The Difference Between Staging And Massing

I am tired of American media reports that describe Russian forces "massing" east of Ukraine. The unclassified aerial photos NATO released from DigitalGlobe show Russian forces staged, not massed. Massing involves fire and maneuver directed at a decisive point.  The Russian forces are in a "sitzkrieg" awaiting the outcome of partisan contests inside Ukraine.

The SACEUR says the masked men are playing for keeps.  Those masked men are doing their own sort of massing at various decisive points, and the firing they've done so far has been mostly non-lethal.  BTW, the "mass" principle of war is clear in US doctrine.  Other military traditions have their own principles of warfare.  Massing means concentrating forces in action, not sitting around, but the American media approaches military commentary without any nuance.

Partisan action against the Ukrainian government is focused on a few highly visible urban centers.  This presents Ukraine with multiple opportunities to show media observers what massing really means if they ever get their act together.  A sufficiently bloody recapture of a city hall or police station from the mysterious masked men of "Novorossiya" will give Russia the pretext it seeks to . . . mass its forces against Ukraine's forces.

The Haiku of OSINT for 04/06/14

Ukraine disorder
Crimea not final prize
Russian land bridge goal

Russia's Post-Crimea Objectives In Ukraine

Russia's annexation of Crimea is complete and there isn't much the West can do to reverse the result.  Moscow obviously did not plan this operation overnight.  Airlifting thousands of troops to Crimea and deploying a naval blockade of Ukrainian ships in their ports required planning that must have predated the Sochi Olympics.  The international community must understand Russia's strategic rationale for the annexation to anticipate its next moves.  Begin with the past to understand the future.

Historical memories of Galicia, Ruthenia, and the Donbas / Donets Basin are very much alive for ethnic Russians.   It is difficult for citizens in the individualistic Anglo-West to imagine the hold that ancient stories have on some modern peoples.  Modern Russians have not forgotten the Ukrainian 14th Waffen SS Division's actions in WWII.  The mere mention of any of these memories is enough to stoke Russian nationalism.  Ukrainian memories of the Holodomor are just as vivid, and just as easily fire the imaginations of right-leaning Ukrainian nationalists.

Language matters as much as history.  The post-Yanukovych revolutionary government in Kiev repealed a law recognizing the status of the Russian language.  This was a major flashpoint for ethnic Russians in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.  The wide commingled use of both the Ukrainian and Russian languages is not much of a unifying factor in the Ukrainian national identity.  Yugoslavia had an extensively commingled ethnicity, yet the Croats and Serbs went to war anyway in the 1990s.  Ukraine's assembly from parts of Poland and Austria-Hungary in the 20th century is just as tenuous as Yugoslavia's architecture without support from all of Ukraine's strongest neighbors.

Diplomatic recognition of Ukraine's pre-2014 borders never offered such assurance.  The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances assuring Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not a treaty.  It is an instrument that allowed Ukraine to surrender its legacy Soviet nuclear weapons and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It does not commit its signatories to go to war if one of them violates the agreement.  It merely commits them to consultations.  This commitment has the force of international law but has no clear enforcement mechanism.  The memorandum thus invites an attempt to breach it; Russia took its chance with Crimea and succeeded.

Angela Stent shared some insights on the US-Russia relationship while publicizing her book The Limits of Partnership at the World Affairs Council in San Francisco this March.  I was present in the audience and gleaned two major points the US often overlooks about Russia.  First, she said that the Russian narrative of the "Soros conspiracy" had little substantiation during the Orange Revolution.  I believe this is a Western perception.  The US should not rule out the possibility that Russian intelligence services promulgated the narrative to stir up anti-foreign sentiment in Ukraine.  Second, she noted that Russia supported the US response in Afghanistan and expected the US to accommodate its sphere of interest in Europe.  President Putin believes the US let Russia down by pushing NATO expansion.  The US doesn't recognize that Russia sees its contraction in the 1990s as chaotic and humiliating.  NATO promptly forgot its promise to Mikhail Gorbachev not to deploy troops into the former East Germany or admit new alliance members.  Mere mention of these humiliations stokes Russian policymakers' nationalism.

The West is left to wonder what else Russia seeks to achieve in Ukraine.  East Ukraine's heavy industries  have significant economic links to Russia.  Natural gas pipelines through Ukraine deliver Russia's gas exports to Europe.  Western Europe's dependency on Russian gas is not so dire, as Russia cannot cut off gas to Ukraine without cutting off gas to Europe as well.

Russia's newest territory in Crimea remains vulnerable to Ukrainian attempts to control its gas and fresh water supplies.  There is no land link from Crimea to Russia's Kuban region, which interestingly enough has a large population of ethnic Ukrainians.  The Yanukovych government in Kiev had agreed with Russia to build the long-planned Kerch Strait Bridge connecting Crimea to Russia.  The provisional government in Kiev after the events of early 2014 obviously had little interest in proceeding with this project.  Russia must secure a land corridor from its territory to Crimea to ensure that peninsula's viability.  Moldova's breakaway Transnistria region has demanded unification with Russia for some time.  The Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odessa constitute a land corridor that secures Russian access to both Crimea and Transnistria.

Third Eye OSINT stands behind its judgment that Russia will continue to foment unrest in eastern and southern Ukraine.  Ethnic Russian provocations of Ukrainian government overreactions will provide the strategic pretext for Russian military intervention in this land corridor.  Memories of the "Galician" SS Divison's actions against Russians are easy to stir among irredentist Russians.  These memories translate as calls for the mother country's intervention.  History never ended in this part of the world, and its frozen conflicts are thawing out for action.

The Haiku of OSINT for 03/15/14

Rapid incursion
Maneuver to advantage
Seizing key terrain

Most Likely Russian Course Of Action In Ukraine

Russia controls Crimea.  The rapid deployment of airmobile forces and subversion of Crimean political institutions presented the world with a fait accompli.  The pending referendum on Crimea's future presents voters with little choice, because the only ballot alternative to a union with Russia is a return to autonomous status under a Ukrainian constitution that is no longer in force.  The world must now consider Russia's further options.

Russia's stated intent to protect "compatriots" who are not Russian citizens establishes a strategic doctrine for intervention in other countries.  Russia used its veto power to nullify a UN Security Council resolution that would have upheld Ukraine's established borders against the Crimean referendum.  Effective action to counter Russian intervention in Ukraine now lies outside the UN diplomatic machinery.

The Crimean peninsula is heavily dependent upon Ukraine for water and energy.  Ukraine claims Russia has already launched an incursion into Strelkova (Strilkove) from the Crimea.  The seizure of a "natural gas station" is probably a warning to Ukraine that it should not interfere with the resource links that feed Crimea.  There is no evidence from open source reporting that Ukrainian military units were able or willing to repulse this incursion.  This lack of resistance will embolden Russian commanders to make further incursions.  The decision of one regional commander to send a combined arms task force to secure a location outside his unit's defined area of operations indicates that other Russian commanders possess similar freedom of initiative.  Ukraine's options for mitigating Russian freedom of maneuver are limited.  Reducing water flow from the North Crimea Canal through the Isthmus of Perekop would hurt all Crimeans and invite a Russian attempt to seize the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant that controls the Kakhovka Reservoir feeding the canal.  Third Eye OSINT assesses the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant to be a critically important infrastructure node.  Control of this node ensures control of Crimea.

Outside The Beltway helpfully provided three maps of Ukraine's ethno-linguistic breakdown, political leanings, and natural gas pipelines at the beginning of March 2014.  Knowing where Russian sympathies are strongest in Ukraine indicates areas where pro-Russian partisans are likely to block Ukraine government actions and incite unrest.  The Wikipedia article on roads in Ukraine describes their general lack of serviceability but shares little detail on routes from the Russian border into the eastern Ukrainian interior.  The accompanying Wikipedia graphic on Ukraine's International E-roads identifies six routes connecting Russia and Ukraine.  Knowing where the E-roads connect to the Russian interior allows understanding of where Russian armored forces may stage prior to tactical maneuvers.

Zerohedge's most recent infographics on Russian force commitments to the Ukraine theater compare what is known in Western media to what Ukrainian observers would like us to know.  Zerohedge publishes geopolitical perspectives that are frequently intriguing and sometimes alarming; its perspectives need independent verification.  The second infographic on that page is from former Ukrainian military officer Dmitry Tymchuk, who publishes an English-language blog for the Kyiv Post.  That blog's header notes that it works closely with Voices of Ukraine, which is associated with the PR apparatus of EuroMaidan.  Both graphical depictions generally match yesterday's State Department travel warning for parts of western Russia that are probable staging areas for Russian military units.  Photos of Russian armored vehicles moving by rail to locations in Russia's western interior are widely available on the Web in English-language media, although I have not seen many in official Russian-language media.

Capabilities and intent indicate a most likely course of action.  Unopposed Russian incursions outside of Crimea indicate the occupying force's ability to seize critical infrastructure at will.  Moscow's declared interest in ensuring the safety of Russian language speakers anywhere in Ukraine is an expansive statement of intent.  It is therefore very likely that Russia will launch armed incursions into eastern and southern Ukraine.  The Carnegie Endowment noted that Russian forces' initiative and tactical maskirovka have succeeded in achieving dominance.  Third Eye OSINT notes that this success has come partly due to very restrictive rules of engagement for Russian forces in Crimea that have blockaded Ukrainian forces in their garrisons.  Pro-Russian partisans intimidating Crimeans and foreign journalists show no such restraint.  It is therefore likely that Russia will continue to employ a combination of cooperative local "volunteer" provocateurs and military units under very restrictive rules of engagement to take control of Russian-leaning parts of eastern and southern Ukraine.  Temporary incursions and unrest may be sufficient to exert a level of control over parts of Ukraine that offers Russia more strategic options in engaging the West.  

Africa Brightens Its Day

Africa still wrestles with its colonial legacies.  Pierre Englebert's State Legitimacy and Development in Africa discusses illegitimate states whose modern functions are not contiguous with their pre-colonial functions, partly due to artificially drawn borders.  Their seemingly interminable corruption and inefficiency stem from the difficulty of managing these borders.  These states expend enormous resources supporting themselves instead of funding vital public goods.  State corruption precludes African entrepreneurs from counting on a fair shake from their own leaders.  This provides a window into what is going right in Africa.

Africa has room to grow.  The World Bank's data for Sub-Saharan Africa shows that it lags behind the MENA region in GNI per capita and life expectancy.  MENA's oil-producing countries have their own problems with artificial borders and corruption yet they outperform their southern neighbors.  The oil wealth of the MENA region is not the only explanation for its advantage over the rest of Africa.  A large number of the World Bank's heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) are in Sub-Saharan Africa.  None of the developing MENA countries appear in the HIPC group.  The explanation for the development differential between MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa isn't as simplistic as the presence of oil in the north and the burden of debt in the south.  Knowing that this disparity exists provides a context for national developmental goals; resource-rich African countries can export their way to success rather easily, while debt-burdened countries cannot.  This developmental gap needs further analysis.

Africa has the multilateral institutions it needs.  The African Union and African Development Bank speak for the continent.  Whether they speak for corrupt autocrats or ordinary Africans is up for debate.  State illegitimacy casts doubt on the ability of officials to push true development agendas without lining their own pockets.  Bottom-up agendas can build credibility in areas that top-down agendas can't reach.  Bankers Without Borders' Sub-Saharan program has completed multiple microeconomic assessments that allow investors to bypass dysfunctional state programs.  This philosophy supports the Center for Financial Inclusion's FI2020 goal of maximizing the participation of developing country citizens in the world's financial markets.  Even the UN Research Institute for Social Development recognizes the importance of non-state mechanisms for socioeconomic development.

Africa has the culture and infrastructure for innovation.  Nigeria's "Nollywood" produces more movies than the US.  The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is like a hybrid of the US's own intergovernmental bodies devoted to innovation.  The Africa Finance Corporation channels investors into infrastructure projects, although its initial capital and membership are limited.  A Google search of that organization with the word "corruption" reveals some troubling early stories of mismanagement.

The World Bank's data on value-added manufacturing reveals that Africa's efforts at developing a hi-tech economy have not yet borne fruit.  The Excel data download comes in handy for regional comparisons.  Both the MENA and Sub-Saharan regions trail the US and world averages for the portion of the economy devoted to value-added manufacturing.  Interestingly, both regions do track fairly closely to the numbers for the HIPC group.  If manufacturing doesn't differentiate MENA from Sub-Saharan Africa, then resource extraction is probably the key difference between those regions.

Development usually follows a clear pattern in the life of most nations, and it is hard to skip from agriculture and extractive sectors directly to high-tech innovation.  The US and Germany were large agricultural producers whose exports produced excess capital available for investment in manufacturing.  Many African nations have abundant natural resources.  They need leaders with the foresight to convert resource exports into capital surpluses for their domestic tech sectors.  The UN's Global Pulse reports on Big Data in development can show African leaders how to leverage their countries' unique gifts.

There is more to Africa than its outdated Western references can describe, just as Dayo Olopade's book The Bright Continent is more than a play on words for Africa's colonial nickname.  Her "kanju" self-starters take a System D approach to innovation.  The M-Pesa mobile payment system is the classic result of this mentality and even MIT Sloan recognizes its value.   Africans don't need to thank the West for its aid.  They should instead thank themselves for remaining open to the possibilities that development brings.  

China's Resource Pursuit Is Inseparable From Its Security Pursuit

Two distinguished geopolitical scholars presented their analysis of "China's Rise and the Global Resource Game" at the World Affairs Council of Northern California tonight.  I have not yet read their companion book By All Means Necessary but now it's on my list.  I have read the China National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) mission statements.  Read them yourselves to see the Politburo's strategic intent.  China's leadership absolutely believes the quest for resources bolsters its security, and that it must pursue a stronger security posture to obtain the commodities it needs.  The two are so intertwined that any outside attempt to interfere with one pursuit will imperil the other.  This is the fundamental fact that the West and China's Asian neighbors must understand when dealing with China.

I am inclined to agree with the authors that China's state-sponsored strategy of resource acquisition is tailored to microeconomic circumstances.  Coal is a terrific example.  China has almost as much coal as the United States but most of it is not nearly as high in quality.  That is why China still seeks to expand its coal capacity . . . by all means necessary.  One factor driving China's coal quest is a resurgence of resource nationalism in Mongolia, where some major Chinese coal producers had lost major investments when Mongolia recently decided to restrict foreign ownership of its resource projects.  I wonder if a PRC representative will address this at the next China Coal and Mining Expo.

China's energy quest does not stop with coal, and China analysts could do more to explain the country's challenges developing hydropower, natural gas, and solar technology.  China is determined to dam the Mekong and other major rivers, with little regard for the water needs of its downstream neighbors.  Refer to my previous Third Eye OSINT analysis of water security, and note my discovery that China does not participate in transboundary water management (TWM) mechanisms.  I will restate my belief that the US can play the role of honest broker in Asia.  It may have already begun to play this role.  Witness this agreement between China's NDRC and the US EPA.  The US is trying to align China with international norms mitigating climate change.  The next logical step is to help China build the capacity for settling disputes peacefully with its neighbors in ways that do not disrupt Asia's water-energy-food security nexus.

I sometimes chuckle to myself when analysts outside the mining sector try to describe China's rare earth element (REE) mining policies.  I gave an interview to the Gold Report in December 2011 on rare earth metals, and I predicted that China's ability to produce REEs would have more to do with global demand than with its export quotas.  The markets proved me to be correct in 2012.  The world prices of rare earth metals plummeted that year and have remained low.  Investors who went all-in on REE stocks at the top of that bubble have been hurting ever since.  China keeps its export quotas just high enough to exceed expected global demand, while it uses environmental laws as a stalking horse to consolidate domestic production and shut down underperforming mines.

I blogged about my experience on the TREM12 panel in March 2012, where I further elaborated on my REE market analysis in front of Washington DC policymakers and mining industry big shots.  I will continue to toot my own horn on this subject because the halls of power can benefit from my genius.  I'll boil down China's basic REE strategy in a nutshell.  The fact that China mines over 95% of the world's REE product is less important than the fact that it owns 100% of the world's oxide and concentrate refining capacity.  Even REE ore mined outside China must still be shipped to China for the final metallurgy that turns it into specialty alloys for industrial use.  Digging new REE mines in Canada and elsewhere gives the West little strategic leverage without a multi-year investment in the processing capacity and engineering knowledge that breaks China's real monopoly.  Full disclosure:  I have a small equity investment in a privately held company that is attempting to break this monopoly by establishing a world-class REE processing facility in North America.  I put my money where my mouth is because I am all about solutions.

I find the two authors' approach to "state capacity" intriguing.  The Wilson Center has a program for building state capacity that could have been a usable framework for the US military's advise and assist missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The NBER thinks state capacity germinates in common interest public goods.  Another NBER study traces the relationship between state capacity, taxation, and conflict.  Nation-building is a big topic for another article, but there are simple metrics for assessing state capacity.  The two authors' example of China's desire to import timber from Russia left me wondering which state they consider to be stronger.  It may be a question of which state is less dysfunctional, or which is less captive to an oligarchical elite.  Consider some comparative metrics for these two countries.

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranks China 80th and Russia 127th.
The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom ranks China 137th and Russia 140th.
The World Bank Logistics Performance Index ranks China 26th and Russia 95th.
Standard and Poor's rates sovereign credit as AA- for China and as BBB to BBB+ for Russia.
Freedom House's Freedom In The World Index rates China as 6.5 and Russia as 5.5 (on a scale where 1 is best and 7 is worst).

It looks to me like the People's Republic of China is a stronger state than the Russian Federation almost across the board.  Russia is slightly higher on Freedom House's scale but both countries are pretty much in the basement on that metric.  Adding more metrics can provide a fuller illustration.

I like hearing from the World Affairs Council's guests, especially when they come all the way out to San Francisco from the Council on Foreign Relations.  Now it's their turn to hear from me.  I would be overjoyed to add my own perspectives to the CFR's deliberations if someone would be generous enough to sponsor me for membership.  The CFR needs market expertise that bolsters its geopolitical bench strength.  Come and get it from Yours Truly, Anthony J. Alfidi, aka "Greatest Man Who Ever Lived."