Sunday, May 25, 2014
Saturday, May 17, 2014
US Conservatives Ally With Boko Haram And Refuse to #BringBackOurGirls
Boko Haram, a radical Islamist terror gang, abducted hundreds of Nigerian girls several weeks ago. The women of the US Senate gathered in support of the #BringBackOurGirls social media meme. This is so obviously a good idea that you'd think every decent American could see the wisdom in claiming the moral high ground. Alas, America's loudest conservative pundits registered their objections to the photo below.
Leading voices on the Right have denounced the photo and its meme as weak and pointless. They have no idea how wrong they are. Napoleon Bonaparte said it best: "The moral is to the physical as three to one." He meant that claiming the moral high ground is an absolute advantage in fighting a conflict. It clarifies strategic goals to allies and gives domestic morale a boost. The West is in a multi-decade struggle with radical Islam. Every time we demonstrate the moral clarity of Western Civilization, we rally neutral people in the developing world to our cause and force jihadis to explain their atrocities.
The anti-female rhetoric I've heard from my conservative colleagues on this photo is disgusting. They sound pathetic by trotting out old misogynistic stereotypes that working women have tried hard to banish. The language some Americans have used to describe the Senators is the kind of verbiage a Salafist sheikh might use to describe his harem. That is not the face America should present to the world.
These hashtags aren't just photo ops anymore. Social media that goes viral now drives strategic decision making. This is the power of "information operations" and I assure you that plenty of people in the US national security establishment take crafting these narratives very seriously. If you disagree, consider how the US will benefit once we share credit for the girls' safe return.
I'd like to know if any of my fellow conservatives see the irony in all of these anti-hashtag comments in light of the Democratic Party's charge that the GOP engages in a "war on women." I've seen a bunch of comments criticizing women for wanting girls to be safe. Meanwhile, the US is doing what it can to help Nigerians bring them back. Do any of you see how getting behind this message sends a powerful signal to Africans who wonder whether the US stands with their hopes? Seriously, I'd like some answers.
Do any of you conservatives know what millions of Africans are saying right now? They are openly questioning the radical Islamic groups that have grown throughout the continent. They do that specifically because of this incident's notoriety. Getting Americans on the right side of that message is a powerful adjunct to our diplomacy. Do you people really not see this?
This isn't about Benghazi. I'm less interested in placing blame for past oversights than in solving a present problem. American leaders made plenty of missteps in the Cold War but our bipartisan foreign policy won in the end partly because our messaging to the world was based on a morally sound foundation. Messages of freedom, dignity, and prosperity matter, just as Ronald Reagan taught us with "Morning in America." Ronald Reagan also taught us that America would not tolerate Islamic terrorists getting away with the Achille Lauro hijacking; he told other would-be murderers, "You can run, but you can't hide." I believe the Gipper would be totally on board with hunting down Boko Haram fighters and rescuing their captive girls.
I'm throwing it down right now, people. Anyone who disagrees with what these women Senators have to say in their hashtag should put up a photo of themselves with a #Don'tBringBackTheGirls tag. I dare you to do something that stupid. See how well that plays in 2016 when Hillary's operatives run the "GOP anti-women" canard all over again. I am amazed that Republicans are willing to cede the moral high ground to both Democrats and Boko Haram out of pure spite. Conservatives should be better than this if they are to convince Americans that the GOP is fit to govern.
It is true that US foreign assistance programs are sometimes messy. It is difficult to advance a freedom agenda in authoritarian countries. We succeeded in countries like South Korea and Thailand even though they had military governments for part of their modern history. Engagement is hard. The alternative is to cede contested countries to powers that have clear anti-West agendas. I'll take the 50% solution if I think it can get to 100% with continued US involvement.
Republicans can't seem to say anything positive about Administration figures who have this crisis on their radar. Hmmm, the Democrats are doing nothing but tweeting? I guess the Democratic President who directed our national security team to work with the Nigerians doesn't count. I know exactly how capable the US can be and that's why all of the partisan criticism I'm seeing here is handcuffing the GOP.
Partisanship during the Cold War stopped at the water's edge, and our bipartisan foreign policy won that competition with the Soviet Union. Today's conservatives (thanks to some Tea Party nutcases) have so little positive news to offer America that they can't resist harassing our own female political leaders. American conservatives have done a whole lot more than make themselves look like fools. They have missed a golden opportunity to demonstrate American resolve in the face of the violent jihadi movements they claim to hate so much. The conservative loudmouths criticizing the #BringBackOurGirls meme have a profoundly immature understanding of information operations. They have in fact aligned themselves in support of Boko Haram.
Leading voices on the Right have denounced the photo and its meme as weak and pointless. They have no idea how wrong they are. Napoleon Bonaparte said it best: "The moral is to the physical as three to one." He meant that claiming the moral high ground is an absolute advantage in fighting a conflict. It clarifies strategic goals to allies and gives domestic morale a boost. The West is in a multi-decade struggle with radical Islam. Every time we demonstrate the moral clarity of Western Civilization, we rally neutral people in the developing world to our cause and force jihadis to explain their atrocities.
The anti-female rhetoric I've heard from my conservative colleagues on this photo is disgusting. They sound pathetic by trotting out old misogynistic stereotypes that working women have tried hard to banish. The language some Americans have used to describe the Senators is the kind of verbiage a Salafist sheikh might use to describe his harem. That is not the face America should present to the world.
These hashtags aren't just photo ops anymore. Social media that goes viral now drives strategic decision making. This is the power of "information operations" and I assure you that plenty of people in the US national security establishment take crafting these narratives very seriously. If you disagree, consider how the US will benefit once we share credit for the girls' safe return.
I'd like to know if any of my fellow conservatives see the irony in all of these anti-hashtag comments in light of the Democratic Party's charge that the GOP engages in a "war on women." I've seen a bunch of comments criticizing women for wanting girls to be safe. Meanwhile, the US is doing what it can to help Nigerians bring them back. Do any of you see how getting behind this message sends a powerful signal to Africans who wonder whether the US stands with their hopes? Seriously, I'd like some answers.
Do any of you conservatives know what millions of Africans are saying right now? They are openly questioning the radical Islamic groups that have grown throughout the continent. They do that specifically because of this incident's notoriety. Getting Americans on the right side of that message is a powerful adjunct to our diplomacy. Do you people really not see this?
This isn't about Benghazi. I'm less interested in placing blame for past oversights than in solving a present problem. American leaders made plenty of missteps in the Cold War but our bipartisan foreign policy won in the end partly because our messaging to the world was based on a morally sound foundation. Messages of freedom, dignity, and prosperity matter, just as Ronald Reagan taught us with "Morning in America." Ronald Reagan also taught us that America would not tolerate Islamic terrorists getting away with the Achille Lauro hijacking; he told other would-be murderers, "You can run, but you can't hide." I believe the Gipper would be totally on board with hunting down Boko Haram fighters and rescuing their captive girls.
I'm throwing it down right now, people. Anyone who disagrees with what these women Senators have to say in their hashtag should put up a photo of themselves with a #Don'tBringBackTheGirls tag. I dare you to do something that stupid. See how well that plays in 2016 when Hillary's operatives run the "GOP anti-women" canard all over again. I am amazed that Republicans are willing to cede the moral high ground to both Democrats and Boko Haram out of pure spite. Conservatives should be better than this if they are to convince Americans that the GOP is fit to govern.
It is true that US foreign assistance programs are sometimes messy. It is difficult to advance a freedom agenda in authoritarian countries. We succeeded in countries like South Korea and Thailand even though they had military governments for part of their modern history. Engagement is hard. The alternative is to cede contested countries to powers that have clear anti-West agendas. I'll take the 50% solution if I think it can get to 100% with continued US involvement.
Republicans can't seem to say anything positive about Administration figures who have this crisis on their radar. Hmmm, the Democrats are doing nothing but tweeting? I guess the Democratic President who directed our national security team to work with the Nigerians doesn't count. I know exactly how capable the US can be and that's why all of the partisan criticism I'm seeing here is handcuffing the GOP.
Partisanship during the Cold War stopped at the water's edge, and our bipartisan foreign policy won that competition with the Soviet Union. Today's conservatives (thanks to some Tea Party nutcases) have so little positive news to offer America that they can't resist harassing our own female political leaders. American conservatives have done a whole lot more than make themselves look like fools. They have missed a golden opportunity to demonstrate American resolve in the face of the violent jihadi movements they claim to hate so much. The conservative loudmouths criticizing the #BringBackOurGirls meme have a profoundly immature understanding of information operations. They have in fact aligned themselves in support of Boko Haram.
Friday, April 18, 2014
The Difference Between Staging And Massing
I am tired of American media reports that describe Russian forces "massing" east of Ukraine. The unclassified aerial photos NATO released from DigitalGlobe show Russian forces staged, not massed. Massing involves fire and maneuver directed at a decisive point. The Russian forces are in a "sitzkrieg" awaiting the outcome of partisan contests inside Ukraine.
The SACEUR says the masked men are playing for keeps. Those masked men are doing their own sort of massing at various decisive points, and the firing they've done so far has been mostly non-lethal. BTW, the "mass" principle of war is clear in US doctrine. Other military traditions have their own principles of warfare. Massing means concentrating forces in action, not sitting around, but the American media approaches military commentary without any nuance.
Partisan action against the Ukrainian government is focused on a few highly visible urban centers. This presents Ukraine with multiple opportunities to show media observers what massing really means if they ever get their act together. A sufficiently bloody recapture of a city hall or police station from the mysterious masked men of "Novorossiya" will give Russia the pretext it seeks to . . . mass its forces against Ukraine's forces.
The SACEUR says the masked men are playing for keeps. Those masked men are doing their own sort of massing at various decisive points, and the firing they've done so far has been mostly non-lethal. BTW, the "mass" principle of war is clear in US doctrine. Other military traditions have their own principles of warfare. Massing means concentrating forces in action, not sitting around, but the American media approaches military commentary without any nuance.
Partisan action against the Ukrainian government is focused on a few highly visible urban centers. This presents Ukraine with multiple opportunities to show media observers what massing really means if they ever get their act together. A sufficiently bloody recapture of a city hall or police station from the mysterious masked men of "Novorossiya" will give Russia the pretext it seeks to . . . mass its forces against Ukraine's forces.
Sunday, April 6, 2014
Russia's Post-Crimea Objectives In Ukraine
Russia's annexation of Crimea is complete and there isn't much the West can do to reverse the result. Moscow obviously did not plan this operation overnight. Airlifting thousands of troops to Crimea and deploying a naval blockade of Ukrainian ships in their ports required planning that must have predated the Sochi Olympics. The international community must understand Russia's strategic rationale for the annexation to anticipate its next moves. Begin with the past to understand the future.
Historical memories of Galicia, Ruthenia, and the Donbas / Donets Basin are very much alive for ethnic Russians. It is difficult for citizens in the individualistic Anglo-West to imagine the hold that ancient stories have on some modern peoples. Modern Russians have not forgotten the Ukrainian 14th Waffen SS Division's actions in WWII. The mere mention of any of these memories is enough to stoke Russian nationalism. Ukrainian memories of the Holodomor are just as vivid, and just as easily fire the imaginations of right-leaning Ukrainian nationalists.
Language matters as much as history. The post-Yanukovych revolutionary government in Kiev repealed a law recognizing the status of the Russian language. This was a major flashpoint for ethnic Russians in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The wide commingled use of both the Ukrainian and Russian languages is not much of a unifying factor in the Ukrainian national identity. Yugoslavia had an extensively commingled ethnicity, yet the Croats and Serbs went to war anyway in the 1990s. Ukraine's assembly from parts of Poland and Austria-Hungary in the 20th century is just as tenuous as Yugoslavia's architecture without support from all of Ukraine's strongest neighbors.
Diplomatic recognition of Ukraine's pre-2014 borders never offered such assurance. The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances assuring Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not a treaty. It is an instrument that allowed Ukraine to surrender its legacy Soviet nuclear weapons and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It does not commit its signatories to go to war if one of them violates the agreement. It merely commits them to consultations. This commitment has the force of international law but has no clear enforcement mechanism. The memorandum thus invites an attempt to breach it; Russia took its chance with Crimea and succeeded.
Angela Stent shared some insights on the US-Russia relationship while publicizing her book The Limits of Partnership at the World Affairs Council in San Francisco this March. I was present in the audience and gleaned two major points the US often overlooks about Russia. First, she said that the Russian narrative of the "Soros conspiracy" had little substantiation during the Orange Revolution. I believe this is a Western perception. The US should not rule out the possibility that Russian intelligence services promulgated the narrative to stir up anti-foreign sentiment in Ukraine. Second, she noted that Russia supported the US response in Afghanistan and expected the US to accommodate its sphere of interest in Europe. President Putin believes the US let Russia down by pushing NATO expansion. The US doesn't recognize that Russia sees its contraction in the 1990s as chaotic and humiliating. NATO promptly forgot its promise to Mikhail Gorbachev not to deploy troops into the former East Germany or admit new alliance members. Mere mention of these humiliations stokes Russian policymakers' nationalism.
The West is left to wonder what else Russia seeks to achieve in Ukraine. East Ukraine's heavy industries have significant economic links to Russia. Natural gas pipelines through Ukraine deliver Russia's gas exports to Europe. Western Europe's dependency on Russian gas is not so dire, as Russia cannot cut off gas to Ukraine without cutting off gas to Europe as well.
Russia's newest territory in Crimea remains vulnerable to Ukrainian attempts to control its gas and fresh water supplies. There is no land link from Crimea to Russia's Kuban region, which interestingly enough has a large population of ethnic Ukrainians. The Yanukovych government in Kiev had agreed with Russia to build the long-planned Kerch Strait Bridge connecting Crimea to Russia. The provisional government in Kiev after the events of early 2014 obviously had little interest in proceeding with this project. Russia must secure a land corridor from its territory to Crimea to ensure that peninsula's viability. Moldova's breakaway Transnistria region has demanded unification with Russia for some time. The Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odessa constitute a land corridor that secures Russian access to both Crimea and Transnistria.
Third Eye OSINT stands behind its judgment that Russia will continue to foment unrest in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ethnic Russian provocations of Ukrainian government overreactions will provide the strategic pretext for Russian military intervention in this land corridor. Memories of the "Galician" SS Divison's actions against Russians are easy to stir among irredentist Russians. These memories translate as calls for the mother country's intervention. History never ended in this part of the world, and its frozen conflicts are thawing out for action.
Historical memories of Galicia, Ruthenia, and the Donbas / Donets Basin are very much alive for ethnic Russians. It is difficult for citizens in the individualistic Anglo-West to imagine the hold that ancient stories have on some modern peoples. Modern Russians have not forgotten the Ukrainian 14th Waffen SS Division's actions in WWII. The mere mention of any of these memories is enough to stoke Russian nationalism. Ukrainian memories of the Holodomor are just as vivid, and just as easily fire the imaginations of right-leaning Ukrainian nationalists.
Language matters as much as history. The post-Yanukovych revolutionary government in Kiev repealed a law recognizing the status of the Russian language. This was a major flashpoint for ethnic Russians in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The wide commingled use of both the Ukrainian and Russian languages is not much of a unifying factor in the Ukrainian national identity. Yugoslavia had an extensively commingled ethnicity, yet the Croats and Serbs went to war anyway in the 1990s. Ukraine's assembly from parts of Poland and Austria-Hungary in the 20th century is just as tenuous as Yugoslavia's architecture without support from all of Ukraine's strongest neighbors.
Diplomatic recognition of Ukraine's pre-2014 borders never offered such assurance. The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances assuring Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not a treaty. It is an instrument that allowed Ukraine to surrender its legacy Soviet nuclear weapons and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It does not commit its signatories to go to war if one of them violates the agreement. It merely commits them to consultations. This commitment has the force of international law but has no clear enforcement mechanism. The memorandum thus invites an attempt to breach it; Russia took its chance with Crimea and succeeded.
Angela Stent shared some insights on the US-Russia relationship while publicizing her book The Limits of Partnership at the World Affairs Council in San Francisco this March. I was present in the audience and gleaned two major points the US often overlooks about Russia. First, she said that the Russian narrative of the "Soros conspiracy" had little substantiation during the Orange Revolution. I believe this is a Western perception. The US should not rule out the possibility that Russian intelligence services promulgated the narrative to stir up anti-foreign sentiment in Ukraine. Second, she noted that Russia supported the US response in Afghanistan and expected the US to accommodate its sphere of interest in Europe. President Putin believes the US let Russia down by pushing NATO expansion. The US doesn't recognize that Russia sees its contraction in the 1990s as chaotic and humiliating. NATO promptly forgot its promise to Mikhail Gorbachev not to deploy troops into the former East Germany or admit new alliance members. Mere mention of these humiliations stokes Russian policymakers' nationalism.
The West is left to wonder what else Russia seeks to achieve in Ukraine. East Ukraine's heavy industries have significant economic links to Russia. Natural gas pipelines through Ukraine deliver Russia's gas exports to Europe. Western Europe's dependency on Russian gas is not so dire, as Russia cannot cut off gas to Ukraine without cutting off gas to Europe as well.
Russia's newest territory in Crimea remains vulnerable to Ukrainian attempts to control its gas and fresh water supplies. There is no land link from Crimea to Russia's Kuban region, which interestingly enough has a large population of ethnic Ukrainians. The Yanukovych government in Kiev had agreed with Russia to build the long-planned Kerch Strait Bridge connecting Crimea to Russia. The provisional government in Kiev after the events of early 2014 obviously had little interest in proceeding with this project. Russia must secure a land corridor from its territory to Crimea to ensure that peninsula's viability. Moldova's breakaway Transnistria region has demanded unification with Russia for some time. The Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odessa constitute a land corridor that secures Russian access to both Crimea and Transnistria.
Third Eye OSINT stands behind its judgment that Russia will continue to foment unrest in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ethnic Russian provocations of Ukrainian government overreactions will provide the strategic pretext for Russian military intervention in this land corridor. Memories of the "Galician" SS Divison's actions against Russians are easy to stir among irredentist Russians. These memories translate as calls for the mother country's intervention. History never ended in this part of the world, and its frozen conflicts are thawing out for action.
Saturday, March 15, 2014
Most Likely Russian Course Of Action In Ukraine
Russia controls Crimea. The rapid deployment of airmobile forces and subversion of Crimean political institutions presented the world with a fait accompli. The pending referendum on Crimea's future presents voters with little choice, because the only ballot alternative to a union with Russia is a return to autonomous status under a Ukrainian constitution that is no longer in force. The world must now consider Russia's further options.
Russia's stated intent to protect "compatriots" who are not Russian citizens establishes a strategic doctrine for intervention in other countries. Russia used its veto power to nullify a UN Security Council resolution that would have upheld Ukraine's established borders against the Crimean referendum. Effective action to counter Russian intervention in Ukraine now lies outside the UN diplomatic machinery.
The Crimean peninsula is heavily dependent upon Ukraine for water and energy. Ukraine claims Russia has already launched an incursion into Strelkova (Strilkove) from the Crimea. The seizure of a "natural gas station" is probably a warning to Ukraine that it should not interfere with the resource links that feed Crimea. There is no evidence from open source reporting that Ukrainian military units were able or willing to repulse this incursion. This lack of resistance will embolden Russian commanders to make further incursions. The decision of one regional commander to send a combined arms task force to secure a location outside his unit's defined area of operations indicates that other Russian commanders possess similar freedom of initiative. Ukraine's options for mitigating Russian freedom of maneuver are limited. Reducing water flow from the North Crimea Canal through the Isthmus of Perekop would hurt all Crimeans and invite a Russian attempt to seize the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant that controls the Kakhovka Reservoir feeding the canal. Third Eye OSINT assesses the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant to be a critically important infrastructure node. Control of this node ensures control of Crimea.
Outside The Beltway helpfully provided three maps of Ukraine's ethno-linguistic breakdown, political leanings, and natural gas pipelines at the beginning of March 2014. Knowing where Russian sympathies are strongest in Ukraine indicates areas where pro-Russian partisans are likely to block Ukraine government actions and incite unrest. The Wikipedia article on roads in Ukraine describes their general lack of serviceability but shares little detail on routes from the Russian border into the eastern Ukrainian interior. The accompanying Wikipedia graphic on Ukraine's International E-roads identifies six routes connecting Russia and Ukraine. Knowing where the E-roads connect to the Russian interior allows understanding of where Russian armored forces may stage prior to tactical maneuvers.
Zerohedge's most recent infographics on Russian force commitments to the Ukraine theater compare what is known in Western media to what Ukrainian observers would like us to know. Zerohedge publishes geopolitical perspectives that are frequently intriguing and sometimes alarming; its perspectives need independent verification. The second infographic on that page is from former Ukrainian military officer Dmitry Tymchuk, who publishes an English-language blog for the Kyiv Post. That blog's header notes that it works closely with Voices of Ukraine, which is associated with the PR apparatus of EuroMaidan. Both graphical depictions generally match yesterday's State Department travel warning for parts of western Russia that are probable staging areas for Russian military units. Photos of Russian armored vehicles moving by rail to locations in Russia's western interior are widely available on the Web in English-language media, although I have not seen many in official Russian-language media.
Capabilities and intent indicate a most likely course of action. Unopposed Russian incursions outside of Crimea indicate the occupying force's ability to seize critical infrastructure at will. Moscow's declared interest in ensuring the safety of Russian language speakers anywhere in Ukraine is an expansive statement of intent. It is therefore very likely that Russia will launch armed incursions into eastern and southern Ukraine. The Carnegie Endowment noted that Russian forces' initiative and tactical maskirovka have succeeded in achieving dominance. Third Eye OSINT notes that this success has come partly due to very restrictive rules of engagement for Russian forces in Crimea that have blockaded Ukrainian forces in their garrisons. Pro-Russian partisans intimidating Crimeans and foreign journalists show no such restraint. It is therefore likely that Russia will continue to employ a combination of cooperative local "volunteer" provocateurs and military units under very restrictive rules of engagement to take control of Russian-leaning parts of eastern and southern Ukraine. Temporary incursions and unrest may be sufficient to exert a level of control over parts of Ukraine that offers Russia more strategic options in engaging the West.
Russia's stated intent to protect "compatriots" who are not Russian citizens establishes a strategic doctrine for intervention in other countries. Russia used its veto power to nullify a UN Security Council resolution that would have upheld Ukraine's established borders against the Crimean referendum. Effective action to counter Russian intervention in Ukraine now lies outside the UN diplomatic machinery.
The Crimean peninsula is heavily dependent upon Ukraine for water and energy. Ukraine claims Russia has already launched an incursion into Strelkova (Strilkove) from the Crimea. The seizure of a "natural gas station" is probably a warning to Ukraine that it should not interfere with the resource links that feed Crimea. There is no evidence from open source reporting that Ukrainian military units were able or willing to repulse this incursion. This lack of resistance will embolden Russian commanders to make further incursions. The decision of one regional commander to send a combined arms task force to secure a location outside his unit's defined area of operations indicates that other Russian commanders possess similar freedom of initiative. Ukraine's options for mitigating Russian freedom of maneuver are limited. Reducing water flow from the North Crimea Canal through the Isthmus of Perekop would hurt all Crimeans and invite a Russian attempt to seize the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant that controls the Kakhovka Reservoir feeding the canal. Third Eye OSINT assesses the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant to be a critically important infrastructure node. Control of this node ensures control of Crimea.
Outside The Beltway helpfully provided three maps of Ukraine's ethno-linguistic breakdown, political leanings, and natural gas pipelines at the beginning of March 2014. Knowing where Russian sympathies are strongest in Ukraine indicates areas where pro-Russian partisans are likely to block Ukraine government actions and incite unrest. The Wikipedia article on roads in Ukraine describes their general lack of serviceability but shares little detail on routes from the Russian border into the eastern Ukrainian interior. The accompanying Wikipedia graphic on Ukraine's International E-roads identifies six routes connecting Russia and Ukraine. Knowing where the E-roads connect to the Russian interior allows understanding of where Russian armored forces may stage prior to tactical maneuvers.
Zerohedge's most recent infographics on Russian force commitments to the Ukraine theater compare what is known in Western media to what Ukrainian observers would like us to know. Zerohedge publishes geopolitical perspectives that are frequently intriguing and sometimes alarming; its perspectives need independent verification. The second infographic on that page is from former Ukrainian military officer Dmitry Tymchuk, who publishes an English-language blog for the Kyiv Post. That blog's header notes that it works closely with Voices of Ukraine, which is associated with the PR apparatus of EuroMaidan. Both graphical depictions generally match yesterday's State Department travel warning for parts of western Russia that are probable staging areas for Russian military units. Photos of Russian armored vehicles moving by rail to locations in Russia's western interior are widely available on the Web in English-language media, although I have not seen many in official Russian-language media.
Capabilities and intent indicate a most likely course of action. Unopposed Russian incursions outside of Crimea indicate the occupying force's ability to seize critical infrastructure at will. Moscow's declared interest in ensuring the safety of Russian language speakers anywhere in Ukraine is an expansive statement of intent. It is therefore very likely that Russia will launch armed incursions into eastern and southern Ukraine. The Carnegie Endowment noted that Russian forces' initiative and tactical maskirovka have succeeded in achieving dominance. Third Eye OSINT notes that this success has come partly due to very restrictive rules of engagement for Russian forces in Crimea that have blockaded Ukrainian forces in their garrisons. Pro-Russian partisans intimidating Crimeans and foreign journalists show no such restraint. It is therefore likely that Russia will continue to employ a combination of cooperative local "volunteer" provocateurs and military units under very restrictive rules of engagement to take control of Russian-leaning parts of eastern and southern Ukraine. Temporary incursions and unrest may be sufficient to exert a level of control over parts of Ukraine that offers Russia more strategic options in engaging the West.
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