Naval War College Foundation's Global Hotspots Symposium 2015 In San Francisco

I attended the Naval War College Foundation's annual San Francisco seminar last month.  This is the third time I've attended and this year's "Global Hotpots Symposium" delivered my money's worth.  The photos below depict the day's action at the Marines' Memorial Club.  The comments below are paraphrased from the speakers, with my own thoughts in bold text.

The first speaker described the insecurity plaguing the Middle East.  Her factual descriptions of conditions in the region were impeccable.  The story of ISIS's rise from the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Al-Nusra Front in Syria is well-documented.  The Assad regime's brutal suppression of its own people was a factor the West must acknowledge.  ISIS captured billions in wealth from looting Iraqi assets in Mosul and draws fighters from around the world.  Disproportionate numbers of wanna-be jihadis are coming from Tunisia, Morocco, and Lebanon.

I disagree with expert assessments of ISIS's tactical and operational prowess.  Photos of their "technical" gun trucks with anti-aircraft weapons hastily placed in pickup trucks show an amateurish approach to fire support.  The gunners in the truck beds aim wildly without even using iron sights.  They exhibit no evidence of combined arms maneuver despite claims of capturing US-made Iraqi armored vehicles and aircraft.  I have seen no evidence in open sources of a logistics system ISIS uses to sustain its captured materiel.  Terror tactics work against Iraqi forces with no ideological cohesion or nationalist sentiment of their own.

I do agree with our NWCF speaker that ISIS excels at information operations.  Erasing the Iraq-Syria border signals Arab rejection of Sykes-Picot colonialism.  Executing POWs wearing orange jumpsuits symbolizes revenge for the perceived US humiliation of Muslim prisoners at Gitmo.

Syrian refugees have been straining civil society in Jordan and Lebanon for several years.  Sunni Arab states may be turning against ISIS, at least among the Gulf sheikdoms.  Turkey and Saudi Arabia could easily be decisive against ISIS if they act.  Saudi Arabia just committed more air and ground forces to fight the Houthis in Yemen than they ever committed against ISIS.  The kingdom obviously believes Iranian influence to its south is a bigger threat than barbarians to its north.  The NWCF speaker astutely observed that the Sunni states tolerated ISIS's expansion as a way to pressure Iran.

Sunni ISIS fighters obviously target Shia.  I don't buy the argument that ISIS represents an existential threat to Iran that justifies Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.  Tehran's threat of a nuclear program is more valuable as a strategic deterrent to Saudi Arabia and Turkey.  I also don't buy arguments that ISIS cannot be destroyed with military force.  They have a strategic-level center of gravity in Raqaa that a ground campaign can destroy.  They also have financial channels from oil revenue and donations that the US can interdict.

Our speaker noted that ISIS's logistics system includes smuggling routes across Turkey's southern border.  The anti-ISIS coalition's effort to retake Kobane makes decent strategic sense in that context.  The coalition's failure to counter ISIS propaganda makes no sense; ISIS's narrative of romance, revenge, honor, and adventure appeals to disaffected youth.

The second NWCF speaker described recent tension between North Korea and South Korea over the Northern Limit Line (NLL).  He recapped recent Hermit Kingdom antics as a reminder that the country's "Byungjin line" requires a dual track of economic development and nuclear weapons.  The world still cannot confirm whether the DPRK has installed a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile.

The Korean War Armistice left the two Koreas' western maritime boundary undefined.  The North has tested the US and ROK commitments to uphold the NLL several times.  North Korea appears to have three aims:  maintaining economic rights to fishing and crabbing waters; retaining Haeju's port access to save shipping costs on its maritime route with China; and maintaining the ease of dropping SOF on islands close to the ROK.

North Korea has zero interest in submitting its NLL objections to international mediation.  Its KPA Navy is too weak to seize disputed islands outright from the ROK.  The Cheonan sinking incident was the North's way of testing how much the US and ROK are willing to escalate after an obvious provocation.  I am unclear on whether the NLL represents an airspace boundary as well as a maritime one.  I do not know whether the ROK has an identification friend or foe (IFF) system compatible with US aircraft but common sense dictates that they should.  South Korea's declared ADIZ clearly extends beyond the NLL, so any North Korean air-sea operation in the NLL's vicinity would demand a military response.

I attended a separate lunch discussion with a senior expert who shared his impressions of the Middle East from several tours.  I was not surprised when he said the US underestimated the Sunni/Shia divide in Iraq.  I figured that out during my own tour, when it was obvious that Sunnis and Shias would not return to formerly mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad.  A similar sectarian fragmentation is not currently evident in Afghanistan.  That's the good news, provided the US can keep a token force there long enough to ensure there is no fragmentation.  The senior official's best success metrics in both Iraq and Afghanistan were not the number of successful troops in contact (TIC) reports or KIA counts.  He valued statistics on local recruitment of military and security forces, along with school enrollment.  Those successes proved that tribal leaders in either country accepted their government's legitimacy.

The third NWCF lecturer addressed the future of urban warfare.  The most recent Israeli-Hamas war showed how targeting insurgents in cities often destroys infrastructure.  The US learned that the hard way in Iraq; just watch the many YouTube videos of JTACs calling for CAS on some building.  We also learned that occupying forces end up owning government services, a lesson learned and forgotten in WWII.

Africa is rapidly becoming a laboratory where urban violence tests tribal and sectarian fault lines.  Boko Haram's objective is larger than seizing Maiduguri.  Their Islamist application of Sharia law appeals to people in corrupt parts of northern Nigeria who have grievances against Nigerian institutions.  The larger story of how Chad and Niger carried the fight against Boko Haram must include Nigerian forces' failure to reinforce liberated towns.  Al-Shabaab's resurgence is another story the West must hear, because that terror group still has a strong hold on Somalia and is now threatening Western malls after its Kenya mall attack.

Our lecturer endorsed US forces training its division-level formations in full-scale urban warfare.  I searched Google for "sewer drone" to find tech options US forces can use in urban warfare.  Advice from JAGs on ROE and targeting will be integral to urban warfare.  Many of the asymmetric advantages the US brings to a conventional fight are negated when defenders have an advantage in urban terrain.

The final NWCF speaker addressed the possibility of a new Cold War in Russian-American relations.  Russia has begun targeting military exercises at NATO areas.  NATO's response has been to preposition equipment in Eastern Europe and step up Baltic air patrols.  Remember, folks, "NATO" has always been the US instrument for influencing Western Europe.  Our European friends rarely take action to assert their interests without US leadership.  Russian opinion polls show a rapid shift against the US, but not so much against Europe until recently.

Russia's national psyche has always been predisposed to insecurity and paranoia.  I recently attended a gathering of Russian emigres in San Francisco.  A lot of them truly believed that pedestrian traffic islands around town were some kind of conspiracy to launder money.  It would have been funny if this wasn't indicative of multigenerational Russian paranoia about any official pronouncements.

The apotheosis of the "vatnik/vatnost" phenomenon represents how far Russia has regressed from its post-Cold War openness.  Search Google for those words to see an Internet meme celebrating the revival of reactionary, anti-intellectual traditions that Western materialism cannot vanquish.  I won't link to the vatnost's retrograde image here, so go find it.  The West recognizes Russia's new belligerency and so do former members of the Warsaw Pact who resented Russian dominance.

The West must understand why free market shock therapy worked in the Baltics and Poland but not Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus.  I suspect the answer lies partly in the US's willingness to extend military cooperation to those successful states but prematurely curtailed Russia's NATO participation.  A strong security link to the West would have made Russian-speaking elites feel safer about sticking with free market reforms.  I may explore this theory in future blog articles if no one in the US foreign policy community picks it up.

Karen Dawisha's Putin's Kleptocracy explores how Putin expropriated KGB funds.  His recent admission that Russian forces invaded Crimea and provoked its secession prove his duplicity.  John Schindler's XX Committee discusses the Chekhism of the Siloviki around Putin, providing invaluable insights into Russia's ruling elite.  US reluctance to challenge Putin emboldens him despite Russia's obviously diminishing power.  The NWCF expert believes Russia's geostrategic pivot is to its east given China's demand for Russian natural resources.  He also believes this will lead to a divorce when they can no longer hide their rivalries.  I think that divorce will come sooner than anyone expects when China's economy crashes.  I also noticed that many of my Russian-speaking friends in the San Francisco area often repeated Russian media narratives about Ukraine's supposed aggression and "Nazi Galitchina" nationalism.  Russia definitely won the propaganda war with Russian language media in Ukraine and elsewhere.

All of the NWCF panelists combined for a final panel and took audience questions.  Here come the panel's answers, in a stream of consciousness style with no unifying theme.  More Middle East nations are at risk of collapse due to poor governance.  The West cannot wear down Russia with spending programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative because the US's ballistic missile defense plan just pumps up Russian nationalism.  It's hard to assess the US response to North Korea's cyber actions.  The ROK's heavy Internet connectivity is very vulnerable to cyber attack.  It is very interesting that piracy is more prevalent on Africa's west cost than its east coast (i.e., Somalia and the Horn of Africa).  The US still has substantial interests in anti-piracy, stability, and development in the Horn of Africa.  The US Navy's Maritime Strategy mentions A2AD as a stalking horse for countering China, with less attention to civil affairs after budget cuts.  China sees global hotspots differently than the US, with separatists in Xinjiang and Tibet figuring prominently.  The US can slow but not stop Iran's march to acquiring nuclear weapons because Iran plays with the Non-Proliferation Treaty's limits.  It will be easy for Iran to get weapons-grade HEU if it can keep enrichment ability.  Saudi Arabia and Egypt are likely to follow Iran into a nuclear arms race.  Boko Haram's captive schoolgirls have either perished, dispersed, or returned home; many are still held captive.  Arabs think the US State Department's information operations campaign against ISIS lacks credibility.  ISIS has a heavy Twitter presence with thousands of sympathetic accounts.  The human capacity to handle deprivation has postponed resource wars and ingenuity drives more efficient resource use.  Russia's economy and demography won't support Putin's planned army expansion.  The Obama Administration truly believes its electoral mandate is to avoid foreign relations.

This concludes my synopsis of the Naval War College's 2015 expedition to The City.  A lot of black swans lurk in the world.  Look at China's tensions with India, a delayed economic crisis over Greece's inevitable exit from the euro, and migrations from Central America to North America that challenge our southern border's security.  US war colleges and private think tanks do a pretty good job of training American leaders to solve strategic problems.  I will extend my own discussion of strategy here on Third Eye OSINT.

Full disclosure:  The opinions I express in this article reflect my own views and do not reflect the official positions of any US Government entity.

Impressions of the Naval War College Foundation Symposium in San Francisco 2014

The Naval War College Foundation held its annual symposium in San Francisco on April 12, 2014.  I attended but did not publish my thoughts immediately.  I was delayed initially by a major schedule commitment I had immediately afterward.  I also wanted to see if the participants' analysis could survive several months of real-world events.  This article reflects my own thinking in response to the material presented.

The symposium was named "How to Build a Superpower:  Thoughts on China's Plan for Global Expansion."  The headline topic was China, but Russian aggression in Ukraine was on everyone's minds that day.  Two new terms kicked things off:  "Cyber Westphalia" and Mutually Secured Systemic Resilience (MS2R).  A Web search of that first term brings up links to discussions of nation-states deterring each other's aggression in the borderless domain of the electromagnetic spectrum.  A search for that second term brings up nothing.  One of those terms is thus fruitful for future blog articles.  The key lesson is that control of the sea includes dominance of undersea telecom cables.  Scale, proximity, and precision are three systemic advantages.

There is no grand unified theory for large-scale complex socio-technical systems (LTSs?) available in open sources.  The closest is the ultra-large-scale system (ULSS) specific to the cyber-electromagnetic domain.  The ULSS does not cover the sociological aspect of the LTS.  Cyber doctrine is maturing.  The spectrum of cyber-EM conflict is as broad as kinetic conflict in the land, sea, and aerospace domains.

Resilience in defense and targeted disruption in offense characterize cyber conflict.  It is tempting to see the current US-North Korea conflict over the Sony hacking in this light.  Sony was not resilient, and entire sectors of the US economy may be similarly unprepared.  Targeted disruption is a perfectly appropriate response to a rogue state's encouragement of vandalism.

China's digital Great Wall separating its domestic networks from the outside world is well known.  Capabilities honed in suppressing dissent are very useful in stealing technology from economic competitors.  Strong US intellectual property controls offer resilience in defense.  China's large but uncoordinated cyber effort is spread between the state and its SOEs, opening vectors for targeted disruption.  The West has capabilities but lacks will.

The NWC's cyber presenter advised us to read Sun Tzu in cyber terms.  Her proposed US strategy is to match deception and opaqueness to our scale / proximity / precision advantage.  China's ancient Confucian mindset persists in cyber space.  The Party retains the mandate of heaven so long as it delivers economic growth.  Stalling growth opens a window of vulnerability.  Use the bulletproof networks.

China and North Korea have a contentious relationship.  They are no longer "as close as lips and teeth," to borrow a translation.  Japan's dominance of the dagger-shaped peninsula was an interruption of thousands of years of Chinese imperial patronage and hegemony.  The large China-DPRK trade imbalance in the junior partner's favor must make Beijing wonder what it gets in return.  The mandarins certainly do not get North Korea's reportedly large deposits of high-grade rare earth elements.  Continued Kim family purges of KWP China hands must irk Beijing to no end.

The US, China, South Korea, and Japan calibrate their regional moves as hedges against North Korean instability.  No one is willing to admit in open sources whether North Korea can weaponize a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead.  This is why the US cannot rule out the outlier of a surprise strike.  The inability of US elites to comprehend the North Korean nuclear program and missile program as existential threats indict their ability to safeguard a democratic society.  Kim Jong-Un does not have reformist impulses.  KGS NightWatch would concur.

South Korea policy elites should spend as much time studying South Africa's "Truth and Reconciliation" post-apartheid process as they do with other forms of transitional justice if they wish to preserve order in a collapsed DPRK.  They should also smuggle some Choco-Pies into the North to destabilize its black market.  I am serious.  Seoul's Blue House should read my Third Eye OSINT article on "Mishandling One of the Two Koreas" for insights into Office 39.

China has an active space program.  It is not a suitable partner for the US space program after our rupture with Russia.  Open sources have little to say about US workarounds if China neutralizes our space assets.  A resilient society has more workarounds than a closed society.  China's odd approaches to legal classification and organizational structure pose analytical challenges.  The inscrutable Orient was never just an Occidental myth.  Anyway, the US easily falls for China's baloney about its space program.  We should not be so gullible.  Copying components is easier than replicating full systems and managerial competence.

Great power ASAT shootouts in low-earth orbit test the international community's limited tolerance for the weaponization of space.  Cold War precedents for overflight of other nations' territory offer little moral suasion to the Chinese.  The US cannot successfully co-opt China into openness as long as they can steal all the IP they need.  Other means of penetration become imperative.  An international effort to mitigate orbital debris fields could be a ripe area for US-China cooperation.  Debris is a proportionately larger threat to smaller space-faring nations (i.e., South Korea) than to those with many satellites who can afford to lose one.

China watches Russia, and Russia watches China.  They both covet superpower status.  Each has something the other wants.  Russia wants an export market for it oil and gas.  China wants to test the limits of its expansionist impulse.  The case for an anti-US conspiracy is weak given the history of imperial rivalries in Asia.  Russian military exercises in its own far east are only nominally directed against the US; their more likely opponent is closer at hand.  Russia's demographic decline and its geopolitical isolation from the West likely doom it to developing country status.  Chinese encroachment into Siberia drives Russian paranoia.  These two bears do not hibernate and they inhabit the same hunting grounds.

Compare "The Rising Sea Dragon in Asia" to the analysis at the NWC's China Maritime Studies Institute.  One source will prove to have more predictive value in about thirteen years as China's demographics overwhelm its economy's ability to deliver satisfaction.

If much of this article comes across as a tease, then that is a condition my readers shall tolerate.  Consider it my contribution to opaqueness.  I am breaking from my usual discussion of public events by not fully disclosing many of the notes I took.    Some of the insights therein are not meant to be shared.  I intend to retain the strategic advantage they bring me.  The departure this year of USPACOM's outspoken Naval intelligence officer is regrettable, because the red star is rising in the East.

Mishandling One Of The Two Koreas

The Commonwealth Club was the latest stop on the tour for The Two Koreas, an updated look at modern US diplomacy in the "land of morning calm."  I have not yet read The Two Koreas so it's going on my watch list for my next trip to the SF Public Library.  The political division of Korea is one of the last Cold War legacies on the planet, aside from the Castro regime in Cuba.  The North Korean regime exhibits behavior that the American negotiators of the Agreed Framework do not completely understand.

The Clinton Administration negotiated the Agreed Framework in the 1990s with the Kim family regime.  The IAEA had already discovered that the DPRK was in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  Negotiating in good faith with a regime proven to break faith with agreements is thus an exercise in futility.  This wisdom is lost on Western diplomats who think Oriental despots can be trusted to keep their word.  The Agreed Framework itself allowed lopsided US concessions to the DPRK and next to nothing in return.  What little the DPRK promised was renewed adherence to the NPT, which of course it later abrogated with nuclear tests.

I am profoundly disappointed at the immaturity of key US diplomats who were witness to this willful negligence of US strategic interests in the 1990s.  Political determination to pursue a questionable diplomatic goal should be grounds for career diplomats to raise strenuous objections.  It is difficult to describe the Clinton Administration's policy toward North Korea as a success given the high costs the US paid for the illusion of progress toward normalization.  JPAC's ability to dig up the North Korean countryside for US servicemembers' remains depended on millions of dollars in aid incentives.  The Bush Administration was still releasing funds to North Korea in 2002 under the Agreed Framework, even though it declined to certify the DPRK's compliance.  North Korean intransigence shredded what remained of the agreement.  Competent diplomats could have seen that coming based on North Korea's demonstrated diplomatic record of duplicity.

Independent assessments of light water reactors (LWRs) make it clear that they can still produce weapon-grade plutonium. The GAO's EMD-79-15 report made it clear during the Carter administration that light water reactors were not proliferation-proof.  This NPEC study from 2004 is similarly clear on LWRs' Pu capability.  The IAEA-SM-367/15/08 paper also made this clear.  Any competent diplomat could have leaned on the US intelligence community's technical specialists to confirm that a gift of an LWR to a hostile state will not hinder nuclear weapons development.  American diplomats should not view strategically questionable agreements as resume builders, time fillers, full employment programs, or bestseller book material.  Unfortunately, that is the Agreed Framework's legacy.

Coercion could have succeeded in curtailing the DPRK's nuclear ambitions where the Agreed Framework failed.  North Korea's Room 39 (or Office, or Bureau, or whatever) is the Kim dynasty's primary source of slush fund revenue from illicit activities worldwide.  The Bush Administration launched a comprehensive plan to take apart Office 39 but for some reason never completed it.  Comments on several websites that summarize reports from North Korean defectors are revealing.  Some of these comments indicate that this US effort to shut off North Korea's illicit funding forced the Kim family to make policy changes.  The Kims and their entourage approach all foreign dealings, including diplomatic efforts, as a matter of personal survival.  The Kim dynasty cannot maintain its extravagant lifestyle, its bribes to internal KPA and WPK factions, and its WMD programs without illicit sources of foreign funds.  Third Eye OSINT is convinced that a serious effort to shut down Room 39, its successors, and other Kim regime extralegal funding mechanisms remains the most promising US interagency option for eliciting diplomatic compliance from the DPRK leadership.  The US Treasury designated two banks as nodes of Office 39 in 2010.  It's good to know that at least one US agency is keeping up the pressure.

Any claim that the US is unable to monitor North Korean compliance with nonproliferation accords is very difficult to believe.  The US has long maintained national technical means that enable it to monitor Russia's nuclear arsenal.  This surveillance, together with IAEA physical site visits, has been sufficient to catch North Korea in the act of violating its agreements.  The US does indeed lack a diplomatic capability to assess the intent of leaders in closed societies.  Diplomatic scholars should revisit classical works on Confucian thinking to recognize the ancestor worship and other forms of filial piety the Kim regime demands of its people.  The dead hand of old thinking is alive and well in North Korea.

The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK completed its report in February 2014.  The objective evidence for barbarity inside the DPRK is as incontrovertible as it is appalling.  News of North Korea's horrors has been available through open sources such as NK News, DailyNK, and various defector sites.  Barbaric regimes do not comply with civilized directives.  This obvious inference escapes US diplomats and intelligence professionals who engage their North Korean counterparts as if an exchange among equals is possible over coffee in Geneva.  Such a comity is impossible so long as barbarity remains unchallenged.  The idealists at the Ploughshares Fund's North Korea section put too much faith in international norms against proliferation.  Barbarians do not subscribe to norms.  They understand threats of punishment backed by demonstrated strength.  Operation Paul Bunyan resolved the JSA axe murder incident on favorable terms for the US and South Korea.  Resolute coercion can make such a difference today.

The US tends to mishandle its relations with at least one of the two Koreas at any given time.  Misguided diplomatic openings to the North risk alienating the South.  It stands to reason that South Korea should be the lead international actor in dealings with its forlorn northern twin.  The Republic of Korea has matured into a modern democracy that ranks very high on numerous global measures of health.  The Democratic People's Republic of Korea ranks at the bottom on almost every conceivable measure.  The US's wisest move would be to defer to its strong ally South Korea in all future negotiations with North Korea.  Koreans understand their kin better than US diplomats who pursue negotiations for their own sake.  

The Haiku of OSINT for 08/31/13

Kim Jong-Un's envy
Rich ROK healthy "mi-guk" tie
"Juche" cannot win

US-South Korea Ties Leave North Korea In The Dust

The US and South Korea get along like old pals.  The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) has been active for over a year.  The ROK's US embassy actively promotes US-ROK business ties under the KORUS FTA through US Korea Connect.  The Korea Economic Institute of America lobbies in the US on behalf of the South Korean government's economic initiatives.  This is a more mature approach to influence than the Koreagate troubles of past decades.  I reviewed OECD StatExtracts on FDI flows by partner country.  It's surprising to note that Korea's FDI in the US was US$6.2B in 2011 while the US's FDI in South Korea was $US1.6B.

The US and South Korea are on the same sheet of music diplomatically.  They oppose North Korea's nuclear development and the Kim dynasty's placement of its self-interest ahead of the welfare of the North Korean people.  North Korea detains about 1% of its population in concentration camps.  The US and South Korea do not punish political dissent with imprisonment or forced labor.

North Korea envies the attention the US lavishes on its healthier twin to the south.  That's why it lashes out with military provocations and drags out even the simplest diplomatic issues for months.  The US-DPRK "New York" channel has been dormant for months because North Korea has nothing new to offer.  The Kim regime likes to imprison some random missionary when it needs attention but delays release negotiations to extort for foreign aid.

Asians can take responsibility for their own security once they outgrow what ROK President Park Gyun-Hye calls the "Asian paradox" where political cooperation has not kept pace with economic integration.  The US will remain engaged in inter-Korean relations until Asian powers resolve that paradox.  They can begin such resolution by working on matters unrelated to North Korea's problems.  Start with climate change and disaster relief.

The Kim regime in the North makes lots of bombastic threats.  It has little to show for decades of hostility to its neighbors and paranoia.  This satirically dubbed video of "Pyongyang Traffic Girls From The Sky" may be all the North can muster as a threat.  I wouldn't mind seeing hot chicks drop out the sky if they were friendly.

Naval War College Foundation Seminar in San Francisco 2013

The Naval War College Foundation has sponsored annual national security seminars in the San Francisco Bay Area for years.  This past April 6 was the first seminar held in San Francisco proper.  I attended for the first time because I liked the theme, "Economic and Maritime Security in the Western Pacific."  I maintain my usual methodology for reporting these types of conferences; I paraphrase the speakers' major points and then offer my own comments in italics.

The introductory speaker noted Guy Kawasaki's 10/20/30 rule for PowerPoint briefings.  That rule is aimed at startups pitching to VCs but I'll bet these policy analysts can figure it out.  I wish more publicly traded small-cap stocks in the mining and energy sectors would use that format so their roadshow pitches wouldn't be so tedious.  Anyway, the main topic headings for the conference are in bold text below, followed by the substance of what was said.

"Balancing the Rebalance:  Political Economy of American Strategy in Asia" by Dr. Peter Dombrowski

 You've probably heard a lot about the US foreign policy pivot to Asia and the emerging defense doctrine of Air-Sea Battle to back it up.  Our speaker mentioned that the US Navy currently patrols the Indian Ocean but Americans have usually ignored this region.  Not for long, folks, because China's sea lines of communication to whatever footholds it plans to occupy in Africa must extend across the Indian Ocean and are therefore susceptible to interdiction by the US and/or India.  "Sustaining US Global Leadership" officially announced the Asia-Pacific pivot, and observers can expect further partnership with India and a continued drawdown in Europe.  The shorthand for European observers IMHO is that they can expect reduced US funding for NATO and no serious land-based ballistic missile defense capability.  This isn't the Cold War anymore and there are no Warsaw Pact armored columns poised at the Fulda Gap.  NATO can't do much with two US Army brigade combat teams anyway.  

The IMF reports rapid Asian GDP growth.  Asian trade is still growing as a share of the percentage of world trade that moves by ship, which will increase their demand for maritime security.  The great powers that meet that demand for security will determine the nature of trans-Pacific trade.  The US Navy currently guarantees freedom of navigation through the Strait of Malacca.  The US government's Energy Information Administration recognizes that strait and several other locales as choke points vital to world commerce.  US naval strategy during the Cold War was to field enough aircraft carrier battle groups to control those choke points and prevent the Soviet Navy from achieving a strategic breakout.  The strategy deserves a review in light of China's rise and its demonstrated anti-ship missile capability.  I'll have a lot more to say about this in future blog articles.

China graduates 200,000 engineers each year.  I'm reminded of the old saying that the US graduates more new lawyers each year than the rest of the world combined.  With numbers like these, it's not hard to guess how far ahead China can push its developmental edge to win the future.  Dr. Dombrowski notes that a common storyline in world capitals is the historical likelihood of conflict between rising empires (China) and declining empires (US).  His thesis is that it doesn't have to be this simplistic, because China's dominance and the US's decline are not guaranteed.

The interpretation of how and why China builds its military strength is key to understanding its intentions.  China's current procurement focus is on anti-access and area denial (A2AD) systems that negate US/allied naval power.  US Navy procurement and force structure should account for this A2AD focus.  Emerging joint doctrine calls for autonomously operating forces.  I recall reading white papers in the mid-1990s that advocated disparate forces that could swarm and then scatter over wide areas.  IMHO drone technology now gives us the chance to test such hardware in programmed combat formations.  Air-Sea Battle notes that China's seaborne flows of imported hydrocarbons are vulnerable to maritime interdiction.  This is why China plans pipelines from Siberia and Central Asia to make its energy supplies less vulnerable.

Public coverage of the US's Asia pivot assumes an inevitable conflict with China.  There are other strategic frameworks besides military confrontation.  Dr. Dombrowski argues for applying the NATO rationale of embedding the military containment of China within a broad strategy of regional engagement.  The logical next step in such a policy would be the creation of a formal multinational alliance.  The US's current web of bilateral alliances in Asia conveniently works around uncomfortable anomalies, such as the traditional animosity of Japan and South Korea.  The containment of China provides a wonderful rationale for cajoling Asian democracies into leaving Japan's 20th century aggression behind.  Creating a NATO-like containment structure also requires some diplomatic fail-safe mechanisms like a Washington-Beijing hotline and the periodic observer exchanges during NATO and Warsaw Pact field maneuvers.  The hotline exists but Beijing has made it cumbersome to use.  China wasn't invited to the U.S./allied RIMPAC naval exercise in 2012.  That snub should be considered with Russian marine and naval participation in RIMPAC 2012 as part of a clear message to Beijing.  Oh BTW, China missed its chance to see RIMPAC 2012 running on biofuel.  Maybe RIMPAC 2014 will be different, but I don't expect China to be moderate its assertive claims to other countries' sovereign waters.  That alone argues against their participation in RIMPAC, but China has accepted the US's invitation to participate in RIMPAC 2014 after all.  

Dr. Dombrowski opened it up to Q&A.  The aircraft carrier's fate is hotly contested inside the Navy but he thinks it will be useful for a long time.  Other platforms may help extend its life even if it's less useful in an A2AD scenario against a major power.  An amphibious carrier that can project an MEU into an austere theater is definitely useful in a Libya-type scenario where the strategic intent is confined to changing a weak regime.

The economic crisis impacts the US's ability to fund combat power.  Maybe tolerating more risk in less-vital places is acceptable if we spend money on defending only vital US interests.  The EIA's choke point report tells us exactly where our vital interests reside.  Some combination of air-sea A2AD plus sufficient land power to breach and hold coastal defenses around the choke points is essential.  Everything else - COIN, BMD, large support infrastructure for NATO and other unlikely land-based scenarios - is negotiable.

Pakistan's biggest patron is China, not the US.  Pakistan is still the linchpin of our Afghanistan policy.  Not for long, IMHO.  India is also a big player in the region.  The US-Pakistan relationship has become very problematic in the context of the US's Asia pivot.  I can't elaborate on why the US has stood by Pakistan for so long given its destabilizing tendencies.  Pakistan's A.Q. Khan helped North Korea's nuclear weapon program, doing more to destabilize Asia than anyone in living memory.  Pakistan's fertilizer vendors provide the ignition material for almost all of the IEDs employed against US/NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan.  Pakistan's third-party logistics providers pilfer US military cargo and help fund Taliban activities.  I say Pakistan is one country the US can afford to eject from its orbit.  

The Indian navy is a small player in that country's internal military/political dialogue, thus it has little independence in developing a relationship with the US Navy.  That's true for now but the US can grow this relationship.  The US Army has sent observer missions to Indian military exercises for several years.  If China doesn't add value to the next RIMPAC, India should be welcome to play.

China's resource acquisition strategy is mostly driven by private Chinese companies with lots of cash and market power.  State-controlled companies are a different concern.  Hmm, that's interesting.  I had always assumed China's private companies somehow got their marching orders from Beijing, with subsidized capital as the incentive for playing ball.

China is disingenuous about its cyberwar strategy.  It is obvious that cyberwar attacks have hurt the US economy.  "Cybrid" conflict addresses cyberwar as a hybrid component of conventional conflict.  US policymakers and strategists need to read Unrestricted Warfare, in which two PLA colonels outline China's plan to defeat the US.  China's veiled cyberwar turns theory into practice.

China's holdings of US Treasuries are a bigger problem for itself than the US.  A hasty sale would backfire and crash the value of remaining bonds.  I've noted on my Alfidi Capital Blog how China has gradually made bilateral currency agreements and has periodically reduced its new purchases of Treasuries.  

"Vietnam:  US Engagement Strategy" by Dr. Casey Lucius

Our next presenter had served at the US Embassy in Hanoi.  She argued that Vietnam is of strategic interest to the US because its long coastline offers port access to the Taiwan Strait.  I believe Vietnam's greater strategic value lies in its shared border with China.  Ports have value if they are conduits for trade or waystations where friendly naval vessels can refuel.  If Cam Ranh Bay and other ports can play these roles then the U.S. has reason to care.  Dr. Lucius argued that Vietnam's diplomatic efforts qualify it as a regional leader and offer engagement opportunities for the US.

Vietnam's participation in the UN Security Council enabled it to engage world problems beyond its own borders.  Vietnam now contributes troops to UN peacekeeping missions.  ASEAN's Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea can help circumscribe China's aggressive maneuvers because saving face matters in Asia.  I must disagree here.  China's declared intent to absorb territories claimed by other nations does not respect international norms.  China's signature on that ASEAN declaration means nothing.  It is only useful in the event of China's eventual breach of agreements if ASEAN needs a rallying point to justify a united response.  China's dispatch of eight vessels to the Senkakus shows how little respect it has for its neighbors' territorial waters.  

Allow me to segue for a bit and wonder just what constitutes Vietnam's military capabilities.  IMHO peacekeeping is nice but can they patrol their own maritime zones?  Or would they need the US Navy's help in their own littorals if China challenged them?  Can Vietnam defend its northern border from Chinese invasion?  China's military performed poorly in its 1979 invasion of Vietnam, so any lessons the PLA learned deserve study in the West.  

The US and Vietnam have a mutual interest in deterring China in the South China Sea, and US arms sales offer leverage.  Vietnam wants to buy weapons from the US but the US has embargoed sales of lethal items Vietnam may use against its own people.

Epidemic outbreaks posed risks of deligitimization to the Vietnamese Communist Party.  The government moved quickly to mitigate local SARS outbreaks and connected with global health organizations for help.  The US worked with Vietnam on a comprehensive disease prevention campaign.  Dr. Lucius believes this experience proves that the US can work productively with Vietnam on developing a comprehensive crisis management plan for the region.

The legacy of the Vietnam War persists.  Every visiting US delegation gets an earful of complaints about unexploded ordnance (UXO) and Agent Orange.  Is there any validation for these complaints from independent non-Vietnamese sources?  Vietnam reports that over 2000 casualties occur every year from UXO.  They'll be dealing with this for a long time.  Germany is still digging up Allied UXOs from WWII.  The US Congress has appropriated money to remove Agent Orange dioxins from Vietnam's water, even though the correlation between Agent Orange exposure and health abnormalities isn't clear from statistics.  This reminds me of the US Department of Veterans Affairs' designation of presumptive conditions arising from US troops' exposure to Agent Orange.  Politics takes precedence over statistical validation.  The American Cancer Society has a good rundown on ailments that have been linked to the small numbers of people who experienced concentrated exposure to Agent Orange.  Good meta-studies on cancer research serve the public interest and cut through politically-motivated disinformation.  Vietnam still suppresses political dissent and religious freedom.  The country does want help with development, so perhaps the US can build trust there.

Dr. Lucius articulated several US options for addressing China's rise that were mutually exclusive, yet the US is pursuing all of them simultaneously.  Asian relations really are all about China.  China's dream is to surpass the US as the world's number one military power, so anything less than a determined US presence in Asia will undermine our partners in the region.  Dr. Lucius advocates using "SMART" risk analysis for Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Results-oriented, and Time-limited goals.  The US should assess its strategic options within this rubric.

Then came the Q&A.  Someone asked whether Russia and China have a naval presence in Vietnam.  The official answer is "unknown," with occasional port visits but no likelihood of a permanent presence.  One sharp observer asked how China deals with its neighbors on water use.  Dr. Lucius said Vietnam, Cambodia, and China have land border disputes over water control.  She does not see this as a source of conflict in the Mekong Delta.  I must disagree.  China has had longstanding plans to build hydroelectric plants along the stretch of the Mekong River it controls,  Dams would clearly give China the upper hand in determining water allocation for its neighbors.  Someone else asked about Vietnam's political-military relations.  The Vietnamese military owns all textile factories and telecommunications.  This policy ensures control of vital defense resources and provides jobs to Vietnamese military members when they're not in their training cycle.  It's still a centrally planned economy.

"North Korea:  Politics, Power and Nuclear Weapons," by Dr. Terrence Roehrig

Dr. Roehrig talked about the world's most reclusive kingdom after lunch.  The military balance between the two Koreas is not in the North's favor and they know it.  I remember my first tour of duty in South Korea in the 1990s.  The Third ROK Army defending Seoul was then the largest "field army" (i.e., an integrated fighting force with a four-star commander) in the world.  The South is not the undeveloped agrarian country it was in the 1950s.  The last Kim-to-Kim dynastic transition was planned in advance and Kim Jong-Il as the designated successor had time to build credibility.  Recall the funeral photo of Kim Jong-Un marching alongside his father's hearse.  Civilian officials were arranged behind him, and Jang Song-Taek is related to him by marriage to Kim Jong-Il's sister, Kim Kyong-Hui (i.e., the guy is Kim J-U's uncle).  The military officials on the other side of the hearse have since been removed from power.  North Korea is shifting from military dominance to a military/civilian balance with the Workers' Party of Korea re-elevated.

Dr. Roehrig is skeptical that Kim Jong-Un is fully in control.  There is no danger of a military coup.  Kim's key position is First Secretary of the Party and Chairman of its Central Military Commission.  It's worth noting that North Korea is the only country in the world where a deceased leader is officially recognized as the Eternal President.  Let's see if Kim J-U times an official visit to China with the aftermath of whatever dramatic demonstration of military might he plans to hold.  Ideology maintains the regime's legitimacy:  "Son-gun" is the geopolitical policy of putting the military first and "juche" is the economic philosophy of self-reliance.  Yeah, good luck with those great ideas.  The military has to supplement its own meager rations by tending its own crops and North Korea is one of the poorest countries on the planet.  Check out a night-time satellite photo of the two Koreas.  The south is lit up with energy while the north is pitch dark.  The contrast between prosperity and self-imposed isolation is clear.  

Kim Jong-Un established his legitimacy by invoking Kim Il-Sung's name and legacy, but this young Kim has a much more public image than his father.  He is remaking himself in his grandfather's charismatic image.  His legitimacy is in part grounded on carrying on the ideology of his father and grandfather, and ideology is a crucial component for the legitimacy of this regime.  Note that some news photos indicated he suddenly had a wife, supporting an image as a family man.  It's embarrassing to note that Dennis Rodman may have more personal knowledge of Kim Jong-Un than our own State Department.  When Dennis Rodman returned from his goodwill basketball trip to North Korea, he indicated that Kim's "wife" may have had a baby but this news was not reported in North Korea's own media.  This implies the newborn may not be considered viable for public display as an heir to the regime.  I would be disappointed if the US government has not fully debriefed Mr. Rodman and his entourage after their goodwill visit.  I am not surprised that Mr. Rodman could not keep his mouth shut about such contact.  This lack of discretion will limit his utility as a diplomat if he makes good on his promise to return to North Korea.  

North Korea's nuclear weapons program is real but its capabilities deserve a big question mark.  Their tests indicate some progress toward miniaturization of a warhead.  The US government needs to speak with one voice on this subject.  National strategy is dysfunctional when the Pentagon says North Korea has miniaturized a warhead while the White House expresses its doubts.  This sends a clear message to America's adversaries that the President's top advisers cannot reach a consensus estimate of a threat.  Disagreement is healthy behind closed doors, but it shouldn't leak into the public realm so readily  China told North Korea not to conduct a nuclear test but they did it anyway.  There is no risk of a rupture between these two countries despite China's frustration.  The US estimates the DRPK has enough plutonium for four to ten warheads.

North Korea's Scud short-range missiles can range the entire Korean peninsula.  Its Nodong mid-range ballistic missiles can range Japan and US bases there.  The Musudan is an intermediate range missile that can reach Guam and the Taepodong, along with the KN-08 mobile ICBM, are the longer range missiles that might be able to reach the US.  The Musudan, Taepodong and KN-08 have undergone various degrees of testing but are not believed to be operational.  The Musudan is the missile that many believed would be tested in April.  The Nodong can target Japan with conventional and probably chemical warheads but they are not believed to be terribly accurate.  NK does not have a missile yet that can reach the US.

North Korea tends to tie its provocations to key dates in the history of its ruling dynasty.  April 15 was Kim Il-Sung's 101st birthday.  It came and went without incident.  This regime may have trouble pulling off provocations according to the Kim traditional timetable if Kim Jong-Un isn't fully in control of the military.

Dr. Roehrig and others try to discern how much of North Korea's saber-rattling is real and how much is bluff.  Their new rhetoric claims the ability to target Japan and the US but they have little demonstrated capability to do so.  Most North Korean statements deliver a deterrent tone, i.e. "we will do this if you provoke us."  It is clear that the ROK will respond strongly if North Korea makes a kinetic provocation (like shelling Yeonpyeong island).  North Korea sees nukes as the ultimate deterrent and regime guarantor.  They learned this from watching Iraq and Libya.  The North Korean leadership also sees prestige in having nukes as something that grants big-power acceptance.  They no longer see nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to  give away.  Nukes are now a permanent part of North Korea's national security doctrine.  This concurs with the open source assessment from KGS NightWatch that North Korea's rhetoric on nuclear weapons will not allow for compromise.  North Korea is unlikely to use nukes offensively, because it knows that would bring regime-ending retaliation.  The nature of that retaliation was left unsaid.  I recall an interview President Clinton gave to CNN in the 1990s when tensions with North Korea were high. He stated clearly that North Korean use of nuclear weapons would bring the end of their country as they know it.  

North Korea's nuclear program is an immediate problem for its neighbors.  South Korea is now seriously thinking of developing its own nuclear weapons.  Japan would then have to decide whether it should obtain nukes, which would be hard due to its WWII experience.  The good news is that US/ROK ties are now better than ever.  We should enjoy the good ties while they last.  Incidents of indiscipline with US troops in South Korea are always fodder for left-leaning student organizations that are probably funded by North Korea.  The US has no "Israel" in the region, i.e. a loyal ally willing to take out the North's nukes.  I'm not so sure that South Korea is totally unwilling to play that role.  I recall one of the old sayings from my first tour in the ROK:  "The US isn't here to keep the North out of the South; it's to keep the South out of the North."  Whatever.  President Park Geun-Hye's "trustpolitik" has not shut off trust-building options despite recent tensions.  I suspect that ROK politicians and geopolitical analysts are better at reading North Korean rhetoric and indicators than their American counterparts.  Letting the ROK take the initiative in resolving tension is correct.  The ROK is strong enough to engage North Korea without deferring to the US.  

The audience questions for this round weren't always intelligible, but Dr. Roehrig answered them well, and that is why his answers will dominate the rest of this summary.  The ROK announced its willingness to resume relief aid even amidst the current tension.  Russia probably has the least leverage of the Six Party members.  Hunger in the North is still a problem, with some chronic food shortages and much evidence of multi-generational health problems.  Selling nuclear weapons materials to other countries would be a US/ROK "red line."  I do not know whether that is officially announced policy or just a reflection of a consensus in Washington.  A ROK pre-emptive strike on a DPRK launch site is unlikely.  One out-of-the-box thinker in the audience asked if it would be possible to buy off the North Korean regime for some unknown price.  I give the guy credit for original thinking.  Dr. Roehrig said that's probably not realistic because you'd have to bribe and relocate tens of thousands of regime officials.

The State Department was irritated when Eric Schmidt visited North Korea with former Gov. Bill Richardson because it legitimized the regime.  The North Korean media played it as a "US delegation."  The ROK military thinks strategic deterrence works but it's harder to deter small-scale incidents like the Cheonan sinking.  The ROK has now publicized very clear red lines that will prompt retaliation.  North Korea's actions may not appear rational to us but they do have patterns of setting criteria for de-escalation.  There is no short-term chance of revolution from below in North Korea.  The good news is that smuggled cell phones and digital media introduce a slow leakage of modern information into North Korea.  That's nothing without openness at the top.  Ordinary Soviets had smuggled Western goods for years but the regime only fell after Mikhail Gorbachev introduced reforms.  Defectors also introduce us to what's going on inside the country.  The Daily NK keeps us apprised of news like executions for defacing pictures of the Kim dynasty.  

I'll close out the North Korea part of this report by wondering out loud why Japan still tolerates the existence of Chongryon.  Japanese law does not begrudge the right of ethnic Koreans to refuse to assimilate.  This does not excuse the blatantly pro-North Korean activities of Chongryon from scrutiny by law enforcement and security agencies.  The activities of this organization as a conduit for illicit transfers of funds and information to North Korea pose a clear security risk to Japan.

Panel Discussion:  Alternative Perspectives

The speakers took their turns developing the US's next steps in Asia.  The rest of this summary will be stream-of-consciousness, without individual attribution.  Embed US strategy within international organizations.  Talk doesn't solve problems but collaboration can bring some actors into a problem-solving process.  China never follows through on any US request to exert leverage over North Korea; they have exerted some pressure on the DPRK but it has either been unsuccessful or not as strong as the US would think necessary.  Why not talk to Vietnam instead?  Hanoi has good relations with Pyongyang and can model a regime North Korea considers a "success."

Our well-informed audience had plenty of questions.  Once again, stream-of-consciousness, without attribution.

Were the sanctions on North Korea effective?  A large body of literature is pessimistic on sanctions causing changes in regime behavior.  Sanctions have degraded North Korea's nuclear weapon and missile programs.  North Korea has found back-channel ways around financial sanctions.  Read my mention of Chongryon above for a hint as to how the DPRK gets around financial sanctions.

What is going on with Indonesia?  The good news is that Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore cooperate in maintaining the security of the Strait of Malacca.  The key to understanding Indonesia's importance is that five of the seven main sea routes for transporting Middle East oil to China transit Indonesian waters.

What about the Burma / Myanmar opening?  The US welcomes it.  Well, obviously.  China is Myanmar's biggest investor so any inroads the US can make will throw China off balance.  China's oil pipeline through Myanmar opens for business very soon, reducing China's vulnerability to constricted sea lines.  Asia really is all about China, and China really is all about resources.

Should the US send Dennis Rodman back to North Korea to gather more intelligence?  Ha-ha, good one there.  There's nothing wrong with private cultural exchanges as long as we're not hopeful they lead to short-term changes.  The guy who calls himself "The Worm" plans a return trip to the Hermit Kingdom later this summer.  

One panelist made the very interesting comment that former Doobie Brothers guitarist Jeff "Skunk" Baxter has been a highly paid consultant to the defense and intelligence communities!  I had no idea that a rock musician could hold a high-level security clearance.  That means there's hope for me yet.  Just think, some analyst could send my blog articles to a senior defense official and then - presto - I'm in the National Military Command Center with Skunk Baxter, Henry Kissinger, and whoever is running the Trilateral Commission and Illuminati these days.  Man, sign me up for that stuff.  

Should the US step back from inter-Korean problems and let the ROK lead?  The ROK still values US tactical fighter superiority.  US troop presence in South Korea has more political value than military utility.  The US does not want South Korea to get nukes.  The US willingness to commit strategic assets (B-52s, etc.) does much to deter ROK aggressiveness.  I'm inclined to let the ROK take the lead so long as we keep them on a long leash to "keep the South out of the North."  The US has always reserved the right to exercise operational control (OPCON) of South Korea's armed forces in the event of hostilities.  This has long been a thorn in the side of South Korean military officers' nationalist sentiments.  The US and ROK agreed to a transition to South Korean OPCON years ago; the transition is running late and one former US commander is now having second thoughts.  This confusion is music to North Korea's ears.  I say let the transition continue as planned.  South Korea's national security architecture is mature enough to handle a war for national survival.  

Why not ignore North Korean rhetoric?   At the national level, not speaking also sends messages.  North Korea may interpret that as preparation for a surprise attack.  These are hard-won lessons from the Cold War.  The US and Soviet Union established hot lines to ensure national leaders could dispel any misunderstandings on short notice and avoid a crisis.  The NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances frequently exchanged military observer missions to monitor each other's announced exercises; this ensured that large-scale field maneuvers were not surprise attacks.  I doubt that North Korea would ever want a hotline with the White House or agree to military observer exchanges with South Korea. The US POW/MIA recovery effort in North Korea has allowed for intermittent foreign military presence inside the Hermit Kingdom that the Kim regime found non-threatening.  Large humanitarian aid promises were the price to pay.

Does North Korea have chemical and biological weapons?  They do have chemical weapons and may have bio-weapons.  They have operationalized their fairly large chemical arsenal.

What is next for China's development?  Every great power strikes a balance between military power and economic development.  Americans ask themselves legitimate questions when considering how much infrastructure investment is sufficient to remain powerful.  Japan and South Korea have low birthrates and may not be able to fill their militaries with males.  So how about females?  Israel does that because its survival in a hostile neighborhood is at stake.  China has a falling birthrate and a gender imbalance that will harm its development.  Other countries think the US's openness to immigration is a strength that negates a low birthrate.  Interesting.  They think it adds to our stock of human capital.  The foreign perspective is one we haven't heard in Washington's debate over immigration reform.

Why does the US periodically shift its strategic focus between Europe and Asia?  The US never left Asia after World War II.  The real anomaly is our huge presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Americans were unwilling to favor a large military presence overseas before WWII.  The US presence in Asia has never been limited to the military; consider development aid.  Look no further than the persistence of the "Ugly American" stereotype to see just how long we've been trying to make a difference in Asia, with varying degrees of success.

What is the current relationship between the US and the Philippines?  Subic Bay is still useful but the Philippine people have little interest in a permanent US presence.  The USS Guardian minesweeper grounded on the country's World Heritage Site coral reef.  US willingness to spend money to dismantle the ship to save the reef sends a tremendous message about American values.  The US should exploit this demonstration of its values with an information operations campaign via the Voice of America and social media.  

Is there some future unidentified third party cyber threat to the US?  There's plenty of evidence for non-state hacker attacks.  The US is studying the usefulness of red lines prompting a cyber-response.  The undeclared cyber-war between the US and unnamed actors has been running for over a decade.

Does Vietnam send officers to the Naval War College?  ARVN officers attended until 1975 and a few Vietnamese officers have attended recently now that relations are better.  Mainland China has never sent attendees to the Naval War college because Taiwan has sent a student every year since the 1950s.  Vietnam is too suspicious of China to send its officers to the PLA's senior academies.

What about Australia?  It's a strong US ally.  The Australian army may have political limits to an extensive US permanent military presence.  Resource exports to China are a factor in Australian policy, giving China leverage.  US Army Pacific now has an Australian two-star army general as its deputy commander for operations.  That is an extremely important development.  Allied officers in the US armed forces are often assigned as liaisons to corps and theater headquarters, military school instructors, and exercise observers.  They rarely assume roles within an American chain of command.  More such arrangements will send a clear message to China and North Korea that an attack on an American ally is an attack on America itself.  

There is one scenario that none of the panelists or audience members addressed, so I'll mention it here.  Russia, China, and India are obviously the most important powers in Asia.  Russia has largely settled its differences with its neighbors except for the frequent outbreaks of Islamic radicalism in the Caucasus.  China and India have yet to settle any of their differences.  They both have unresolved claims on parts of each others' territory.  China's control of the headwaters of the Indus River will eventually pose problems for India's water need if China continues its hydroelectric building programs.  India and China's demographics and development needs will inevitably bring them into direct competition for access to energy, water, and mineral resources.   I take a potential conflict between China and India very seriously.  I would very much like to contact other members of the US defense, diplomatic, and intelligence communities who have an interest in studying this scenario.  Capt. James Fanell (US Navy) also takes the rise of China seriously, and as a Hoover Fellow he studied China's open source developments in his Red Star Rising column.  He continues to discuss China in his Red Star Rising Google Group and in public appearances.  Capt. Fanell performs a great service for our nation by discussing emerging security risks in frank terms.  

I had a blast absorbing all of this knowledge from serious national security scholars.  I spent several weeks preparing this article to ensure it reflected everything discussed, met my high editorial standards, and referenced only unclassified information found in open sources.  I will definitely attend next year so I can keep scouting for an audience that will listen to my pet theories about security in Asia.

Brief Education on East Coast Missile Threat

Our nation prospers when we all have a solid grasp of strategic threats.  DOD is beefing up the Alaskan missile interceptors while one elected official calls for a similar site on the U.S. east coast.  It would help if we describe the threat to the east coast before we decide whether another interceptor site is necessary.

The Alaskan interceptors are specifically intended to counter a potential ballistic missile launch from North Korea.  The National Research Council published a report in September 2012 that explored options for strengthening U.S. ballistic missile defense.  I know that most of my readers don't have as much time to read as I do.  The report's summary press release restates its conclusions.  The report advocates an east coast interceptor site to counter missile threats from countries other than North Korea.

Most previous tests of North Korea's ballistic missiles, specifically the Unha and Taepodong-2, have been spectacular failures, although the Unha-3 did successfully orbit an object in December 2012.  That's something their Paektusan launch vehicle could not accomplish.  The DPRK just can't seem to get those second and third stages more than halfway across the Pacific Ocean, which is unsurprising for a country that can't feed itself.  North Korean missiles are not yet a serious threat to the U.S. west coast, let alone the east coast, because the country needs several years between single launches.  The existing interceptor sites at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB are sufficient to take down a single launch of a North Korean ICBM.

Iran may be a similar story.  It has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles but none of them have sufficient range to reach the U.S.  Iran has a very limited space program unless they really are monkeying around with with astro-monkeys.  Maybe sending Mahmoud Ahmadinejad into space isn't such a bad idea if it keeps him out of earthly affairs.

There is little point in deploying missile interceptors to counter a nonexistent Iranian threat.  A proposed east coast site would probably be a waste of money in an era when the U.S. needs to reduce its fiscal profligacy.

The Haiku of OSINT for 02/11/13

North Korea nuke
Test weapons while people starve
Totally insane