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Friday, April 19, 2013
Asymmetric Implications of Boston Marathon Bombings
One of the alleged suspects of the Boston Marathon bombings is now in custody. Cooperation among multiple law enforcement agencies and some crowdsourced tips helped identify the likely perpetrators very quickly. The after-action reviews of the tactical effort should be interesting. The larger implications of this incident also deserve exploration.
Two amateur insurgents with no apparent formal military training assembled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from common household items. Whether they had access to live networks of Al-Qaeda or Chechen bomb makers is likely irrelevant. Designs for explosive devices are within the reach of anyone with an Internet connection and knowledge of household chemistry. A trip to the local mall yields pressure cookers, circuit boards, nails, and other implements. Preventing the assembly of hardware is impossible. Deterring human actors is the more fruitful route.
These two amateurs generated a police response that shut down the economy of a major American city for more than a day. The city of Boston was under siege from an internal threat. A transportation network shutdown of more than three days would have seriously affected the city's ability to sustain itself, based on my hip-pocket guess of the days' of supply available at most major grocery stores.
The incident received national-level attention. The federal government's strategic decision cycle was tied directly to a tactical response for about five full days. This focus probably accelerated the final resolution but left the nation vulnerable to strategic surprises in other domains. The damage to the U.S. economy and infrastructure from the attack was nowhere near the level of the 9/11 attacks yet the national response was significant.
Aspiring terrorists will learn a great deal about the asymmetric effects of attacking a high-profile public event. Two IEDs launched a major response from the national security apparatus. Terrorists planning future incidents now have clear incentive to launch multiple simultaneous attacks in different locations. American policymakers must now model scenarios for multiple attacks in multiple locations that are sustained over time. That is one worst-case scenario around which America must build a resilient and flexible security architecture.
The good news is that national policy makers have shown an open interest in learning from other nations' experiences with high-profile urban terrorism. Washington is reaching out to Moscow. This is very good news. Russia has decades of experience dealing with Islamic militancy in Chechnya. The Russians have lessons to share with us in counterinsurgency and law enforcement if we are willing to learn. The dialogue can be a basis for restoring trust in other areas of the American-Russian relationship that have deteriorated since 9/11.
Speaking of Chechnya, it is high time for the U.S. intelligence community to review the transit patterns of Chechen nationals as they enter and depart the U.S. The details are properly left to the operators and analysts. Throw in Dagestan and Ingushetia too, you know, just in case. This is how we can help Moscow in return for their help.
In the week after 9/11, I recall speculating to a few of my colleagues that the most likely follow-on attacks would look like the car bombs the IRA used in Northern Ireland. I was too early with that prediction. We can credit the sharp work of the intelligence and law enforcement communities since 9/11 for the fact that follow-on attacks by Islamic radicals have taken so long to manifest. The good guys rounded up the most obvious bad guys early on. The new crop of bad guys is less obvious but just as deadly.
Friday, April 12, 2013
Saturday, March 23, 2013
Did the Axis Plan to Invade US During WWII?
I have stumbled across odd references over the years to supposed Axis plans to invade and conquer the United States during World War II. I have never been able to locate historical confirmation of these plans. One colleague told me that Japan and Germany had agreed to divide governance of an occupied U.S. at the Mississippi River. Another acquaintance said the line of demarcation would be at the Continental Divide.
The U.S. Army's official history of WWII has little to say on Axis plans for North America other than their desire to degrade the U.S.'s ability to aid its allies in Europe or operate in the Pacific. Life magazine published theoretical invasion scenarios in 1942, probably at the behest of the U.S. Office of War Information to scare Americans into putting more elbow grease into the war effort.
Where can I find historical sources for these war plans, if they in fact existed? I sometimes wonder whether Japan and Germany may have leaked existence of notional occupation plans just to convince the U.S. national leadership to devote military forces to securing the coasts of the U.S. from attack. If this was a strategic deception, it would be interesting to know what FDR's war cabinet was willing to commit to coastal defense at the expense of front-line forces in the European and Pacific theaters. If anyone out there has suggestions on where I should look, just drop me a line.
The U.S. Army's official history of WWII has little to say on Axis plans for North America other than their desire to degrade the U.S.'s ability to aid its allies in Europe or operate in the Pacific. Life magazine published theoretical invasion scenarios in 1942, probably at the behest of the U.S. Office of War Information to scare Americans into putting more elbow grease into the war effort.
Where can I find historical sources for these war plans, if they in fact existed? I sometimes wonder whether Japan and Germany may have leaked existence of notional occupation plans just to convince the U.S. national leadership to devote military forces to securing the coasts of the U.S. from attack. If this was a strategic deception, it would be interesting to know what FDR's war cabinet was willing to commit to coastal defense at the expense of front-line forces in the European and Pacific theaters. If anyone out there has suggestions on where I should look, just drop me a line.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Iraq Liberation Ten Year Anniversary Scorecard
Ten years ago today, the United States led a coalition of the willing to liberate Iraq from the Saddam Hussein regime. Let's run through the neighborhood and examine the strategic results.
Iraq. The liberated Iraqi people suffered anywhere from 109,000 to over 1,000,000 deaths, depending on who does the counting and whether it includes sectarian violence and deaths from disease or malnutrition. Iraq is no longer governed by an autocrat but its democratic institutions are still weak. The country is still periodically beset by sectarian violence and instability. The good news is that Iraq has functioning democratic institutions and is producing oil for export, although energy supermajors are beginning to sour on Iraq's business climate and poor infrastructure. The bad news is that the Sunni and Kurd minorities are not full partners in Iraq's governance. Iraq is a winner, just barely.
Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been ascendant since the overthrow of the Saddam regime. Its remaining regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel, are unwilling to officially cooperate to restrain potential Iranian hegemony. A continued U.S. military presence in the Middle East deters Iran's overt ambitions. This does not deter Iran from using asymmetric methods to influence the Syrian insurrection (Quds Force support to the Assad regime) or the Iraqi government (support to Shiite sect leaders). Iran is probably the biggest winner of the war.
Saudi Arabia. American assurances sustain the kingdom against external threats. Oil revenue sustains it against internal unrest. The House of Saud bribed its citizens to ignore the Arab Spring and the gamble paid off. The Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force stopped Bahrain's unrest from spreading. It's business as usual in Riyadh as if nothing changed in Baghdad. Saudi Arabia is a big winner.
Kuwait. The Saddam regime posed an existential threat to Kuwait as long as it existed. Kuwait now has a much freer hand in dealing with its neighbors. A large U.S. military presence in the Emirate ensures its security. Kuwait is a big winner.
Israel. The oldest democracy in the Middle East is no longer faced with the threat of land invasion or ballistic missile attack from Iraq. The Palestinian insurgency is still a problem but it has one less Arab sponsor. Israel is a big winner.
United States. America's years in Iraq cost over 4400 combat-related casualties and have afflicted thousands more veterans with combinations of mild ailments and severe wounds. The best estimates of the financial costs exceed US$2T including direct appropriations, interest on debt, supplementary expenses in related budget lines (State Department aid), and deferred costs of veterans' care. The opportunity costs of careers unfulfilled and businesses interrupted by repeated mobilizations of the military reserve components are incalculable. The U.S. gained no permanent military basing rights other than the right to continue a large advisory mission under the supervision of its embassy in Baghdad. Concessions for U.S.-based energy producers were mostly limited to support services and a U.S.-Iraq trade framework has taken eight years to implement. The U.S. strategic position as guarantor of the balance of power in the Middle East is unchanged; this came at an enormous cost in lives, prestige, material, and treasure. The United States cannot lose as long as it remains engaged in the Middle East with all elements of its national power, but the price of truly winning is now higher than ever.
Iraq. The liberated Iraqi people suffered anywhere from 109,000 to over 1,000,000 deaths, depending on who does the counting and whether it includes sectarian violence and deaths from disease or malnutrition. Iraq is no longer governed by an autocrat but its democratic institutions are still weak. The country is still periodically beset by sectarian violence and instability. The good news is that Iraq has functioning democratic institutions and is producing oil for export, although energy supermajors are beginning to sour on Iraq's business climate and poor infrastructure. The bad news is that the Sunni and Kurd minorities are not full partners in Iraq's governance. Iraq is a winner, just barely.
Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been ascendant since the overthrow of the Saddam regime. Its remaining regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel, are unwilling to officially cooperate to restrain potential Iranian hegemony. A continued U.S. military presence in the Middle East deters Iran's overt ambitions. This does not deter Iran from using asymmetric methods to influence the Syrian insurrection (Quds Force support to the Assad regime) or the Iraqi government (support to Shiite sect leaders). Iran is probably the biggest winner of the war.
Saudi Arabia. American assurances sustain the kingdom against external threats. Oil revenue sustains it against internal unrest. The House of Saud bribed its citizens to ignore the Arab Spring and the gamble paid off. The Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force stopped Bahrain's unrest from spreading. It's business as usual in Riyadh as if nothing changed in Baghdad. Saudi Arabia is a big winner.
Kuwait. The Saddam regime posed an existential threat to Kuwait as long as it existed. Kuwait now has a much freer hand in dealing with its neighbors. A large U.S. military presence in the Emirate ensures its security. Kuwait is a big winner.
Israel. The oldest democracy in the Middle East is no longer faced with the threat of land invasion or ballistic missile attack from Iraq. The Palestinian insurgency is still a problem but it has one less Arab sponsor. Israel is a big winner.
United States. America's years in Iraq cost over 4400 combat-related casualties and have afflicted thousands more veterans with combinations of mild ailments and severe wounds. The best estimates of the financial costs exceed US$2T including direct appropriations, interest on debt, supplementary expenses in related budget lines (State Department aid), and deferred costs of veterans' care. The opportunity costs of careers unfulfilled and businesses interrupted by repeated mobilizations of the military reserve components are incalculable. The U.S. gained no permanent military basing rights other than the right to continue a large advisory mission under the supervision of its embassy in Baghdad. Concessions for U.S.-based energy producers were mostly limited to support services and a U.S.-Iraq trade framework has taken eight years to implement. The U.S. strategic position as guarantor of the balance of power in the Middle East is unchanged; this came at an enormous cost in lives, prestige, material, and treasure. The United States cannot lose as long as it remains engaged in the Middle East with all elements of its national power, but the price of truly winning is now higher than ever.
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