven unwillingness to acknowledge its potency. Echoes of that unwillingness remained audible in tonight's address. The National Security Council's mission is to synchronize threat warnings with a whole-of-government response to threats. Political operatives who supplant foreign policy professionals among NSC staffers are incapable of providing thereat warnings or staffing strong responses. The tragedy of America's new counter-ISIL policy is that it came long after the threat was obvious. It is still incomplete without a US ground force option.
This concludes today's commentary. Have a nice evening.
Sunday, June 22, 2014
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